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Abstract
At the same time as uncertainty and vulnerability exist in today’s society, requirements 
for public policies and actions are increasing. This study argues that performance 
management in governmental agencies and institutions is ambiguous. Shifting goals, 
incomplete information, time pressure, uncertainty, and volatile conditions are present 
in public decision maker’s agenda. Uncertainty is an overwhelming feature in public 
management, especially in the rescue services, and in fire safety policy. It is uncertain 
where and when fires will occur; however, the unfortunate certainty is that they will, 
and decisions have to be made and actions taken. Concurrently, expectations improving 
performance in the public sector and in public actions are relatively high. 
The government is held responsible in terms of preventing accidents and disasters, and 
is accountable when taking action and saving lives during emergency situations. However, 
one-third of all deaths caused by fire in Finland were brought about by human error. 
Smoking is one of the most common causes of fires leading to human casualties. In most 
cases, the victims are under the influence of alcohol and are therefore helpless victims 
of fires. Carelessness and lack of caution have been identified as important contributory 
factors. In addition, it is widely supposed that fire deaths are a problem relating to social 
exclusion. For reasons of such an etiology, even the generally good proven performance of 
fire departments and fire brigades is not enough to ensure a reduction in the number of 
fire deaths and an improvement in performance.
Gaining an improved performance and increased effectiveness has been a dominant 
feature in public administrations and public management in recent years. The public 
management model is based on performance management that aims at measurable results 
and outcomes in terms of public actions. The performance management model is studied 
as a cycle, where the identification of policy problems should be, and can be perfectly 
rational; policy targets are rationally set and policy actions are properly chosen. Given the 
same model, evaluations of the rationality of policy actions commonly entail accounting 
and outright measurement. 
At the heart of the performance management model lies the “rational actor model.” In 
a rational world, a rational actor would make “optimal” choices in a highly specified and 
clearly defined environment. However, public decision making purports to be rational, 
but is constrained by limited cognitive capabilities and incomplete information that limits 
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rational behavior. Research problems are both – in general and in the particular application 
of fire safety policy – regarded in the light of what is known as bounded rationality.
The theory of bounded rationality has been elaborated on 1957, when Herbert A. Simon 
and James G. March developed it. The theory has been applied in different disciplines, for 
example, in economics. James G. March together with Johan P. Olsen in 1976 developed 
the theory even further in the context of organizational research and created the garbage 
can model, involving a complete cycle of choice and the theoretical concept of ambiguity. 
These theoretical tools are used in this study to scrutinize performance management in 
terms of fire safety policy.
Performance management is ambiguous and ambiguity affects the coherence of the 
performance management cycle. How different but intercrossing policies “go together” 
and mutually support each other is studied through the concept of coherence. Ambiguity 
illustrates the complexity in organizational decision making, and coherence describes 
the relationship in organizational decision making between different phases in the 
performance management cycle, and between different policies.
The fire safety policy and deaths caused by fire in Finland have been chosen as the 
empirical research subject due to the ambiguous character of this specific policy problem. 
Target setting in safety policies is ultimately ambiguous. Safety is, at the same time, an 
overall state of effectiveness and also a target for effectiveness. Safety is usually confronted 
by operative performance targets. The Government of Finland has set an objective that 
Finland will be the safest country in Europe in 2015 and fire deaths is one of the measures 
targeted for improving internal safety. By the end of 2015, the number of fire deaths should 
be reduced to 50. This objective is 37 deaths less than the average from the 1952–2010 
yearly count, and, therefore, can be considered as ambitious. However, the optimal result 
would be zero, where no one would die in a fire, and without ambitious objectives, the 
relevant operations to curb deaths will not necessarily develop. Statistical variation, but 
also changes in society affect the number of fire deaths.
No matter how carefully fire safety policy problems are identified, policy targets are 
set, policy actions are chosen, and policy measures are evaluated; rescue measures alone 
do not reduce the number of fire deaths. It is becoming increasingly common to state 
that many of the actions with respect to the threat from fire deaths should be preventive 
in nature, and that the implementation, and performance of these measures also require 
individual choice and responsibility, coherence, and co-operation between several policies, 
their planners, and the various implementing agencies involved.
Keywords: Decision making, ambiguity, performance management, fire deaths.
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Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksen mukaan valtionhallinnon tulosjohtaminen on monitulkintaista. Muuttuvat 
tavoitteet, epätäydellinen informaatio, aikapaineet, epävarmuus ja vaihtuvat olosuhteet 
ovat julkisjohtajan arkipäivää. Päätöksiä täytyy kuitenkin tehdä ja kantaa niistä vastuu. 
Julkisjohtajalta odotetaan aikaan saatuja tuloksia ja vaikutuksia. Miten tuloksia sitten 
saavutetaan ja kenen tuloksellisuudesta lopulta onkaan kysymys? Hätätilanteissa ja 
onnettomuuksissa valtionjohto on vastuussa toimenpiteistä, ihmishenkien pelastamisesta 
ja onnettomuuksien ehkäisemisestä. Kuitenkin samaan aikaan kolmannes tulipaloista, 
joissa ihmishenkiä menetettiin, aiheutui inhimillisestä virheestä.
Tutkimuksessa on tarkasteltu palokuolemia vuosina 2007–2010, jolloin palokuole-
mia tapahtui 379. Tupakointi oli palokuolematapauksissa tulipalojen yleisin syttymissyy. 
Useimmista tapauksista uhrit olivat myös alkoholin vaikutuksen alaisena ja heidän toi-
mintakykynsä oli alentunut. Varomattomuus ja huolimattomuus olivat tulipalojen syt-
tymisen kannalta vaikuttavia tekijöitä. Palokuolemiin liittyy myös syrjäytymiskehitystä. 
Näiden tekijöiden vuoksi pelastustoimella on vain rajalliset mahdollisuuden vaikuttaa 
palokuolemien vähenemiseen ja sitä kautta saavuttaa tuloksellisuutta ja vaikuttavuutta. 
Tuloksellisuudesta ja vaikuttavuudesta on kuitenkin tullut eräs keskeisimmistä suo-
malaisen julkishallinnon toiminnan päämääristä. Tähän on vaikuttanut jo 80-luvun lo-
pulta syntynyt uusi julkisjohtaminen (New Public Management), jonka tarkoituksena oli 
aikaansaada käytetyillä verovaroilla konkreettisia ja vastikkeensa arvoisia tuloksia (value 
for money).
Uutta julkisjohtamista on toimeenpantu tulosjohtamisen ja tulosohjauksen keinoin 
suomalaisessa keskushallinnossa. Tulosjohtamisen myötä hallinnon toiminnalle on ase-
tettu tulossopimuksin sovitut tulostavoitteet, joiden toteutumista mitataan, seurataan ja 
arvioidaan. Tulostavoitteita on asetettu niin organisaatioille, yksiköille kuin yksittäisille 
virkamiehille. Pyrkimyksenä on ollut saavuttaa ja tuoda esille tuloksia aina yksittäisistä 
toimijoista, organisaation tasoisiin tuloksiin ja lopulta laajempiin toimintapolitiikkata-
soisiin vaikutuksiin (Bouckaert & Peters, 2000; Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008).
Pyrkimyksistä huolimatta tuloksellisuuden ja yhteiskunnallisen vaikuttavuuden 
osoittaminen on kuitenkin osoittautunut vaikeaksi ja tulosjohtamisjärjestelmään on si-
sältynyt epätäydellisyyksiä, jotka ovat vaikuttaneet sen soveltamiseen ja aiheuttaneet tyy-
tymättömyyttä etenkin virkamieskunnassa.
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Päätöksenteon näkökulmasta tähän sisältyy monitulkintaisuutta (ambiguity). Ei ole 
lainkaan selvää, miten tulokset ja vaikutukset on saatu aikaan. Yhteiskunnallisia on-
gelmia, joihin pyritään vaikuttamaan politiikkatoimenpiteillä – politiikkaongelmia – ei 
välttämättä tunneta. Politiikkaongelmat ovat monitulkintaisia ja sotkuisia ja niitä on lä-
hes mahdoton ratkaista (Ney, 2009). Täydellinen optimointi politiikkaongelmien ratkai-
suissa ja päätöksenteossa ei ole mahdollista. Rajoitetun rationaalisuuden mukaan, jota so-
vellan tutkimuksessa, päätöksenteko on etsintäprosessi, jonka kautta etsitään tyydyttävää 
päätösvaihtoehtoa. Etsintäprosessi jatkuu, kunnes tyydyttävä vaihtoehto löytyy. (Simon, 
1957; March & Olsen, 1979; Selten, 2002.)
Tulostavoitteiden asettaminen vaatisi kykyä tuntea tulevaisuutta ja seurauksia, joita 
tavoitteiden asettamisella olisi tulevaisuudessa. Tulosjohtamisjärjestelmän osat (politiik-
kaongelmien määrittely, politiikkatoimien valinta, tavoitteiden asettaminen ja tulosten 
arviointi) muistuttavat täydellisen rationaalisuuden mallia, mutta toteutuakseen täydel-
linen rationaalisuus vaatisi rajattoman kapasiteetin ratkaista politiikkaongelmia, valita 
sopivia toimenpiteitä ja arvioida aikaansaatuja tuloksia. (Autero, 2009, 111.)
Tarkastelen näitä epätäydellisyyksiä tässä tutkimuksessa hyödyntämällä monitul-
kintaisuuden käsitettä ja rajoitetun rationaalisuuden viitekehystä, joita ovat kehittäneet 
Stanfordin yliopiston professori James G. March, joka oli Herbert A. Simonin tohtoriop-
pilas 1950-luvulla Garnegie Institute of Technology -yliopistossa (nyk. Garnergie Mellon 
-yliopisto) (Vakkuri, 2009, 21). Päätöksenteossa pyritään rationaalisuuteen, mutta sitä ra-
joittavat kognitiiviset rajoitteet sekä epätäydellinen informaatio (March & Simon, 1959; 
March, 1988). 
Pelastustoimen osalta yksi keskeinen tulosjohtamisjärjestelmään sisältyvä epätäy-
dellisyys on se, että sisäasiainministeriön pelastusosasto johtaa ja valvoo pelastustoin-
ta. Alueelliset pelastuslaitokset kuitenkin hoitavat varsinaiset pelastustoimen tehtävät 
alueillaan ja kunnat rahoittavat pelastuslaitosten toiminnan. Siten pelastusosastolla on 
rajalliset mahdollisuudet vaikuttaa pelastustoimen tuloksellisuuteen ja vaikuttavuuteen, 
koska varsinainen pelastustyö ja sen resursointi tapahtuu muualla. Pelastustoimi onkin 
todennut, ettei se voi toteuttaa tulosjohtamisjärjestelmää hallinnonalallaan, koska sen 
soveltaminen on osoittautunut hankalaksi. Sisäasiainministeriön pelastusosasto solmii 
kuitenkin tulossopimukset alaisensa hallinnon kanssa ja toteuttaa siten tulosjohtamisjär-
jestelmän mukaisia menettelyjä. 
Suomalainen tulosohjausjärjestelmä, hallitusohjelma ja hallituksen politiikkaohjel-
mat muistuttavat kaikki täydellisen rationaalisuuden mallia, jossa pyritään tunnistamaan 
politiikkaongelmat, valitsemaan politiikkatoimenpiteet, asettamaan tulostavoitteet ja ar-
vioimaan tulosten aikaansaannoksia.
Täydellinen rationaalisuus vaatisi toteutuakseen kuitenkin rajattoman kapasiteetin 
ratkaista politiikkaongelmia ja valita sopivia politiikkatoimenpiteitä sekä arvioida ai-
kaansaatuja tuloksia. Päätöksentekijä kohtaa kuitenkin rajoitteita päätöksenteon toimin-
taympäristössään. Politiikkaongelmia ei välttämättä tunnisteta, politiikkatoimenpiteiden 
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keskinäisvaikutuksia ei tiedetä, politiikkatavoitteita ei osata asettaa optimaalisesti, eikä 
tulosten arviointikaan ole täydellisen rationaalista tulosten ja vaikutusten tarkastelua. 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan mitä rajoitteita päätöksentekijä toimintaympäristössään 
kohtaa ja miten päätöksentekijä tässä ympäristössä päätyy tekemiinsä päätöksiin. Näitä 
kysymyksiä tarkastellaan tutkimuksen teoreettisen viitekehyksen ja palokuolematapaus-
ten avulla.  
Tuloksellisuuskoherenssilla tarkoitan yhteensopivuutta tulosjohtamissyklissä politiik-
kaongelmien ja niiden tunnistamisen, tavoitteiden asettamisen, politiikkatoimenpiteiden 
ja niiden toimeenpanon sekä tulosten arvioinnin kesken. Muodostan tuloksellisuusko-
herenssia koskevan käsitteellisen viitekehyksen, joka on tutkimuksen ”ideaalityyppi” 
päätöksenteon mallista ja kutsun tätä tulosjohtamissykliksi (performance management 
cycle). 
Tämän työvälineen tai viitekehyksen avulla voidaan tarkastella sekä konstruktion 
kohteena olevaa ilmiötä, että ilmiöitä, jotka poikkeavat siitä. Niinpä vaikka tulosjohta-
missyklin mukaan inhimillisessä päätöksenteossa on kysymys pyrkimyksestä rationaa-
liseen käyttäytymiseen, syklin avulla voidaan tutkia myös poikkeamia tuollaisesta ratio-
naalisuudesta.
Syklin avulla ja samalla tukeutuen myös rajoitetun rationaalisuuden laajempaan teo-
riaviitekehykseen tutkin erityisesti ilmiöitä, joissa koherenssi ja rationaalisuusolettamuk-
set eivät pidäkään täysin paikkaansa. Tätä luonnehtii ambiguity eli monitulkintaisuus. 
Rationaalisuuden ja nimenomaan rajoittamattoman rationaalisuuden rinnalla tutkin 
myös ilmiötä, jossa rationaalisuus on määrätyin tavoin ”bounded” eli rajoitettu. 
Tutkimani paloturvallisuuspolitiikka ja siitä erittelemäni palokuolemien torjuntaan 
liittyvä pulmallisuus soveltuu hyvin tuloksellisuuskoherenssin ja samalla yleisemmin 
rajoittamattoman rationaalisuuden ongelmien tieteelliseen tarkasteluun. Lähtökohtaha-
vaintojen mukaan palokuolemaluvut ovat hiljalleen kääntyneet laskuun ja palokuolemien 
vähentämiseen on kiinnitetty paljon huomiota osana valtakunnallista paloturvallisuus-
politiikkaa. Valtioneuvosto asetti 29.8.2007 hankkeen valmistelemaan sisäisen turvalli-
suuden ohjelmaa. Asettaminen perustui pääministeri Matti Vanhasen toisen hallituksen 
ohjelmaan 15.4.2007, jonka mukaisesti hallitus määrittää sisäisen turvallisuuden tavoit-
teet ja toimenpiteet poikkihallinnollisesti sisäisen turvallisuuden ohjelmassa. Valtio-
neuvosto teki periaatepäätöksen sisäisen turvallisuuden ohjelmaksi 8.5.2008. Ohjelma 
ulottuu vuoteen 2015. Järjestyksessään jo kolmas sisäisen turvallisuuden ohjelma hyväk-
syttiin valtioneuvostossa 14.6.2012.
Ohjelman tavoitteena on, että Suomi on Euroopan turvallisiin maa vuonna 2015. 
Ohjelmaan sisältyy toimenpiteitä turvallisuuden ylläpitämiseksi ja parantamiseksi. Oh-
jelmalle on asetettu tavoitteet ja toimenpiteet koskien turvallisuuden kannalta keskeisiä 
alueita. Ohjelman yhtenä tavoitteena kodin, vapaa-ajan ja liikkumisen turvallisuuden 
parantamiseksi on laskea palokuolemien vuotuinen määrä 50:een vuoteen 2015 mennes-
sä. Kuitenkin esimerkiksi vuonna 2007 tulipaloissa kuoli 85 henkilöä, vuonna 2008 107 
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henkilöä, vuonna 2009 107 henkilöä ja vuonna 2010 80 henkilöä. Päihtyneiden osuus oli 
63 % kaikista tulipaloissa kuolleista. Alentunut toimintakyky on keskeinen taustatekijä 
tulipalojen syttymisessä ja erityisesti henkilövahingoissa. Tupakointi oli yleisin kuolin-
palon syttymissyy, ensimmäisenä syttyivät useimmiten huonekalut. Uhreista 73 % oli 
miehiä. Miehistä suurin palokuoleman riski oli keski-ikäisillä ja naisista ikääntyneillä. 
Palokuolemien tapauksessa on kyse laajemmasta syrjäytymiskehitykseen liittyvästä 
yhteiskunnallisesta ongelmasta, johon vaikuttavat muutokset useilla politiikkasektoreil-
la. Palokuolemaongelman vähentämiseen vaikuttavat heijastusvaikutukset muilla poli-
tiikkasektoreilla kuten esimerkiksi alkoholi- ja sosiaalipolitiikassa. Pelastustoimen lisäksi 
eri politiikkatoimijoiden yhteistyö ja panostukset ovat keskeisessä roolissa ongelman vä-
henemisessä tulevaisuudessa. 
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1 Introduction
“What we have believed immovable and permanent has shifted, and 
that a climate of vulnerability and fragility is what best characterizes 
the past decade.” – Sandra S. Phillips, SFMOMA, 2011.
This extract, taken from Sandra S. Phillips, senior curator of photography, who presented 
her exhibition “Fragility” at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Arts, describes the 
vulnerability and fragility in society today. Conditions under which we live are precarious 
and obscure, and what we have believed to be immovable will change. Beliefs and 
certainties in our world have changed and we are united by uncertainties.
Uncertainties entail natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, or tsunamis, or 
human-made crises such as financial crises, terrorist attacks, or even fires, and traffic 
accidents. The terrorist attack of 9-11 has kept disasters and catastrophes in the public 
awareness for the last decade. It is certain that these emergencies will occur and that they 
will be accompanied by negative consequences. What is uncertain is exactly where and 
when these emergencies will take place. 
Governments are held accountable for their response to disasters, emergencies, and 
accidents. Governments are responsible for taking actions through public decision making 
and by public policies. However, disasters are unforeseen, and there are numerous other 
attributes that make public decision making less efficient than it theoretically should be. 
The governmental system and the decision making models are incoherent and much 
messier than these unforeseen events would require in order for them to be rapidly and 
efficiently solved, and responded to. However, governments are expected to take action. 
Fire deaths are a case composed of mistaken human behavior connected to precarious 
but chosen individual conditions. A typical case of a fire death would be a middle-aged 
man or an elderly woman from the province dying in a fire under the influence of alcohol 
while smoking in bed and falling asleep. Typically, no fire alarm was on, and passers-by, 
or neighbors call out the fire brigade when it is too late. Even the generally good proven 
fire brigades are not necessarily able to save lives of these people in these tragic cases. This 
case connects several spontaneous events or transactions, and creates an intriguing case 
to study in more detail in the context of the political-administrative, decision making 
environment.
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Performance management and decision making in the context of political-
administrative environment and especially in the context of emergencies are in the focus 
of this research. Management in the Finnish central government administration has been 
directed towards management through performance targets for the last decade (Autero, 
2009, 111; Meklin, 2009, 36; Vakkuri, 2009, 16). 
Studying performance management and fire safety policy in the emergency context 
combines studying performance management and emergencies where change and 
uncertainties prevail, but where targets are supposed to be set. Performance management 
and the context of emergencies is an interesting research area because of the unexpectedness 
and unpredictability involved. How should agencies prepare and plan for action, set 
targets, and improve results when the events are not known? This is contradictory to 
performance management which is based on targets set beforehand (Autero, 2009, 117). 
Against which context can the targets be set if the events are not known beforehand? It 
is only known that in some unfortunate circumstances people die in fires. However, is it 
a relevant measure to set targets for the actions of the government, the Ministry of the 
Interior, the rescue services, or any of the publicly funded organizations? 
Section 1.1 represents the phenomenon of public performance around the doctrine 
of new public management (NPM) in more detail. This section is not a prior research 
section, but it represents how NPM has been developed and studied in recent years and 
what the research “gap” is that this study attempts to fill. 
Section 1.2 is motivated by the study of the specific policy cases relating to fire deaths, 
and how fire deaths have gained the attention of public and governmental decision 
makers. Section 1.3 describes the nature of emergencies surrounded by uncertainties and 
unexpected occurrences. 
1.1 Motivation for researching performance management
Performance improvement has been a dominant feature in public administrations and 
public management in recent decades. The “age of performance” has increased attention 
on performance management and performance measurement, and on how governments 
should fulfill their obligations to citizens, and their representatives, by producing good 
results (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008).
The phenomenon of performance has been widely studied in the research fields 
around the doctrine of NPM (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011; Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008; 
Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008; Bevir & Rhodes, 2003; Pollitt, 2003; Lähdesmäki, 
2003). NPM has been an ongoing administrative reform since the late 1980’s. 
One of its’ visionaries was the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in the UK, who 
promoted privatization, deregulation and an enterprise culture in the public administration 
(Telegraph 10.4.2008). Prime Minister Harri Holkeri launched a 24-item program in 1987 
to develop the Finnish public administration. Criticism toward the ineffectiveness and 
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the expansion of the public administration had risen in the OECD countries in the end of 
’80s. (Autero, 2009, 113; Meklin, 2009, 35.)
NPM is oriented toward results and outcomes, and at improving effectiveness and 
efficiency, and managerial accountability. Pollitt (2003, 27–28) describes key elements 
of NPM as focusing on the management systems in terms of outputs and outcomes 
instead of in terms of inputs and processes, and focusing on performance measurement 
and quantification. NPM prefers more specialized, “lean,” “flat,” and autonomous 
organizational forms rather than large, multi-purpose, or hierarchical forms. Contract-
like, market–type mechanisms, an emphasis on service quality and consumer-orientation, 
a broadening of the frontiers between the public sector, market sector, and voluntary 
sector, efficiency and individualism are all features of NPM. 
The death of NPM has been declared by some following digital-era governance that is 
characterized by reintegration, needs-based holistic structures, and the digitalization of 
administrative processes (Dunleavy & al., 2005). However, NPM is still alive but a shift 
from NPM to a new era of “post-NPM” is currently under study (Lodge & Gill, 2011, 141). 
The declaration of death and the shift from NPM to post-NPM is mostly due to a 
will to diagnose the failures and shortcomings of earlier NPM administrative reform 
attempts and to develop the “old NPM” (Christensen & Laegreid, 2008). In response to 
“NPM-failures,” post-NPM is associated with a strengthening of coordination through a 
more centralized or collaborative capacity, whether it is via what is called the “whole of 
government” or through a “joined-up government” (Lodge & Gill, 2011, 143–144; Hood, 
1998).
Lodge and Gill (2011, 144) divide the periods of administrative reform into progressive 
public administration (PPA), new public management (NPM), and post-NPM. PPA places 
an emphasis on procedural controls and rules, and on public sector distinctiveness. NPM-
related reforms are identifiable by their hands-on, professional management process with 
explicit performance standards, output controls, and private-sector-style management 
practices. Post-NPM reforms have returned to a mixed pattern of in-house and marketized 
services, delivery networks, a client-based style, boundary-spanning skills, joined-up 
targets, and procedural/centralized controls, and ethical rules. 
The advantage of regenerating these administrative reforms is that it revitalizes 
public management. Performance and result-orientation are an important part of public 
management today. Public opinion in times of financial crises requires that the tax-payers 
should have a right to know where their tax-money has gone and how their money is 
being spent. How achievements and results in the public sector have been measured is a 
question that public managers have to face. Achievements in management are measured 
in order to know what the actual score is. Behn (1995) poses this as an essential question 
in management. Public actions should produce results, and results should be measured, 
and, eventually, that information should be used in decision making, and in the political 
decision making process. 
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However, considerably little attention has been paid to the ambiguities and dysfunctions 
of performance management and measurement from an analytical point of view. Vakkuri 
(2010) has analyzed the situations in which using NPM-oriented management instruments 
has led to intended, and desired, or unintended, and even dysfunctional consequences by 
using the conceptual framework of ambiguity. This is a research area or a “gap” that this 
study attempts to fill. 
This research uses the bounded rationality framework and ambiguity as a 
methodological concept to illustrate the struggle that public managers have with 
performance management and problem identification, target setting and performance 
evaluation. 
Ambiguity highlights the opaqueness in organizational decision making and behavior 
(March & Olsen, 1976). Decision making is constrained by cognitive capabilities and 
incomplete information. How, then, are public organizations and agencies managed 
and run if the results and the performance of their actions are constrained? One way 
to overcome this is to “muddle through” as opposed to employing rational processes 
(Brunsson & Olsen, 1993, 73). 
Performance management is studied in the context of fire safety policy and fire 
deaths, because this policy case offers an interesting chance, and the appropriate 
interconnectedness to enable the exploration of ambiguities in the world of performance 
measurement and management, and in the multifaceted world of emergencies and safety 
research, where everything is uncertain and vulnerable, but, in practice, is linked and 
interconnected by several simultaneous events (Perrow, 2009).
Performance management in the special context of emergencies is studied through a 
performance management cycle. The Ministry of the Interior and the rescue services have 
a key role in fire safety policy in terms of fire deaths. Their actions are studied through the 
identification of policy problems, setting policy targets, through selecting policy actions, 
and evaluating policy performance. However, fire deaths are a question of life and death, 
and this makes target setting difficult. Even one person dying in a fire is a bad result. Can 
one then say that the rescue services and the key actors have succeeded in their work? 
What are, and are not the areas that authorities can influence, and who takes the credit, 
or the blame for the actual results? 
Another interesting feature is how fire deaths come to the attention of the public and 
governmental decision makers overall. The Internal Security Program has been mandated 
by the government of Finland to prepare objectives and measures for internal security. 
1.2 The government’s objective to reduce fire deaths 
Fire deaths were originally put on the political agenda on 24 June 2003, when the 
government of Finland set up a project to prepare an Internal Security Program. This 
was mandated by the Government Program of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s cabinet, 
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issued on 2 October 2003, which states that the government will determine the primary 
objectives and measures for internal security via an inter-agency Internal Security 
Program. 
The government adopted a resolution concerning the second Program on 8 May 2008. 
The program extends to the year 2015. One of the indicators in the Program is the number 
of fire deaths. This is why the case of fire deaths is followed more closely as a policy case 
in this study. 
Altogether, 379 people in Finland have died in fires from 2007–2010; 18 deaths per 
one million inhabitants. Accidental fire deaths have ranged from 52 to 139 through 1952–
2010. Compared to other Western European countries, the level is high. 
The government of Finland has set an objective in 2008 to reduce the number of fire 
deaths to 50 by the end of 2015. The first Program aimed at reducing fire deaths to 30 by 
the end of 2012. In 2010, the total number of fire deaths was 80 and in 2009 and 2008 the 
total number of fire deaths was 107. In 2007, the total number of deaths by fire in Finland 
was 85. 
Compared to the population of Finland, the level is high. The average number of fire 
deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in Finland was 2.0 in 2004 with a population of five million 
people. In the USA, the comparative figure was 1.3, with a population of 300 million 
people. Russia, Estonia, Latvia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Moldova, and Mongolia have the 
highest fire rates relative to population. Laos, Vietnam, and Singapore have the lowest 
rates. Some of the differences may be due to reporting standards, but typically, Laos and 
Vietnam are countries in Asia having unusually low fire rates relative to population size. 
(Brushlinsky, Hall, Sokolov & Wagner, 2006, 47.) 
In comparison, in road traffic accidents in Finland, 279 people were killed in 2009, in 
2008, 344 were killed, and in 2007, 380 people were killed (Road Traffic Accidents, 2009, 
13). Road traffic accidents have varied from 113 to 1,072 from 1931–2009. 
Concern over reducing the number of fire deaths has drawn attention to the problem. 
Smoking has been identified as one of the most common cause of fires leading to human 
casualties in Finland. In most cases, the victims were under the influence of alcohol, and, 
therefore, were helpless victims of fire (Kokki, 2011). Carelessness and lack of caution 
have been identified as important contributory factors. For reasons of such an etiology, 
even the generally good proven performance of fire departments and fire brigades is not 
enough to ensure a reduction in the number of fire deaths. It is widely supposed that fire 
deaths are also related to the greater problem of social exclusion. Fire deaths are a question 
of different policies and their connections, for example, social and healthcare policies, at 
the very least pertaining to alcohol policies.
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1.3 The nature of emergencies
Emergencies and crises are familiar historical phenomena and are contemporary events 
(Rikoski, 2008, 6). The recent financial crisis in the EU, attacks in Norway, an earthquake 
and tsunami in Japan – all of these are just some examples of natural and man-made 
disasters, or a combination of both. The list could be continued endlessly. None of 
these disasters were certain to occur, but many of them did, with more than a minimal 
probability (Posner, 2004, 5). Crises always come as a surprise (Hellenberg & al., 2011, 9). 
Emergencies and disasters can occur anywhere in the world, affecting human health, 
people’s lives, and the infrastructure built to support those aspects of living (Wisner 
& Adams, 2002). The nature of an emergency is that the inevitable happens and that 
when it does, it should be managed rapidly. In case of emergency, the time to respond is 
limited and the decision making environment demanding. Prevention of accidents and 
operations beforehand are elementary. How to prevent accidents and make efficient and 
fast decisions in the case of emergencies are essential to damage limitation. There is not 
much that can be done once a fire is underway, especially in sparsely populated areas. No 
matter how accurately and rigorously the fire fighters operate, it takes dozens of minutes 
to drive from the nearest fire station to the scene of the accident in sparsely populated 
areas (Kokki, Jäntti, Rasmus & Tervo, 2008). 
In terms of fire safety policy, resilience in the face of uncertainty is the greatest 
challenge (Handmer & Dovers, 2007). However, it is not always clear how to prepare 
beforehand for these situations. Risks should be identified and responses should be 
practiced (Whittingham, 2008; O’Malley, 2004; Posner, 2004; Davies & al., 2003). 
What is the nature of an emergency, and what is the decision making and management 
like in a political-administrative environment, especially in the context of fire safety 
policy? These questions are studied further in this text. An interesting question arises 
as to how different policies “go together” and what the connections between different 
policies are when considering the case of fire deaths. This is elaborated on through the 
theoretical concept of policy coherence. 
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2 Setting the Research Problem 
And Research Task
2.1 The aim and research questions 
The aim of the research is to explore performance management in the context of 
emergencies and especially in terms of fire safety policy. Performance management is 
analyzed in a cycle with three phases: identification of the policy problem, target setting, 
and performance evaluation. The first question concerns the nature and the scope of this 
policy problem (Rossi & Freeman, 1993, 5). What is the policy problem and how can it be 
identified? Technical elements of fire safety may as well be the core of the problem, rather 
than social behavior. Among the problems of policy identification, policy problems are 
multi-dimensional, and messy, as much as they are conflicting (Jochim & May, 2010, 304). 
The second phase of the cycle is target setting. What ambiguities are there in target 
setting in the rescue services and in fire safety policy? In public policies, targets and 
indicators measuring and evaluating the achievements of public actions are usually less 
tangible. In addition, connections between actions and their consequences are difficult 
to understand. It is uncertain what the future consequences of a chosen action are. Fire 
deaths are also a question of life and death and even one person dying in a fire is a bad 
result. How should targets be set to produce good and measurable results? 
The third research question concerns what ambiguities there are in evaluating the 
performance of the fire safety policy. It is not known who will take the credit or the blame 
for the intended results. Performance can be achieved with or without targets. Evaluating 
performance of the public policies and actions can be difficult. 
All these questions are studied through the theoretical concept of ambiguity. 
Ambiguity relates to public management and public policies (Vakkuri, 2010; March & 
Olsen, 1976). Organizations are characterized by inconsistent and ill-defined objectives. 
Identifying policy problems, setting suitable policy targets, and selecting policy actions, 
measuring, and evaluating the performance of policy actions are all ambiguous. It is 
difficult to see the connections between organizational actions and their consequences 
(March & Olsen, 1979, 12). 
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Policy problems are messy and complex. Contemporary policy problems have no clear 
causes, but rather a host of loosely connected and interrelated factors. It seems the more 
we try to solve the policy problems, the further away we seem to move from the resolution. 
Disappointments and the inability to deal with urgent policy problems corrode trust in 
political and policy-making institutions (Ney, 2009, 1–5). 
As a consequence of crosscutting multiple areas of policy and their policy subsystems, 
it is difficult to craft and implement coherent policy approaches. The goal of greater 
policy cohesion is the core element of various approaches to coordinated governmental 
actions (Jochim & May, 2010, 303). Coherence between governmental actors and policies 
is studied through the concept of coherence. 
Coherence is a system based on beliefs and how well a body of beliefs “hangs together” 
(BonJour, 1985, 93). Policy coherence means how different policies “go together” and share 
a set of ideas and aims. 
The bounded rationality theory is kept as an overall theoretical foundation to structure 
the organizational decision making environment. Decision making and choice have been 
studied widely in economic theories, but bounded rationality is an approach in decision 
making theory that acts to complete misplaced rational choice (Simon, 1957). 
The concept of ambiguity is an extension to bounded rationality theory by Herbert A. 
Simon and James G. March. Ambiguity is used to explain constraints in decision making 
and choice in the performance management cycle. The garbage can model and the complete 
cycle of choice by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1976) are used to consolidate how 
organizations actually deal with flows of problems, solutions, and decision-makers. A 
decision is an outcome or an interpretation of several relatively independent “streams” 
within an organization: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities 
(March & Olsen, 1979, 26–27). 
How political-administrative organizations act and how decisions happen in the 
boundedly rational, decision making world are intriguing and topical questions in public 
management. Through this doctoral dissertation, the idea develops as to how decisions 
happen in the political-administrative environment where information is overloaded, 
where interests are conflicting, and where time is lacking. 
The general research problem is to study performance management as an ambiguous 
management model in the context of emergencies and fire safety policy. Performance 
management is studied through a cycle and the broad aim of this study is as follows: 
This research seeks to study the ambiguity of performance management in the fire safety 
policy of Finland. 
Research questions are studied at the institutional level (public agencies and organizations), 
at the policy level (ministries, Parliament), and at the incident level (fire deaths). At the 
incident level, what is significant is that only the “unsuccessful” or unfortunate cases are 
studied. Cases classified as “saved” or “injured” are excluded from the study because of 
25
AMBIGUITY OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN
ThE FIRE SAFETY POLICY OF FINLAND
the lack of available data. The data and methods are described in more detail in chapter 
2.2. Institutional and policy levels are examined more precisely through documentary 
data and interviews with political-administrative decision-makers. At the incident level, 
fire deaths are studied through specific statistical data.
Table 1. Empirical context and data sources.
Empirical context Data sources/ informants
Institutional level (agencies, organizations) Civil servants
Policy level (fire safety policy) Politicians, civil servants
Incident level (fire deaths) Fire death data
The institutional level is the agency and organizational level where central government 
authorities and regional rescue authorities implement fire safety policy. At this level, all 
questions pertaining to ambiguities are relevant. What ambiguities there are relate to fire 
safety problem identification, setting fire safety policy targets, implementing fire safety 
policies, and evaluating the results and performance improvement. At the policy level, 
the same questions are studied, but the performance of the actions is emphasized. At the 
incident level, ambiguities in terms of problem identification are emphasized more fully. 
Questions of ambiguities in identification of the fire safety policy problem, in setting fire 
safety policy targets, implementing fire safety policies, and evaluating fire safety policies 
are the research questions of this study. Additionally, coherence between different but 
intercrossing policies is one of the research questions. 
This research seeks to answer to more specific research questions:
1. What are the ambiguities in identifying fire safety policy problems?
2. What ambiguities are there in target setting in the rescue services and in terms of 
fire safety policy?
3. What are the ambiguities in evaluating the performance of the fire safety policy? 
Who takes the credit or the blame for the performance of the actions? 
4. Are intercrossing policies coherent in the fire safety policy?
To achieve the aims and research questions mentioned above, this study analyzes 
performance agreements between the Ministry of the Interior and agencies, interviews with 
public managers in the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance, and representatives 
in Parliament, and statistical data considering fire deaths, especially from 2007–2010. 
Fire death cases and the fire safety policy have been chosen for this research because 
of the continuation of the policy problem and because of the interconnections between 
different public policies especially safety policies. Continuation in this context means that 
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fires do occur across time. Fires change form and extent, but they will occur in the future 
and they will make fire prevention inevitable1. 
Additionally, an influencing factor in choosing fire safety policy as a research context 
has been the willingness of the rescue services to be part of this research. The Emergency 
Service College has provided statistical data on fire deaths for this study, and the Ministry 
of the Interior and the Department of Rescue Services has welcomed me as a researcher to 
undertake interviews and let me study fire safety policy more detailed. 
The state level government performance management is in the focus of this research. 
Performance management in the municipalities and the rescue service regions including 
fire departments is another perspective to study. This study touch on some of these 
perspectives through the research data especially in the fire death statistical data and 
through the description of the performance management system, but the focus is on the 
governmental level and in the role of the central government organizations such as the 
Ministry of the Interior and its’ subordinate agencies. 
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 The scientific methodological approach 
The theory of knowledge epistemology deals with what can be said about science (Kaplan, 
1964, 20). The theory of knowledge epistemology deals with what is, or should be regarded 
as knowledge in a discipline, and whether the social world can, and should be studied with 
the same principles (Bryman, 2008). 
Ontology is the study of being, the nature of existence. Ontology tries to represent what 
is, and epistemology tries to understand what it means to know. Epistemology provides 
a philosophical background to decide what kind of knowledge is legitimate and adequate 
for a given purpose (Gray, 2004, 13–16). 
Epistemological nature entails ideas about what forms of knowledge can be obtained, 
and how one can sort out what is to be regarded as “true” from what is to be regarded as 
“false” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, 1). Burrell and Morgan (1979) conceptualize social science 
in terms of four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology, human nature, and 
methodology. Human nature describes the relationship between human beings and their 
environment, for example, through determinism and voluntarism. In determinism, every 
event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions, together with the laws of nature, 
and with voluntarism, “free will” occupies centre stage. However, it is notable that Burrell 
and Morgan wrote sociological paradigms and organizational analysis at the end of 1970s 
and the debate in sociology is different today. 
1 The first signs of fire prevention were in 1700 BC. Building constructs and instructions were included 
into the Code of Hammurabi (Tolppi, 2001, 64).
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The philosophers distribute scientific approaches among, for example, positivism, 
scientific realism, constructivism, and their modifications. Objectivism stands for reality 
that exists independently of consciousness – that there is an objective reality “out there” 
and research is about discovering this objective truth (Gray, 2004, 16–17). Bryman (2008, 
19) formulates this as: “objectivism implies that social phenomena and the categories we 
use in everyday discourse have an existence independent or separate from actors.” In 
natural sciences, objectivism and positivism are common positions. 
Constructivism rejects the view that truth and meaning exist in some external world. 
Reality is socially constructed and the sociology of knowledge must analyze the process in 
which this occurs. Reality is a quality appertaining to the phenomena that we recognize as 
independent from our own will, and knowledge is the certainty that phenomena are real, 
and that they possess specific characteristics (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, 13). Subjects 
construct their own meaning in different ways (Gray, 2004, 16–17). 
Constructivism implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced 
through social interaction, but they are also in a constant state of revision. Constructivism 
in recent years has come to include the conception that the researcher presents a specific 
version of social reality, and there is not just one definitive reality (Bryman, 2008). 
Participants actively construct the world of everyday life and its constituent elements 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 2008, 3). 
In subjectivism, meaning does not emerge from the interplay between the subject 
and the outside world, but is imposed on the object by the subject (Gray, 2004, 117). 
Subjectivism can be seen as an information–producing process in which subjects produce 
information, and in which the choice between subjectivism and objectivism in research 
lies only in accepting that knowledge is subjective and that there is no strictly objective 
truth. 
Certain fixed or categorized assumptions of social science theorizations may lead to 
the suppression of their discourse (Ahonen, 1985, 15). However, something must be said 
about the epistemological, ontological, and methodological choices on which the study is 
built. In this research, truth and meaning are created by the subject’s interactions with the 
world. Despite the dictum that objective truth exists in some external world “out there,” 
this study pursues the truth by using a subjective research methodology and design. 
Subjectivity means that the researcher interacts with the “research subjects.” Political-
administrative decision makers and managers, and internal safety policy producers in 
the Ministry of the Interior, in the Ministry of Finance, in the Parliament, in the National 
Audit Office, and in the Emergency Service College are informants producing information 
about the research subject so as and to create truth and meaning. The researcher in this 
study constructed the truth and meaning “in there” with the informants of the research. 
However, the truth and meaning were in a constant state of revision during the research 
process. 
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In order to make an inference on the performance management system and the 
context of emergencies, the Finnish public administration system needs to be understood. 
During the research process, the researcher worked in the State Treasury of Finland and 
in the Ministry of Finance, and learned about the administrative processes, financial 
management, and performance management that lay inside the research context. This 
helped to generate practical and theoretical truths about the public administration 
grounded in the realities of their daily existence (Jorgensen, 1989, 14). 
Methodology is often indistinguishable from epistemology or the philosophy of 
science (Kaplan, 1964). In this research, theoretical models and perspectives such as the 
bounded rationality theory and ambiguity were chosen before conducting the research. 
However, they also guided the data collection and the research process. Some of the 
research data was also excluded from the study because otherwise the area it would have 
become too wide to study. In this respect, deductive and inductive approaches were both 
adapted (Gray, 2004, 25).
The role of the researcher in this study is to understand the Finnish public 
administration and the processes of socially constructing it by looking at meanings, 
metaphors, and perceptions of public managers by interviewing them (Apostol, 2011, 94). 
In order to defend the methodological choices made, the data collection and methods 
for analyzing data are presented in chapter 2.2. A summary of the research setting is 
presented at the end of the section. 
2.2.2 Research method 
The aim of research design is to provide a framework to collect and analyze data. The 
research method is a technique for collecting and analyzing data (Bryman, 2008, 31). 
Methodological communities can be categorized into quantitatively2 oriented social and 
behavioral scientists, qualitatively3 oriented social and behavioral scientists, and mixed 
methodologists (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2009). 
In this study, it is not intended that delimitations will be made concerning the research 
methodology. However, this research integrates quantitative and qualitative approaches 
and orientations, and in that sense, conducts the mixed–methods research design. Mixed 
methods integrate and do not segregate different orientations. Mixed methodologists are 
interested in both narrative and numeric data and their analyses, and this is well suited to 
the current research setting (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
2 Quantitatively oriented scientists use techniques associated with gathering, analysis, interpretation, and 
presentation of numerical information and use the postpositivist/-positivist paradigm.
3 Qualitatively oriented scientists use techniques associated with gathering, analysis, interpretation, and 
presentation of narrative information. Qualitative orientation is subscribed to constructivism and its 
variants.
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Interviews and documentary data are analyzed by using the qualitative approach 
and orientation, and statistical data are analyzed by using the quantitative approach and 
orientation. This study integrates different methods throughout the research process and 
could be defined as an integrated and holistic research design from a mixed-methods 
typology (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).
Integration means integrating different methods throughout the research process 
as distinct from component design, where data-gathering methods are implemented as 
separate aspects, and where these aspects remain distinct throughout the research process. 
A holistic research design means the simultaneous integration of methods. The aim is to 
build one integrated explanation of results (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, 496). 
Fire deaths are an empirical case analyzed by using features of a case study research 
strategy. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003, 13). However, the ability 
to investigate the context of fire deaths is limited to statistical data, and this limits the use 
of the case study method through which the purpose is to investigate the context more 
broadly. Nevertheless, statistical data provides some information about the geographical 
and residential circumstances where fires have occurred (the data is explained in more 
detail in section 2.2.3). The political-administrative decision-making context is studied 
through the interviews with the public managers. In this respect, the context is partly 
studied. 
A case study is a comprehensive research strategy comprising an all-encompassing 
method covering the logic of design, data-collection techniques, and specific approaches 
to data analysis. Even if the research strategy has not been designed by strictly following 
the case study research strategy, it has followed the five research design components 
forming the research questions, directed attention to propositions, defining the case and 
the unit of analysis, linking data to propositions, and criteria for interpreting the findings 
(Yin, 2003, 21–28). 
In important respects, this study involves of policy analysis in the established sense of 
regarding policies decided upon and possibly also carried out by public sector organizations 
(Weiss, 1992; Dunn, 1994; Parsons, 1995). However, this study is not a policy analysis as 
such. A major objective of policy analysis is to analyze and present alternatives available 
to political actors for solving public problems (Weimer & Vining, 1989, 3). This study 
aims at more the objective of academic social science research to construct theories for 
understanding society. Even if the purpose of this study is not to offer direct information 
or alternatives available to the political actors, this study analyzes the fire safety policy in 
Finland, and within this, there are features of policy analysis.
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By mixing methods and features of case study research strategy and policy analysis, 
this study aims at as good as possible research results in terms of validity4 and reliability5. 
The performance management model and fire deaths are the subjects of this research. 
Mixed methods, features of case study research strategy, and features of policy analysis are 
instruments to measure these subjects. This study also attempts to provide information 
supporting political-administrative decision-making.
Integration of the methods and the methods to collect and analyze data are presented 
in the following sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4. 
2.2.3 Data collection
The data collection strategy in this study includes different viewpoints. Data is gathered 
from different sources including qualitative and quantitative sources. Diverse research 
data is used in order to study an ambiguous research phenomenon. The idea in using 
various data is to strive for valid research results. Quantitative data sources covering 
numeric data are fire death statistical data and some of the budgetary and financial reports 
that are in numeric form. Qualitative data sources are interviews and documentary data 
(performance agreements). 
The data–collection strategy covers different dimensions with various data. Different 
dimensions come from the research setting: identification of the policy problem, target 
setting, policy implementation, and evaluating policy performance. These dimensions 
are covered with various data to triangulate with the viewpoints of different actors. The 
dimensions are not restricted to certain data; they are used reflectively and interactively. 
Different data sources offer research results for various research dimensions (Vartiainen, 
1994). 
Politicians, civil servants, individuals (victims), and fire fighters are different actors 
representing various viewpoints. Politicians represent decision-makers, civil servants 
are executors of policies and also decision-makers, individuals are users of policies and 
services, but also subjects in the case of fire deaths, and fire fighters are operative actors. 
Politicians and civil servants were interviewed. Fire fighters were not interviewed, but fire 
fighters were questioned outside of this research work. 
The researcher also participated actively into fire safety research conferences6 to 
deepen her understanding of the national fire safety research work. These conferences and 
4 Validity represents the extent to which an instrument measures what it is intended to measure (North & 
al., 1963, 42).
5 The research results are valid when the same results are produced with different measures. When the 
same research process is repeated and it will reproduce the same results, the reliability is achieved 
(North & al., 1963, 42).
6 The fire research conferences arranged by the Palotutkimusraati Incorporated Association were held in 
Hanasaari in Espoo in 2009 and 2011. The Emergency Service College arranged a researcher meeting 
with the fire safety researchers in Kuopio in 2009.
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meetings offered the researcher an opportunity to familiarize herself with the national 
fire safety research work. 
The researcher also took part in a three–month visit to the University of Colorado 
at Denver (UCD) and to the School of Public Affairs in Denver, Colorado in 2008. The 
University specializes in studying public policies and emergency management and has 
some of the best scholars in the country. This visit led the researcher into the international 
research world and familiarized her with the international research field of emergency 
management. 
The researcher arranged scientific colloquiums in UCD and in the School of Public 
Affairs in 2008, 2009, and 2010. These colloquiums developed and widened her research 
work year by year and offered her an opportunity to follow international research work 
and develop her own dissertation. 
A four–month visit to Stanford University and the Scandinavian Consortium for 
Organizational Research (Scancor)7 in spring 2011 deepened her theoretical understanding 
of organizational theories and improved her methodological skills in policy analysis. 
Although the purpose of the visits to Colorado and California was not just to collect 
data, these visits also helped locating relevant theoretical literature and articles. Articles 
and theoretical literature were collected in UCD, which had a wide collection of literature 
on emergency management. The relevant research data was also discussed with scholars 
who specialized in emergency management. 
The interview data (considering the third phase) was reanalyzed just before the visit to 
Stanford University. A policy analysis was produced, considering the Finnish fire safety 
policy, in Stanford University. This working method deepened the understanding of the 
interview data and connected the results into the fire safety policy analysis. 
Fire death statistical data loosely covers the individual point of view. Statistical data 
offers only restricted material about fire deaths. Interviews with relatives of the victims 
were considered in the initial stages of the research. However, this idea was later discarded. 
One of the reasons was that the contact information of the bereaved is police material, 
and, considering the circumstances in that the victims had all perished, it would not have 
been natural to interview the families. Fire death statistical data has been, nevertheless, 
one of the most important research data sources throughout the research process. Even 
though the study is not statistical research, the significance of the statistical data has been 
emphasized. 
Budgetary data, performance agreements, thematic interviews, and the fire death 
statistical data form the research material of this study. These materials are presented in 
more detail in the following sections.
7 Scancor facilitates inquiry in organizational social science among a transnational network of scholars in 
Stanford University in Palo Alto California.
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Budgetary data
Budgetary data has been used as research material considering that they are the main 
planning documents used in the preparation of the central government budget. In 
practice, budget proposals and justifications are the main content used. Performance 
agreements and budgetary documents are connected and therefore it is important to 
study both documents. 
It is enacted in the Central Government Budget Decree, section 1b (7.4.2004/254) that: 
“Budget proposals shall comprise proposals for appropriations and revenue estimates, 
reasons for the appropriations, and other justifications intended to represent the views 
of Parliament and justifications in the explanatory parts of the Budget Proposal to be 
submitted to Parliament.”
Budget proposals comprise proposals for targets set by the government, including 
proposals for the effectiveness of central government activities and finances in the policy 
sector of the ministry in question. Budget proposals also include the ministry’s tentative 
performance targets for the effectiveness of central government activities and financing in 
its policy sector, and the ministry’s tentative performance targets for the most significant 
elements of operating performance of the most important government agencies in the 
administrative sector of the ministry.
The budget is a decision made by Parliament and it includes performance targets 
concerning operational performance itemized into targets concerning operational 
efficiency, outputs, and quality management, and, if necessary, the management, and 
development of human resources. Whenever possible, indicators are used in presenting 
the performance targets, and the indicators are supplemented with qualitative targets, as 
required. (Salminen & Viitala, 2006.)
A budget proposal is not a general strategy document. The effectiveness and performance 
targets included in the budget proposal must be clearly connected with the appropriations 
included in the proposal. How to formulate performance targets in the central government 
budget proposal is an important issue for the functioning and comprehensibility of the 
control system. Parliament has expressed a desire for performance targets to be based 
on simple indicators (Kertomusmenettelytyöryhmän mietintö, 2002). Using indicators to 
present outcome targets and operational performance targets is a guiding principle. 
Justifications should be presented at the main title level, at the class level, and at the 
item level in the budget proposal. The main title level includes the entire administrative 
sector and operational branches, and contains general outcome targets. These targets are 
set for policy sectors and for major duty areas or performance areas, and they should 
be compact descriptions of the main policies and of the operational emphasis of the 
government and the Ministry of the Interior. 
Targets included in the ministry strategy documents, especially the Internal Safety 
Program, and in the operational and financial plan of the rescue services should agree 
with the targets in the budget proposal. Targets presented at various levels in the budget 
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proposal should be logically related and their relationship should be easy to understand 
(coherence between lower-level and higher-level targets) (Salminen & Viitala, 2006, 38). 
Performance agreements
Performance agreements have been used as the main documentary data because 
performance contracting is an essential part of the performance management system 
(Salminen & Viitala, 2006, 43). Performance agreements are written agreements including 
expectations of attainable results (outputs and outcomes) and they should also indicate 
who is responsible for each target in each budgetary year. 
The Ministry of the Interior makes performance contracts with regional state 
administrative agencies, the Emergency Response Center (ERC), the Emergency Service 
College, and the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency8. Performance agreements were 
collected and analyzed from the years 2001, 2005, and 2010. 
Regional State Administrative authorities began to operate at the beginning of 2010. 
Their performance agreements were written for the very first time in 2010, thus it is not 
possible to examine any earlier agreements of the regional state administrative authorities. 
The performance management, reporting style, and structure of the government 
budget were developed in the middle of the 2000s. Performance criteria including policy 
effectiveness (outcome targets) and operational performance targets (outputs) were 
defined in the Budget Decree in 2004. The outcome targets and performance targets 
should be presented in the central government budget proposal to the Parliament. The 
budget proposal is a proposition for the financing plan for central government finances 
submitted to the Parliament (Salminen & Viitala, 2006, 38). 
Agreements from the years 2001, 2005, and 2010 were chosen for this study to see if 
there was any change or development before and after the Budget Law reform. Examination 
of these five-year periods makes for a better comparison. 
The Ministry of the Interior delivered performance agreements for this study. Some 
of the performance agreements were available only in paper form. These agreements were 
rewritten into electronic form. Performance agreements were also partly available from 
the governmental Netra online information service. The Central Government Budget 
Decree (sections 14, 63, 65a, and 66i) stipulates that agencies and ministries must submit 
their operational and financial plans, final accounts, annual reports, and statements of the 
ministry on the final accounts to the Netra online information service. However, all this 
information is not available from the system when considering the years that have been 
studied, since the system is still in development. The Ministry of the Interior delivered all 
the missing material needed for the study. 
8 Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency Tukes operates under several government ministries. The 
Ministry of the Interior and the Rescue Service Department makes an agreement with Tukes on 
inspection of safety equipment, installation, and care and control. Tukes is responsible for preventing 
fires and accidents through different legislative sectors (electrical and pressure devices and industrial 
use of chemicals) and by providing guidance and support to rescue authorities. 
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Interview data
The interview data includes 24 interviews. 21 people were interviewed and some of 
them were interviewed twice. Interviewees were distributed across various agencies that 
implement fire safety policy such as the Ministry of the Interior and The Association of 
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities. The Ministry of Finance, the Parliament, the 
National Audit Office, State Treasury and the Prime Minister’s Office and the Policy-
analysis Unit were also interviewed in order to understand public management better and 
to understand the performance management practices in more detail. The interviewees 
were mainly high level public managers and some of them were experts or middle 
managers. The research setting was designed to focus into the management practices 
and ambiguities in the level of the central government, and, thus, the managers from the 
ministries and agencies were interviewed. 
Research interviews were undertaken by using the qualitative thematic interview 
method (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2001). Interviews were conducted in order to get a better 
understanding of performance management (Wengraf, 2001, 3–4). It would not have 
been possible to obtain this information via a questionnaire, survey, or by the statistics. 
Communication and mutual understanding between the interviewee and the interviewer 
was essential. The interviewer had worked for some years developing performance 
management processes and also knew the processes inside the administration. The 
interviewer also knew most of the interviewees, and this increased mutual trust, and 
encouraged interviewees to answer the questions more critically and openly when 
compared to a situation where the interviewer would not have known the interviewees. 
Interview data was collected from 2005–2010. The interviews were carried out in three 
phases. The first phase involved preliminary interviews with selected informants from 
the State Treasury, and from the Ministry of Finance. The goal was to survey the research 
subject and the possibility of studying the research subject. The second phase included 
interviews in the Ministry of the Interior, and the third phase, interviews with Director 
Generals in the Ministry of Finance, in the Parliament, and in the National Audit Office. 
This last set of interviews was undertaken to examine administrator’s tasks in the Ministry 
of Finance in 2010. 
The preliminary interviews were undertaken in 2005 with administrative developers 
from the Ministry of Finance and from the State Treasury. These interviews tested 
the actual research subject and the content. At the beginning of this dissertation, the 
research subject was the wider study of performance management in the Finnish public 
administration. This perspective was eventually narrowed down to the Ministry of the 
Interior and to the rescue services, and finally to fire safety policy and to the case of fire 
deaths. Preliminary interviews highlighted that the Ministry of the Interior would be a 
good target to be examined. They had already adapted their performance management 
and performance contracting processes already since the budget legislation reform in 2004 
(Salminen & Viitala, 2006, 6) and their practices had been developed further. They were 
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considered as having good practice in developing performance management processes 
and performance indicators. In addition, their willingness to participate in the research 
process was considered as a positive factor. 
Since the Ministry of the Interior was selected as the research subject in the first place, 
the head of the Ministry was contacted. A covering letter (see appendix four) in which the 
aim and content of the interviews was described was sent to the head of the Ministry. Their 
approval for the interviews was sought, and, finally, five Directors from the Ministry of 
the Interior were scheduled for interviews in January 2008. 
The research data including the whole Ministry of the Interior, and the performance 
agreements and contractual practices between the ministry and all the agencies concerned 
was too wide to study. The performance agreements were collected from the whole 
Ministry of the Interior, but this data, excluding the data on rescue services, was later 
discarded, because it was too vast to study. 
This selective narrowing down of research subject from a wider public administrative 
point of view, to the Ministry of the Interior, and to the fire safety policy, and eventually 
fire deaths was due to the fact that the research data would have become too wide to 
analyze, and, as a consequence of this, too superficial. It was considered reasonable to 
process one case that was more detailed than several larger cases. 
Due to this, the research subject had to be marked off inside the Ministry of the 
Interior and eventually the rescue services were chosen as the research object. The case 
of fire deaths came forth clearly later in the research interviews. Ambiguity in the rescue 
services came forth clearly in these interviews and the final research subject was set. 
The third interview phase was conducted in relation to administrator work9 in the 
Ministry of Finance. The researcher was the administrator and interviewed developers, 
directors, evaluators, and academics in ministries, in the Parliament, in an evaluation 
company, and in a university. The main question asked was if there had been a change in 
the performance reporting and target setting in these selected sectors in the years 2006–
2010. The second target of the work was what the NPM system should look like in the 
future. This interview data was used in this thesis and results of the work are elaborated 
on in the empirical chapters and conclusions. 
Interview themes were defined beforehand and sent to the interviewees except in the 
last definitive interviews. In order to avoid biases the interview material was recorded 
with a tape recorder. However, tape recording was not undertaken in all interviews. 
The researcher considered what the appropriate use of the tape recorder was before the 
interviews. The decision depended on whether the researcher believed the tape recording 
would have disturbed the interviews, their progress, and, in the end, the results. Notes 
were carried out from each of the interviews. Notes were written with a laptop. The 
9 The Ministry of Finance ordered assessment in 2010 to analyze the performance reports in three 
administrative sectors from 2006–2010. The Ministry of Education and Culture, The Ministry of 
Finance, and The Ministry of Transport and Communications were the selected sectors.
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interview data was read and analyzed several times during the research process in order 
to find possible anomalies and generalizations. 
Fire death statistical data
Fire death statistical data covering the individual and victim’s point of view was collected 
in the Emergency Service College from 2007. This specific data on residential fire deaths 
was collected from fire investigations. Finnish fire investigators from the fire brigades and 
from the local Finnish police had carried out fire investigations from 2007–2010. Each 
rescue service area (22) named their own investigators. The rescue services resource and 
accident statistics program, Pronto, completes this gathered statistical data. The number 
of fire deaths has been collected since 1952, but this specific data on fire deaths has been 
collected since 2007. It is unfortunate that the specific statistical data from 2007–2010 is 
limited to only a few years. However, this data includes more detailed information on the 
causes of the fire (ignition), the scene of the accident, housing types, in which storey the 
fire occurred, what time of the day the fire occurred, and what year it was, if there was a 
functioning fire alarm, who made the emergency call, how long the fire extinction took, 
the background factors of the victims (age, gender, socio-economic factors), and what the 
circumstances were before the fire. Previously, no data like this was available in Finland. 
The Emergency Service College provided the data for this research purpose. 
These research materials are at the disposal of the study. Once the data and the data 
collection have been described, the following section will describe how the data was 
analyzed. 
2.2.4 Methods for analyzing data
This dissertation applies both qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative content 
analysis is used to study the content of the documentary data and the interview data. 
Through content analysis, textual material can be classified and reduced to more 
manageable chunks of data (Weber, 1990, 5). Content analysis is a method used to analyses 
the content of documents, interviews, or written texts, and it can be used in all the varying 
traditions of qualitative study. Content analysis can be considered both as an individual 
method and also as a loose theoretical frame, which can both be connected to different 
analytical entities (Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2006, 93).
Content analysis has its own approach to analyzing data, and it results from how the 
object of analysis – the content – is regarded. Content analysis is an instrument used to 
analyses data and produce repeatability10 and valid inferences from the data. However, 
the purpose is to make conceptual assumptions and not to be limited to immediate 
10 The main idea of repeatability is that at different points in time, perhaps under different circumstances, 
when applying the same technique to the same data, the results will be the same (Krippendorff, 1980, 
21).
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observations from the data. Conceptual assumptions require construction and knowledge 
of the studied phenomenon. Conceptual analysis is used as an instrument to analyze 
textual data and interview data to find certain repeatable and significant findings from 
the data. 
It is important that findings or “messages” do not have a single meaning that needs to 
be “unwrapped,” and that those meanings may be different to another receiver. The data 
can be examined from numerous perspectives and phrases can be categorized, the logical 
structure of expressions can be described, association, connotations, and denotations 
may be simultaneously valid, but all of these may convey a multitude of different content 
even to a single receiver. Meanings are always relative to a communicator. Messages may 
convey different things to different people. (Krippendorff, 1980, 22.) 
Fire safety statistical data is analyzed by quantitative data-analysis. The purpose of 
the analysis is to create a profile of fire deaths from 2007–2010. The number of cases (N) 
was 379 and the data was collected for the four-year period. Multivariate methods were 
considered at the beginning of this study. For example, regression analysis could have 
been used to model the dependency between different variables. However, this idea was 
later discarded, since the comparative data considering cases of injury and of survival 
cases was missing. The missing comparative data compounded the fact that it was not 
possible to attempt a regression analysis, since regression analysis is a statistical tool for 
the investigation of relationships between variables. Regression analysis seeks to ascertain 
the causal effect of one variable upon another. This causal effect was not possible, since 
the number of cases was still small. 
2.2.5 Summary
A summary of the research settings is presented in table two (see below). The summary 
includes research areas, theoretical models, and conceptions that are presented more 
precisely in the next chapter (chapter three), and methodology including, the research 
methods, data collection, and methods for analyzing the data. The table highlights the 
main elements of the research settings.
Table 2. Summary of the research settings.
Research areas Theoretical models 
and concepts used
Methodology
Performance 
management
Fire safety policy
Bounded rationality
Ambiguity
Coherence
Safety research
Research 
methods
Research data Methods for data-
analysis
Case study Literature
Documents
Interviews
Statistics
Content analysis 
Statistical analysis
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2.3 Structure of the study
This research consists of eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction and the 
second chapter introduces the general scientific research setting and the research problem, 
with particular research questions, data, and methods for answering certain research 
questions, and, also, prior research that motivated the study and addressed the specific 
theme of the research. 
Chapter three includes the theoretical framework and key concepts. The theoretical 
framework lays the foundation for the research work and for the empirical analysis of fire 
safety policy. The fourth chapter elaborates on the features of public administration and 
the context of Finnish public administration and the rescue services in Finland. 
Chapters five, six and seven include empirical analysis and the main findings are 
summarized at the end of each chapter. Chapter eight concludes the theoretical and 
empirical findings emerging from the entire research process. This chapter links the 
research problem, questions, and the theoretical framework into research results and 
conclusions as the outcomes of the study. 
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3 Theoretical Framework
This research scrutinizes the ambiguity in performance management through a cycle 
in terms of Finnish fire safety policy. The performance management cycle describes the 
existing management model in the Finnish public administration. The aim of this chapter 
is to present the theoretical approaches and tools used to analyze the empirical data and 
to interpret the results. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Chapter three includes two sections that are 
divided into several sub-sections. Part one conceptualizes the key concepts of ambiguity, 
rationality, and bounded rationality. The complete cycle of choice and the garbage can 
model of organizational choice are presented in order to understand how decisions 
are actually made during organizational decision making. In addition, the concept of 
coherence is presented in order to describe the relations between different phases in the 
performance management cycle and in order to study different but intercrossing policies 
that “go together.” 
The second section presents the concepts of safety and security, certainty and 
uncertainty in the safety research discipline. In addition, prior research is presented on 
this relatively wide and pluralistic research area including examples of emergencies and 
accidents, disasters and crises, terrorism and attacks. These concepts are defined in the 
second section. At the end, a synthesis of the theoretical framework and essential concepts 
for this research are presented. 
3.1 Ambiguity of decision making in public organizations 
Organizational decision making is simply about making choices in an organization when 
attempting to reach goals or objectives. Herbert A. Simon (1997, 1) defines administration 
as the art of “getting things done.” Decision making and execution of decisions are the 
basic tasks administration has: “deciding” and “doing.” Nevertheless, large organizations 
and governmental organizations have generally been blamed for being bureaucratic and 
inefficient. The effects of governmental decision making and performance are actually 
obscure. This phenomenon is studied through ambiguity and decision making relating to 
public policies and organizations. This is the theoretical task of the research. Challenging 
decision making environment of the rescue services and fire safety policy are the empirical 
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research subjects of the research. Uncertainty is an overwhelming feature of decision 
making processes, especially in the rescue services, and in the generation of fire safety 
policy. It is uncertain where and when fires will occur, but it is an unfortunate certainty 
that they will happen, that the consequences are unwanted and that decisions have to be 
made. 
Decision making is at the heart of the administration and the vocabulary of 
administrative theory must be derived from the logic and psychology of human choice. 
Attention should be paid to the choice and to the processes of decisions: what is to be 
done rather to the actual doing. The theory of administration involves both the processes 
around decisions and the processes of action (Simon, 1997). Simon identified decision 
making as the ultimate keystone for the reconstruction of administrative theory (Augier 
& March, 2001, 398). 
3.1.1 Ambiguity as part of bounded rationality
Herbert A. Simon started to use bounded rationality as a concept to describe limits on 
rationality in decision making (Klaes & Sent, 2005, 30–37). Bounded rationality is an 
approach used in the decision making theory that completes misplaced rational choice 
(Simon, 1957). Ambiguity is part of the theory of bounded rationality in organizational 
research (Simon, 1957; 1978; 1997; Selten, 2002). Ambiguity is an extension to the concept 
of bounded rationality (Vakkuri, 2009, 20). 
The conceptual history of bounded rationality goes back a long way historically. Limited 
intelligence was already used in 1840, finite intelligence in 1880, incomplete rationality in 
1920, and approximate rationality in 1940. Simon began to use bounded rationality as a 
label for the things that economists needed to pay attention to (Simon, 1957; Klaes & Sent, 
2005, 37). Rational choice and behavior were strongly attached to economic theory. Simon 
questioned rational behavior in human decision making. It became “a natural meeting 
ground” for psychological and economic theory (Simon, 1957, 261). 
Simon suggested that no matter how adaptive the behavior of organisms in learning 
and choice situations is, adaptiveness falls far short of “maximizing” in economic theory. 
Simon used an example of an organism. In choice situations organisms do not, in general, 
“optimize” but “satisfice.” By satisficing Simon meant that the organism does not choose 
the best and the most optimal decision alternative. The best and the most optimal 
alternative is not necessarily even known. The most suitable and sufficient alternative 
is good enough. A great deal can be learned about rational decision making by taking 
into account the limitations of the capacities and complexity of the organism, and the 
fact that the surrounding environment allows for a further simplification of its choice 
mechanisms. The organism also possesses limited information and limited computational 
facilities (Simon, 1957, 261). 
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3.1.1.1 James G. March’s definition of ambiguity
Professor James G. March from Stanford University and Herbert A. Simon’s doctoral 
student in Carnegie Mellon University in the 1950s developed the bounded rationality 
theory and the concept of ambiguity in organizational research (Vakkuri, 2009, 21). Simon 
and March examined both the informational and computational limits on rationality by 
human beings and explored the consequences of simple payoff functions and search rules 
in an uncertain environment. March’s school of bounded rationality identifies that there 
is a discrepancy between full rationality in decision making and in the world where the 
decision-maker actually lives (Simon & March, 1959; March, 1978; 1988; 1994; March 
& Olsen, 1979). Descriptions of decision making in terms of March conformed more to 
actual human behavior than descriptions built upon classical rationality. 
The world where the decision maker actually lives has cognitive limitations that 
bounds rational decision making. Allocation of attention, problems of attention, and 
memory, and problems of comprehension and communication are all cognitive limitations 
(Kahneman, 1973). The decision-maker cannot observe and remember everything, and 
gets only partial information about decision alternatives and effects. Decision making 
information is never “perfect.” Organizational learning and motivational boundaries also 
have an effect on decision making. 
Understanding the decision making ecological environment within which we act is an 
essential part of decision making. Our understanding depends upon our reading of the 
context we work within (Forester, 1984, 23–31). Decision making is rational only in the 
present decision making environment. The decision making environment is crucial. In 
what context are decisions rational, in the past, in the present, or in the future, and what 
is the overall decision making environment? 
The term “environment” is ambiguous. It is not some physically objective world in 
its totality, but only those aspects of the totality that have relevance for the “life span” of 
the organism being considered. An organism in this context refers to the decision maker. 
What we call the environment is dependent on the “needs,” “drives,” or “goals” of the 
organism, and upon its perception (Simon, 1957, 262). 
In collective decision making there is a problem of conflicting interests and objectives 
representing the values of different participants. Members of organizations have different 
wants, motives, and drives (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1978, 589). The decision making 
environment and the context is the second constraint in rational decision making. 
Intention is one of the features found in the theories of boundedly rational decision 
making. Choices can be made deliberately or by trial and error (Elster, 1979, 13–19). In the 
species the pursuit of indirect strategies and waiting are impossible in the simple model. 
Man is distinguished from animals as taking one step backwards and two steps forwards. 
Human actors make mistakes. Human actors also do not only make choices on the basis 
of expectations about the future, but also on the basis of their expectations about the 
expectations of others. 
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Decision making in organizations is considerably ambiguous. Although choice 
opportunities may lead to the generation of decision alternatives, and then to an 
examination of the consequences of those alternatives, and then to the examination of the 
consequences as objectives, and finally to a decision, this model is not sufficient enough 
to describe what actually happens (Cohen, March & Olsen 1976, 26). 
Ambiguity illustrates the complexity involved in organizational behavior and in choice 
situations (March & Olsen, 1976, 12). Ambiguity signifies four major kinds of opaqueness 
in organizations. The ambiguity of intention: organizations may be characterized by ill-
defined and inconsistent objectives. The preference function as to what to pursue and 
how to gain objectives in organizations is often impossible to specify when satisfying 
both the consistency requirements of theories of choice, and the empirical requirements 
of describing organizational motives. The second lack of clarity comes the ambiguity of 
understanding. The causal world in which organizations live is obscure. Technologies are 
unclear; environments are difficult to interpret. Connections between organizational 
actions and their consequences are difficult to understand. The third lack of clarity 
concerns the ambiguity of history. The past is important, but history can be twisted. 
What happened, why it happened, and whether it had to happen are all problematic. The 
fourth lack of clarity concerns the ambiguity of the organization. Individuals vary in the 
attention they give to decisions. They vary from one time to another. Thus, the pattern of 
participation is uncertain and changing.
The concept of ambiguity is used in administrative, economic and organizational 
sciences, psychology, philosophy, and linguistics (Vakkuri, 2009, 18). Simone de Beauvoir 
(Ruonakoski, 2007, 23) used the concept ambiguïté when referring to the double aspect of 
the human being; the human being exists in the tension between two forces. The human 
being is mental but also belongs to a material reality. The human being is a free actor and 
a subject but also other actors’ targets, an object. The human being is a thought directed 
to the world and at the same time part of this world. Ambiguity describes duality instead 
of indefiniteness. 
English literary critic and poet Empson (2004, 22) conceptualizes seven types of 
ambiguity related to poetry and literature by using examples from Shakespeare. The next 
section looks at Empson’s seven types of ambiguity. 
3.1.1.2 William Empson’s seven types of ambiguity
The concept of ambiguity is based on philology and linguistics (Vakkuri, 2009, 18). In 
this sense it is relevant to scrutinize English literary critic and poet Empson’s definition 
of ambiguity (2004, 22). Empson conceptualizes seven types of ambiguity related to 
poetry and literature by using examples from Shakespeare. The first type of ambiguity is 
defined as: “I have already considered the comparison of two things which does not say 
in virtue of what they are to be compared. Of the same sort, though less common, is the 
ornamental use of false anthesis, which places words as if in opposition to one another 
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without saying in virtue of what they are to be opposed.” Empson uses an example from 
Peacock’s War Song. The example concerns killing people in a war, and there is a relation 
between heroes and cravens, and a relationship between their equivalent deaths. There 
is also a relation between eagles and heroes, ravens and cravens. These distinctions are 
emphasized differently. This example of ambiguity reminds us of the fortuitous confluence 
of March and Olsen (1979, 27) and the simultaneity of problems and solutions and their 
arrival (see section 3.1.4). 
In the second type of ambiguity, in word or syntax, the ambiguity takes place when 
two or more meanings are resolved into one. These are alternatives, even in the mind of 
the author, not only different emphases, as in the first type of ambiguity (Empson, 2004, 
48). The third type of ambiguity takes place when two ideas, which are connected only 
by being both relevant in the context, can be given in one word simultaneously. In this 
context, ambiguity is considered as a verbal matter (Empson, 2004, 102). Ambiguity of the 
fourth type takes place when two or more meanings of a statement do not agree among 
themselves, but combine to make clear a more complicated state of mind in the author 
(Empson, 2004, 133). 
The fifth type of ambiguity occurs when the author is discovering his/her own idea 
in the act of writing. The author does not hold it all in mind at once. Empson (2004, 155) 
refers to “a simile which applies to nothing exactly, but lies halfway between two things 
when the author is moving from one to the other.” He uses an example from Shakespeare’s 
poetry: 
Our Natures do pursue
Like Rats that ravyn downe their proper Bane
A Thirsty Evil, and when we drink we die.
(Measure for Measure, I.ii.) (Empson, 2004, 155)
In this poem, “proper bane” becomes ambiguous, since it is water as well as poison. Poisons 
were designed to prevent rats from dying in the wainscot. Eating the poison corresponds 
to the “Fall of the Man,” and in this sense it is the drinking water, a healthy and natural 
human function, unavoidable in its nature, which brings death. This proper bane then 
becomes ambiguous. (Empson, 2004, 155.)
The sixth type of ambiguity takes place when a statement says nothing, by tautology, 
by contradiction, or by irrelevant statements. The reader is forced to invent statements of 
their own. Statements are liable to conflict with one another. (Empson, 2004, 176.) 
The seventh type of ambiguity is the most ambiguous. It takes place when the two 
meanings of the word, the two values of the ambiguity, are the two opposite meanings 
defined by the context. The total effect is to show a fundamental division in the writer’s 
mind (Empson, 2004, 192). 
Empson’s types of ambiguities are more illustrative in the literal context and March 
and Olsen’s ambiguities in the organizational and behavioral context. However, these 
different definitions assign that ambiguity includes more than two meanings and more. 
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Ambiguity is more than conciseness. In puns or puzzles, two things are said at once. 
However, ambiguity is constructed from more than this. If the pun or puzzle is quite 
obvious, there is no room for puzzling, and then there is no space for ambiguity (Empson, 
2004). 
3.1.2 Concept of rationality
The definition of bounded rationality requires the definition of what is meant by 
rationality. Sometimes it is better to define a concept by telling more of what it is not 
than of what it is (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, 109). To understand boundedly rational decision 
making, one must also understand rational decision making. 
There are plenty of connotations related to the term “rational.” Connotations range 
from formal notions of efficiency and consistency to the substantive notions of autonomy 
or self-determination. Rational action is action that stands in a certain relation to the 
agent’s beliefs and desires: that is, reasons. Reasons are reasons for the action. Reasons do, 
in fact, cause the action for which they are reasons, and the reasons cause the action in the 
right way (Elster, 1983, 1–3). 
In traditional economic theory, “economic man” was economic and also rational. 
Economic man had the knowledge of the environment, if not absolutely complete, at 
least impressively clear, and voluminous. Economic man had a well-organized and stable 
system of preferences and skills in computation to be able to calculate the alternative 
courses of action available to him (Simon, 1957, 241). 
This schematized model of economic man made Simon argue for the theoretical 
foundation. If an actor were a true rational actor, he would make “optimal” choices in 
a highly specified and clearly defined environment (March & Simon, 1959, 137). Full 
rationality would then require unlimited cognitive capabilities and capabilities to calculate 
the most suitable choice opportunities for each problem. In human decision making, full 
rational calculation is limited because of cognitive and decision making environmental 
bounds (Gigerenzer, 2002, 57–58). Simon suggested an alternative approach to the 
description of rational behavior that is related to psychological theories of perception and 
cognition (Simon, 1957, 273). 
Does rational behavior mean that the agent is doing what he is told to do? In addition, 
would irrational behavior then mean that the agent is doing otherwise? There is 
considerable evidence that this is not the case. There are many cases in which rationality 
can do no more than exclude certain alternatives. Rationality and rational beliefs are 
grounded in the available evidence (Elster, 1983, 1–2).
March and Olsen (1979, 11) pointed out that ideas with a “decision” as an outcome 
and “decision making” as a process are already confused by a semantic presumption 
that decision making is connected to the decision in a self-evident way. Rational choice 
involves guesses about future consequences of current actions and guesses about future 
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preferences for those consequences. What will happen in the future as a result of our 
actions is a wild guess (March, 1978, 589; Thompson, 2004). 
Elster (1979) refers to different explanations in science and behavioral models. All 
sciences use causal explanation. Physical sciences use causal explanation, in social sciences 
there is no place for functional sciences, and in biology there is no place for intentional 
explanation. Animal and human behavior should be studied with the notions of function 
and of intention as regulative ideas. Not all animal behavior is functional, not all human 
behavior is rational or intentional, but there is a presumption that this is typically the 
case. Human rationality is characterized by the capacity to relate to the future in contrast 
to the gradient-climbing that takes place in natural selection. Man is capable of taking 
the strategic nature of the context into account. In contrast to natural selection, man 
is capable of realizing the solution to games where no actor has a dominant strategy. A 
parametrically rational actor treats the environment as constant. 
However, the decision-maker is capable of taking the strategic nature of the context 
into account, as Elster describes above. Limited cognitive capabilities refer to decision-
makers’ limitations in terms of attention and memory, and in their capacities to learn 
and to solve problems (March & Simon, 1959, 136; March, 1988). The decision making 
environment, the context in which decisions are made, is essential. We know the history 
but we can make our own interpretations. We do not know what the future will bring. 
Altogether, a decision is rational only in a certain decision making context (Gigerenzer, 
2002). 
Is failure a lack of rationality? Failure does not necessarily imply a lack of rationality 
(Elster, 1979, 41). Irrationality can be explained as contradictions of the mind (Pears, 1986). 
In the boundedly rational world people make decisions surrounded by contradictions in 
a short time and with a lack of knowledge. Decision making is constrained by cognitive 
problems of attention, memory, comprehension and communication (Vakkuri, 2009). 
Possibilities to observe and consider observable variables in decision making are limited. 
Our memory capacity and our understanding of transactions are limited. In addition, 
our communication skills are limited. Perfect information to make decisions does not 
exist, but decisions have to be made. Human behavior is intelligent, even when it is not 
obviously so (March & Simon, 1959, 136; Cyert & March, 1963). 
3.1.3 Complete cycle of choice
Ambiguity in organizational decision making refers to complex and uncertain choice 
situations. March (1978, 587–589) specifies that rational choice involves guesses about 
uncertain future consequences and a guess about uncertain future preferences. A decision-
maker only tries to imagine what will happen in the future as a result of the actions, 
and imagines how to estimate what will happen. This definition sums up the struggle a 
decision-maker has to face with ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making (Vakkuri, 
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2010). The decision-maker has to struggle with the discrepancy between what they think 
the world ought to be and what the world actually is. 
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1979, 13) specified this discrepancy as producing 
individual behavior, aggregating into collective choices, and the outside world responding 
to these choices in a way that affects individual assessments of the state of the world and 
of the efficacy of the actions. This conception of choice the complete cycle of choice to 
describe how choices are actually made, and how environmental actions affect individuals’ 
cognitions, and their actions, and how this aggregates into the organizational level and 
actions, and overall, again into the environmental level.
Organizational choice includes four concepts:
(1) The cognitions and preferences held by individuals affect their behavior.
(2) The behavior (including participation) of individuals affects organizational 
choices.
(3) Organizational choices affect environmental acts (responses).
(4) Environmental acts affect individual cognitions and preferences.
Individual behavior is produced by the discrepancy between what individuals think the 
world ought to be and what the world actually is. Individual behavior is aggregated into 
collective, organizational actions and choices. In the end the outside world responds to 
this choice in some way that affects individual assessments both of the state of the world 
and of the efficacy of the actions (March & Olsen, 1976, 13).
The complete cycle of choice does not assume that behavior and attention would 
follow belief and attitude, as in most organization theories. Instead, people move in and 
out of choice situations. The flow of attention is dependent on scarce resources of time 
and energy. Practically, this means that involvement in a decision is not attractive for 
everyone in all relevant choice situations, all the time. Individuals do not act only in one 
arena (March & Olsen 1976, 14–15).
The connection between values and action is problematic in organizations. The decision 
process transforms the behavior of individuals into something called organizational 
action. Organizational choice is connected to individual action. Organizations could be 
seen as instruments of individuals. However, the connection between individual action 
Figure 1. Complete cycle of choice by March 
and Olsen (1976, 13).
Individual 
actions
Individuals’ 
cognitions
Organizational 
actions
Environmental 
actions
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and organizational action can be loose. Policies can be selected, prices set, people hired, 
and other organizational actions can be done without being strongly related to internal 
decision making processes (March & Olsen, 1976, 16). 
Actions and events in the environment may have a little to do with what the organization 
does. Environmental acts are relationships among events, actors, and structures in the 
environments more than responses to what the organization actually does. In other 
words, the same organizational actions will have different responses at different times, 
and different organizational actions will have the same response (March & Olsen 1976, 
17). 
Individuals and organizations develop myths, fictions, legends, and illusions and 
develop conflicts over these. Environmental actions and events are frequently ambiguous; 
it is not clear what happened and why it happened. Our interpretations are seldom based 
on our own observations and they rely heavily on the interpretations offered by others. 
Our trust in the interpretations is dependent on our trust in the interpreters. The degree 
of ambiguity will be dependent upon the efficiency of the channels through which 
interpretations are transmitted (March & Olsen, 1976, 18).
3.1.4 Garbage can model of organizational choice
Organizations have inconsistent and ill-defined preferences. Preferences can be discovered 
through action as much as they are the basis of action (March, 1999). Organizations deal 
with flows of problems, solutions, and decision-makers in garbage can situations. A 
decision is an outcome or an interpretation of several relatively independent “streams” 
within an organization: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities 
(March & Olsen, 1976, 26–27). 
Problems indicate the concerns of people inside and outside the organization, and they 
arise over different, and independent issues of, for example, lifestyle, family, frustrations 
at work, career, ideology, or current crises of mankind. All these issues require attention, 
but they may not be resolved while choices are made. Solutions are somebody’s products. 
In spite of the idea that answers cannot be found until the right questions have been 
formulated, this concept does not prevail in a garbage can situation. Participants come 
and go in a garbage can situation. Every entrance is an exit somewhere else, meaning 
that these entrances or choices depend on the attributes of the choice being left behind as 
much as on the attributes of the new choice being made (March & Olsen, 1976, 26). 
Choice opportunities refer to occasions when an organization is expected to produce 
decisions, for example, on contracts to be signed, people to be hired, money to be 
allocated. These four streams are not completely independent but their connections are 
random. The link between a problem and a solution depends heavily on the simultaneity 
of their arrival (March, 2006). An organizational choice is a fortuitous confluence (March 
& Olsen, 1979, 27). 
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Search rules, stop rules and decision rules
Herbert A. Simon described decision making as a search process guided by aspiration 
levels (Selten, 2002, 13–14). The search process goes on until a satisfactory alternative is 
found. The aspiration level means the value of a goal that must be reached by a satisfactory 
decision alternative. In the context of the theory of the firm by Cyert and March (1963), 
goal variables could be profit or market shares. In the context of public administration, 
variables could be public services and societal effectiveness. The search for alternatives, 
satisficing, and aspiration adaptation are features characterizing Simon’s view of bounded 
rationality (Selten, 2002, 13–14). 
Cyert and March (1963, 115) identified two sets of variables affecting the goals of an 
organization: the dimensions of the goals and the aspiration level. The dimensions of 
the goals means viewing the things that are important. The aspiration level is influenced 
by the organization’s past goal, past performance, and the past performance of other 
“comparable” organizations. The search goes on until a suitable choice is found and the 
decision is made. For example, a driver is searching for a parking place in a parking lot. 
The search process goes on until a satisfying alternative, a parking place, is found (Selten, 
2002). It is not necessarily the perfect parking place, right next to the entrance, but it is 
quite close to it, only a short walking distance to the main entrance. 
3.2 Performance management cycle
Management matters the most when the government or agency has a clear purpose and 
mission, when the government or agency has the flexibility to be able to pursue that 
purpose, when predictable action is valued for linking to results and performance, and 
where new leadership requires institutional strength and support for effective change 
(Ingraham, Joyce & Donahue, 2003, 123). 
Performance management was created to respond to these needs, to set clear and 
measurable performance targets to clarify the purpose and the mission of the public 
agencies. The definition of objectives has been central in the Finnish performance 
management systems. Management by objectives has affected the formulation of Finnish 
performance management (Möttönen, 1997, 45; Salminen & Viitala, 2006; Joustie, 2007).
Governance by targets and measured performance indicators is a form of indirect 
control that is necessary for the governance of complex systems. The form of control that 
target system represents is a version of homeostatic control in which desired results are 
specified in a measurable form in advance, where some system of monitoring measures 
performance against that specification, and a feedback mechanism is linked to measured 
performance (Bevan & Hood, 2006, 519). 
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Identifying policy problems, setting policy targets, and choosing and implementing 
policy actions, and evaluating policy performance are parts of the performance 
management cycle, as described in figure two. 
Organizations, and especially administrative organizations such as central government 
ministries and agencies, are decision making bodies processing problems concerning 
making choices about goals. The decision making process is divided into planning 
and preparation (identification of policy problems), decision making and choice, 
implementation (target setting and policy implementation), and control and evaluation 
(evaluating policy performance). Planning and preparation should produce information 
to support decision making and the choice situation. In the implementation phase, 
decisions should be executed efficiently and effectively following the actual purpose of 
the decisions. In the supervision and evaluation phase the consequences and advantages 
of the decision are evaluated and controlled (Anthony & Govindarajan, 1995; Jones & 
Pendlebury, 2000, 21). 
In the performance management cycle the decision-maker identifies policy problems 
rationally, sets policy targets properly, and chooses suitable policy actions to solve policy 
problems, and finally evaluates the effectiveness of policy actions. However, the world is 
much messier than this. Target setting, planning beforehand, and the reporting of results 
are ways to keep the managerial processes “neat” (Abrahamsson & Freedman, 2006). 
People distrust the idea that mess can work better than neatness. Moderately disorganized 
institutions and systems can frequently turn out to be more efficient, more resilient, more 
creative, and in general, more effective than when highly organized: 
If a cluttered desk signs a cluttered mind, of what, then, is an empty desk a sign? –Albert 
Einstein (Abrahamsson & Freedman, 2006)
IDENTIFICATION 
OF POLICY 
PROBLEMS
TARGET SETTING 
AND POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION
EVALUATING 
POLICY 
PERFORMANCE
Figure 2. Performance management 
cycle.
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Due to ambiguity and complexity, the purpose and the mission of the organization are not 
necessarily clear, or there is no flexibility to pursue these purposes, as Ingraham, Joyce and 
Donahue (2003) highlighted. Often, public organizations have ill-defined and inconsistent 
objectives (ambiguity of intention), connections between organizational actions and their 
consequences are difficult to understand (ambiguity of understanding), and the pattern 
of participation in organizational decision making is uncertain and changing (ambiguity 
of organization) (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1976).
Ambiguities cause incoherence in obeying the performance management cycle as a 
compatible cycle where each section follows another. In the coherence theory of truth 
there is coherence with some specified set of sentences, propositions, or beliefs (Young, 
1996). BonJour (1985, 93) defines coherence intuitively as a matter of how well a body 
of beliefs “hangs together.” One of the most characteristic features is the relationship 
between parts. When propositions cohere with a specified set of propositions and are not 
in contradiction, they are in coherence (Lammenranta, 1993, 134–136; Niiniluoto, 1997, 
110). In linguistics, coherence is what makes the texts semantically meaningful between 
paragraphs. 
However, the problem framing discourse is problematic. As Cohen, March and Olsen 
(1976, 27) identified, preferences may be discovered through action as much as them 
being the basis of action. Problems and solutions do not follow each other in a self-evident 
manner. In most cases, problem framing is an enlightened guess about the actual policy 
problem. An assumption that target setting will follow problem identification does not 
hold. Problem identification and target setting are consistent processes of success and 
failure and making changes. When problems are better identified, it affects target setting, 
and while targets are reached, or they are discovered, unattainable problems are identified 
again. In this sense, parts of the performance management cycle between problem 
identification and target setting are not in coherence. 
Targets should navigate policies and lead actions in a desirable way. Targets should 
show results with measurable indicators and also show whether actions are performing 
or not. After solving policy problems, the decision-maker should choose suitable policy 
actions. 
When performance of the actions is evaluated, it may turn out that targets were set 
for the wrong subjects, and the performance of the actions was caused by some other 
unintended measures and causes that were not even thought about. In this sense again, 
parts of the performance management cycle between target setting and evaluating 
performance are not in coherence. 
3.2.1 Identification of the policy problem 
Policy problems are complex and difficult to identify. Societal needs and problems are 
multi-dimensional and conflicting. The problem framing discourse is problematic. How 
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are policy problems identified, and what is the nature and the scope of actual policy 
problems (Parsons, 1995)? How do public policies come to be formed in a political-
administrative system? These are all interesting questions in terms of identifying public 
policies. 
Public policies are everything the government does and does not do. An interesting 
question is also what the government does not do. Preferences guide governmental decision 
making. However, what is ambiguous is that preferences may be discovered through action 
as much as through them being the basis of action (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1976, 27). This 
leads to the idea that we may have the solution even if we do not know what the actual 
problem is. In organizational decision making this means that you often do not know 
the question in terms of organizational problem solving until you know the answer. This 
causes ambiguity in problem identification and problem solving. In fire safety policy, this 
would mean that when fire deaths show a relative decrease in the number of fire deaths it 
may seem that the problem is solved. However, not until this point may the actual problem 
show itself as having been identified. 
Identifying the policy problem, policy alternatives, and solutions are questions of 
policy agendas and alternatives. Why are some of the problems on the governmental 
decision making agenda and some of them not, and what mechanism brings problems to 
governmental officials’ attention? 
According to Kingdon (2002, 90–91) policy problems come to the attention of the 
public and governmental decision makers not through political pressure or perceptual 
sleight of hand, but because some more or less systematic indicator simply shows that 
there is a problem out there. These indicators abound in the political world because 
governmental and non-governmental agencies both routinely monitor them. One of 
the most common monitoring activities is to follow the patterns of expenditures and 
budgetary impacts. Problems are directly affected through the budget process and by the 
rise and fall of the budget. People in the government know when their budgets are rising 
or falling. (Kingdon, 2002, 91.)
In addition to monitoring, studies on a particular problem by a government agency 
or by non-governmental researchers or academics may suggest a problem needing 
governmental attention. Indicators or studies are not primarily used to determine whether 
or not a given problem exists. What matters is the interpretation. Decision makers use 
indicators to assess the magnitude of a problem, how extensive the problem is, and also to 
become aware of possible changes in the problem. (Kingdon, 2002, 91.) 
Problems are not self-evident through the use of indicators. Usually, focusing events, 
crises, or disasters come along to call attention to the problem. A powerful event or even 
a symbol, for example, 9-11, can catch the attention of political decision makers all over 
the world. The function of a crisis is that it gets the attention of governments (Kingdon, 
2002, 94). Crisis situations can create a political window of opportunity to certain agendas 
(Kingdon, 2002; Ahonen, 2009, 95). 
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Fire safety policy gets the attention of political decision makers because fires and fire 
deaths are crises and they are measured on the governmental Internal Safety Program. 
Interpretations of the decision makers are essential. How extensive the problem is seen to 
be, what the magnitude of the problem is, and if there have been changes in the problem 
are questions decision makers have to solve. 
Connecting solutions to problems 
Policy problems may also be associated with different solutions. In that, the significance 
of the problems cannot be distinguished from the solutions (March & Olsen, 1979). 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 150) present an example of drug abuse. It is evident that 
drug abuse is bad; however, what is, essential is what the nature of the governmental 
response to this problem should be; the government decisions about the solutions to be 
adapted. Incarceration of users and dealers, interdiction, treatment, and education are 
various approaches to the problem. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) present that solutions 
are attached to problems and that they influence policy dynamics later. De Lint and Virta 
(2004) write about safety politics as “living with ambiguity,” meaning that safety politics 
always include ambiguity in terms of the problems and solutions that are raised. 
Alcohol abuse has been a problem longer than, for example, illegal drug abuse. 
However, alcohol abuse is more easily accepted by the political system than drug abuse. 
One explanatory factor is that familiar, routine problems are more easily accepted than 
unusual or unfamiliar ones (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 6). An interesting question is 
how this is considered when formulating fire safety policy. 
Fire deaths are a policy problem that is difficult to define, especially in the light of 
individual choice and the collective choice, but also in the light of responsibility between 
citizens and the government. Government represents the collective choice exercised 
through governmental actions. Government is responsible for providing rescue services 
and measures. An intriguing question is when is public intervention needed? When 
should citizens be held responsible for their own individual behavior and choice, and when 
should the government intervene and be held accountable for its actions. Collective choice 
offers at least the possibility of correcting the perceived deficiencies of individual choice 
(Weimer & Vining, 1989, 94). In some cases, society and governmental officials have a 
duty to intervene in citizen’s behavior by limiting their personal freedom, for example by 
arresting and imprisoning while breaking the law or committing a serious crime. 
3.2.2 Target setting in organizations 
Target setting is a way to make organizations rational and functional. NPM represents 
this strong rationality and functionality in organizational behavior. However, a strong 
primacy of rationality, in relating consequences systematically to objectives, rejects other 
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procedures aimed at choice and excludes the processes of intuition, and the processes of 
tradition, and faith (March, 1988, 254–255). 
Why are organizational targets set, and what purpose do they serve? Etzioni (1964, 
5) identifies functions for organizational targets: to portray the future state of affairs to 
strive for; to set guidelines for organizational activity; to constitute a source of legitimacy, 
justifying the activities of an organization, and its existence; and to provide standards by 
which members of an organization and outsiders can assess the success of the organization. 
March (1988, 254–255) identifies target setting as a way of expressing an organization’s 
purpose and of how it intends to strive towards this purpose. Action in an organization 
is explained in terms of this purpose. Action should serve the purpose and it should be 
defined in terms of a consistent set of pre-existent goals or targets. The pre-existence of 
a purpose is one of the features in choice behavior and target setting. Targets are set by 
evaluating alternatives on the basis of the information that is available. Eventually, choice 
should be based on a consistent theory of the relation between action and its consequences. 
If action in an organization is explained in terms of its’ purpose what purpose is 
then actually served generally in organizations and especially in the rescue services? 
Organizational theorists claim organizations generally understood to be systems of 
coordinated and controlled activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizations create order 
instead of stateless. 
The new institutionalism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) proposes 
that formal organization structure is shaped by institutional forces; including rational 
myths, knowledge legitimated through the educational system, and by the professions, 
public opinion, and the law. Organizations are deeply embedded in social and political 
environments, and organizational practices and structures are often either reflections of, 
or responses to rules, beliefs, and conventions built into the wider environment (Powell, 
2008). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 148) define organizations that, on the whole, constitute 
a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products, and 
the totality of the relevant factors. DiMaggio and Powell highlight the coercive, normative, 
and mimetic processes of reproduction. Coercive factors involve political pressures, the 
force of the state, and regulatory oversight and control. Normative factors are rooted in 
the influence of the professions and the role of education, and mimetic process draw on 
habitual, taken-for-granted responses to circumstances of uncertainty (Powell, 2008). 
Organizations are, for many people, a main source of their identity (Czarniawska-Joerges, 
1992, 2), or social units devoted primarily to the attainment of specific goals (Parsons, 
1966; Etzioni, 1961, xi). 
Brunsson (2000, 4) identifies that organizations exist to coordinate action and to 
achieve results, which would be beyond the reach of unorganized individual actions. 
Brunsson and Olsen (1993, 4) identify organizations as institutionalized when their 
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behavior is determined by culturally conditioned rules, which manifest themselves 
in certain routines for action and which give meaning to those actions. According to 
Anthony and Govindarajan (1995, 5), an organization consists of a group of people 
working together. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977, 340) distinguish between the formal structure of an 
organization and its actual day-to-day activities. The formal structure is a blueprint for 
actions including the manner of organization, listing of offices, departments, positions, 
and programs. These elements are linked by targets and policies and they create a rationally 
suitable theory as to how actions should be fitted together. There is a considerable gap 
between the formal and the informal organization. Formal organizations are often loosely 
coupled, and structural elements and activities are only loosely linked to each other 
(March & Olsen, 1976; Weick, 2001; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
The formal organization structure requires the blueprint to express the aims of the 
organization. Through this, organizations express their purpose and aims, and how they 
intend to strive toward these purposes. 
Organizations are oriented around goals or targets. Targets can be seen as providers 
to purpose towards decisions and activities (Simon, 1957, 112). In public policies, targets 
and indicators are usually less tangible. For example, an increase in a fire safety policy and 
in the welfare of society is difficult to measure, but operations are still more likely to be 
organized and the results are expected by the public.
However, all operations are not surrounded by targets. Operations outside the target-
orientation can also lead to results. In addition, results can also be achieved in sectors for 
which the targets would not have been set at all (Kassel, 2008, 241–252; Autero, 2009, 118).
Target setting is a choice situation. Targets are made by evaluating alternatives on the 
basis of the available information. The pre-existence of a purpose is one of the features 
in choice behavior. Values, needs, wants, preferences, goals, and drives all reflect the 
tendency to believe in a set of objectives that are prior features or attributes of the system 
and make the observed behavior seem intelligent in terms of these objectives (March, 
1988, 254–255). 
In public policies, targets and indicators are usually less tangible. For example, an 
increase in internal security or in societal welfare is difficult to measure, but operations 
are still more likely to be measured.
As Meyer and Rowan (1977) described, organizations have their formal structure 
with targets in the blueprint and the actual informal day-to-day activities. Performance 
agreements represent the formal structure and the blueprint in the organization. However, 
this does not mean that the objectives defined in the agreement would be consistent with 
what the organization actually does in its day-to-day activities. 
Besides, connections between organizational actions and their consequences are 
difficult to understand. An assumption about known future consequences is problematic. 
The future is uncertain and a decision-maker cannot know the exact future consequences 
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of a chosen course of action. The assumption that decision-maker would have known, 
coherent and stable preferences in decision making is difficult to sustain in practice. 
(Sjögren, 2006, 29). 
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very 
small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively 
rational behavior in the real world – or even for a reasonable approximation to such 
objective rationality. (Simon, 1957, 198) 
As observed in the complete cycle of choice, individual preferences and cognitions are 
aggregated into organizational choices. This process can be bureaucratic-administrative 
or bargaining-political. The bureaucratic-administrative procedure is a process by 
which problems are solved, relevant solutions are associated with appropriate problems, 
and choices are made in order to resolve problems. The bargaining-political procedure 
is a process by which coalitions are formed and political bargains struck. Choices are 
made by forming a group with sufficient power to enforce a joint solution to a problem 
(Cohen, March & Olsen, 1976, 24). Fire safety policy target setting is more bureaucratic-
administrative. This is studied empirically in chapter six. 
3.2.3 Performance evaluation 
Performance evaluation in this study refers to efforts that increase human effectiveness 
through systematic data-based inquiry. When one examines and judges accomplishments 
and effectiveness, one is engaged in evaluation, and when the examination of effectiveness 
is conducted systematically and empirically through careful data collection and thoughtful 
analysis, it is called evaluation research (Patton 1990, 11).
Evaluation and research are concepts that are closely related. The systematic inquiry of 
data gives feedback to management on accomplishing certain results. In the performance 
evaluations in public management, it is important to know what the outcomes of public 
policies are. 
Outcomes are results gained due to public policies and to other actors. In performance 
evaluation, the focal question is who will take the credit for the intended results? The 
purpose of measuring outcomes is to assess the valuation placed on the activity (Smith, 
1996, 1–2). Smith identifies an outcome as a personal valuation of a quality-adjusted output. 
Quality adjusted measures could be, for example, exam success rates in schools, or victims 
saved from fires. Output measures would be measures of process such as pupils taught, or 
safety measures performed. The value added by the schools or the rescue services would 
be more refined quality measures that were starting to take on the characteristics of an 
outcome measure. According to Smith (1996), there is a continuous spectrum between the 
traditional output measures and the pure outcome measures. 
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Outcomes can be distinguished from outputs of an activity, but measuring outcomes is 
an entirely different matter, entailing tracing ramifications or actions throughout society. 
Outcome measuring relates to, for example, measuring improvements in the health of 
the population instead of measuring hospital activity. Or measuring intellectual capital 
produced by schools instead of measuring the number of pupils taught (Smith, 1996, 2). 
Measuring safety in society is an outcome measure of the internal safety policy, instead 
of measuring the efficiency of the rescue services. Another intriguing question concerns 
how to evaluate performance and measure the outcomes of the intended actions in the 
rescue services, fire brigades, ERC, or in the Emergency Service College. Who will take 
the credit or blame for the actual results? The state ensures protection for its citizens as a 
public service. Rescue operations and services are state provided public goods for citizens; 
however, the rescue services are provided by the municipalities. But the government is 
held responsible for the actions of fire safety policy and for reducing the number of fire 
deaths. 
Thus, what makes performance evaluation ambiguous is that there are numerous actors 
affecting the policy problem. The government can be held responsible for the actions but 
the overall effectiveness is brought about through several actors and measures. Measures 
range from legislation, regulations and stipulating safety instructions, to buildings and 
fire-extinguishing equipment (alarms, sprinklers), to selling self-extinguishing cigarettes, 
producing rescue operations and services, supervising the services and the functions 
of the fire brigades, not to mention preventive measures such as chimney sweeping, or 
fire inspections. Increasing public awareness of fire safety and risky situations through 
marketing is also a measure affecting organizations and individuals in their decisions and 
preventing accidents. Who takes the credit or blame for the successes or failures in terms 
of these measures is a question that needs to be solved through performance evaluations. 
Performance evaluations can be target based or non-target based. The performance 
management model is based on target setting and for this reason the performance 
evaluations are also based on targets. Were targets accomplished or not, and if not, why 
not, and how should targets be met better in the future are questions to be solved through 
evaluation. Additionally, what the intended effects and non-intended effects were and 
what any side effects were are questions to be solved via performance evaluation. 
A closer understanding of what causes fire deaths, or causes changes in the decrease or 
increase requires evaluation in both the material and the social world. The material world 
refers to the world of technical devices from fire safety equipment, to fire-extinguishing 
systems, and to the operationalization of the entire rescue services that exist in the material 
world. The material world is real and can have real effects on the decrease or increase in 
fire deaths. The social world in which fires occur is real too, and it can have effects on the 
decrease or increase in fire deaths. The Government Program and the Internal Security 
Program are political and social programs attempting to address existing social problems 
and make a change at the social level in terms of these problems. 
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Pawson and Tilley (1997) termed realist evaluation as an approach grounded in 
realism, which asserts that both the material and the social worlds are ‘real’ and can 
have real effects, and it is possible to work toward a closer understanding of what causes 
change. Some of the implications that Pawson and Tilley raised for program evaluation 
fit well to fire safety policy. Social programs are an attempt to address an existing social 
problem and create some level of social change. Programs work if they enable participants 
to make different choices, although choice-making is always constrained by participants’ 
cognitive abilities, previous experiences, beliefs and attitudes, and the decision making 
context. However, making and sustaining different choices requires a change in the 
participant’s reasoning and the resources they have available to them. For example, a 
change in reasoning means values, beliefs, attitudes, or the logic they apply to a particular 
situation for example, in smoking and alcohol abuse. The resources they have available 
are, for example, information, skills, material resources and support (e.g. knowledge), fire 
alarms, and extinguishing systems. The combination of reasoning and resources is what 
enables the program to work and is known as a program mechanism. 
However, programs work in different ways for different people and programs can 
trigger different change mechanisms for different participants. The contexts in which 
programs operate such as within social, economic, and political structures or in the 
organizational context, geographical, or historical context can make a difference to the 
outcomes achieved. Some factors in the context may enable particular mechanisms to 
be triggered. Other aspects of the context may prevent particular mechanisms from 
being triggered. There is always an interaction between context and mechanism, and 
that interaction is what creates the impacts or outcomes; that is, the context and the 
mechanism produces the outcome. As measures work differently in different contexts 
and through different change mechanisms, measures cannot simply be replicated from 
one context to another and automatically achieve the same outcomes. An understanding 
about what works for whom, in what contexts, and how, are important questions in public 
interventions. Therefore, one of the tasks in evaluating performance and outcomes is to 
learn more about these questions and also about what mechanisms are triggered by, and 
in what contexts. 
Performance of public actions and operations is a construction of multilevel actors in 
the public and private sector and non-profit sector (the context). Allocating budget money 
into rescue services is a mechanism to effect fire safety policy at the political level. Public 
sector organizations such as emergency response centers and fire brigades are responsible 
for producing efficient rescue services. The Emergency Service College is responsible for 
educating professionally skilled firefighters and squads. Producing rescue services and 
educating firefighters is a mechanism and also involves resources. Making and sustaining 
different choices at the citizen level is also a mechanism and it requires a change in the 
participant’s reasoning as to whether to smoke, use alcohol, and take care of fire alarm 
systems. The mechanism in fire deaths is a combination of reasoning and resources, 
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and the interaction between context and mechanism creates the impacts or outcomes of 
performance. 
3.2.4 Ambiguity and coherence
What is the relationship between ambiguity and coherence? Why are these two concepts 
used in this study? These two concepts are used to study complexity in performance 
management and examine why it is so hard to “get things done” and to “decide and do” in 
public administration. These two concepts are used to study the world where the public 
manager actually lives and makes decisions. 
As mentioned above in chapter 3.1.1, ambiguity illustrates the complexity in 
organizational behavior and choice situations. Ambiguity explains what makes problem 
identification, target setting, implementation, and performance evaluation problematic. 
Coherence explains what makes them inconsistent, but it is more elusive and difficult to 
define (Audi, 2001). 
Shepherd and Sutcliffe (2011, 365) divide coherence theory into two main branches: 
perception and explanation. The coherence theory of perception explains how data, as 
quanta, is turned into a representation that is used to “see” objects or relationships between 
objects. What is essential is where people focus their attention. Attention is guided by 
knowledge based on past experience, for example, on preconceptions or the formation of 
a gist. A gist is a holistic representation of the environment that does not require attention 
to stabilize a subset of the environmental stimuli. The coherence theory of explanation 
explains how perception becomes represented in beliefs. People attend to data and then 
make inferences in order to tie the data into a coherent mental representation that can be 
used to explain the phenomenon. 
The belief system is essential in coherence. Audi (2001, 24) uses an example of a fan 
running on the roof and making a whirring sound. The whirring sound implies that 
the fan is running, but it is not necessarily so. If someone is imitatively creating the 
whirring sound, the justification for believing that the fan is running is undermined by 
the incoherence in the belief system. Several beliefs are needed in order to achieve the 
relevant coherence. For example, hearing should be normal; there should be no other 
machine nearby making the same sound, and so on. It is not quite clear how far this goes 
on, and whether we form that many beliefs of the ordinary kind in question. However, 
justification concerns one’s beliefs about the world, even without being able to show them. 
Another example of Audi’s (2001, 25) implies dependence in coherence. A job is the 
source of one’s income. The job is vulnerable to severe depression. Depression would 
eliminate the income. However, it does not follow that the absence of a depression is a 
source of one’s income. Positive economic conditions are not a source either, although 
one’s source depends on them. Without enabling conditions, nothing can be served as 
a source of anything. Conditions can be conceptual and psychological. For example, if a 
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child has no concept of an insurance inspector then seeing one examining a damaged car 
and talking to its owner is not a source of justification for the proposition.
Another relevance of coherence in this study can be defined as a political imperative 
that derives from the threat of appearing inconsistent in the electoral arena, and an 
economic imperative that arises from the need to organize a large, complex organization 
to conserve scarce public resources (Di Francesco, 2001, 105). To get things “done” and 
look compatible in the eyes of the electorate is one incentive. 
Policy coherence is often taken to imply that various policies “go together” sharing a 
set of ideas or aims (Van Bommel & Kuindersma, 2008, 19). However, policy coherence is a 
relative concept, elusive, and difficult to define (Audi, 2001; Olsson, 2005, 12). Jones (2002, 
391) segregates coherence from policy coordination and consistency with the argument 
that coherence goes further in the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy 
actions. BonJour (1985, 93) defines coherence intuitively as a matter of how well a body 
of beliefs hangs together. Coherence becomes relevant once the reliability of informants 
is in doubt and we are unable to take that which is being reported at face value (Olsson, 
2005, 10). 
In policy coherence, “coherence” is taken to imply that different policies “go together” 
and share a set of ideas and aims. Policy coherence can be studied based on the policy 
sector, the target group, or geographic area. Policy coherence can be defined as a systematic 
promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions across government departments and 
agencies, creating synergies toward achieving the defined objective (Jones, 2002, 391). 
Policy coherence is not about choosing between conflicting aims, but more about enabling 
the process through which both the aims and means can be redefined and achieve better 
outcomes. This study demonstrates fire safety policy and mutually reinforcing policy 
actions across governmental policy actors to study how different policies can “go together.” 
Ambiguity and coherence are not concepts that are mutually exclusive. They are 
concepts that are proximal, but they have their own different theoretical tasks. Both 
concepts are used to study performance management in the context of fire safety policy 
but with different purposes. 
The following section represents the conceptual framework of safety research. Essential 
concepts of safety are relative and bounded into context. This is examined further in 
the following section. Ambiguity and coherence construct the theoretical framework of 
organizational decision making and the safety research framework offers an approach to 
study fire deaths in the emergency context. 
3.3 Conceptual framework of safety research 
Besides the bounded rationality decision making theory and ambiguity (Simon & 
March, 1959), this study applies a combination, or a “weft” of emergency, disaster, and 
risk-management approaches to scrutinize the case of fire deaths (Davies & al., 2003). 
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This “weft” includes the human error approach and systemic error approach (Perrow, 
1999; Bogner, 1994; Reason, 1990), meaning that accidents occur in systems with many 
components and complex interconnections. However, this study does not include technical 
approaches or models to explain huge disasters such as Three Mile Island in 1979 or the 
Chernobyl disaster in 1986 (Bogner, 1994). This research is more focused into a loosely 
coupled system of fire safety and other policies and their interconnections (Perrow, 1999). 
3.3.1 Prior research
Prior research is elaborated on ahead of the context of safety research. Prior safety 
research is divided into the study of natural disasters and emergencies, and human-made 
attacks and accidents based on the research subjects. Classification could be done in many 
other ways, for example, based on different disciplines of science, for example, social 
sciences, political sciences, criminology, military science, engineering, economics, or 
organizational sciences. This is done more completely in the concept definitions of safety 
(3.3.2). The classification based on the research subjects describes the modern problems 
of safety research in society today. 
Natural disasters can be global and effect wide areas at the same time. A disaster does 
not have to hit a home area for its effect to be felt there (Rikoski, 2008). This happened in 
the case of Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, which also affected Scandinavian tourists or 
hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, which affected numerous states in the USA.
In the 21st century, safety policy issues have varied broadly from international terrorism 
to natural disasters. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have kept attacks in the 
public awareness for the last decade. The responses of policymakers to these events have 
been under observation (May, Sapotichne & Workman, 2009, 797). An essential question 
concerns how governments will now respond to and prepare for these unpredictable 
disasters and attacks. 
Collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organizations is 
necessary when dealing with disasters, attacks, and accidents. Governments usually have 
the leading role in cases of emergency, but the capacity to plan for disasters and their 
consequences is not purely the governments’ responsibility. In response to disasters, not 
only public organizations, but also non-profit and private organizations need to cooperate. 
Cooperation is necessary when dealing with natural disasters and attacks (Waugh & 
Streib, 2006; Moynihan, 2007; 2008; Rikoski, 2008). 
As governments do not have the capacity to plan for disasters and their consequences 
in isolation, in most cases, multiorganizational and multisectoral cooperation is essential. 
The Red Cross, Salvation Army and churches are voluntary organizations working with 
crises and accidents. However, different accidents require different partners working 
in unison. In the case of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, important co-operational 
partners were travel agencies and also a local group of Finnish divers. Travel agencies 
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contacted tourist guides in resorts and a local group of Finnish divers supported rescue 
work and evacuation, advised on local circumstances, and passed on information 
regarding victims to relatives and families in Finland via a homemade web site. 
Emergency management requires the participation of many governmental, voluntary, 
and private organizations. Consequently, much research has been done on social network 
analysis to map multiorganizational networks (Mattila & Uusikylä, 1999; Drabek, 
2003; Rikoski, 2008). What is the best way to organize and manage the consequences 
of a disaster or an emergency? As mentioned, in most cases the government lacks the 
capacity to manage consequences alone, and needs collaboration. Mixed collaboration 
and hierarchical command structure serve the function best (Rikoski, 2008). 
One way to scrutinize disasters is to break disasters into phases and view whose 
responsibility it is to correspond in each phase: pre-impact, impact, immediate post-
impact, recovery, and long-term reconstruction; warning, impact, emergency and 
recovery; warning, evacuation, emergency response, and restoration. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency of the United States divides disasters into mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. These specific phases overlap and boundaries may 
be indistinct, but the idea is to plan and to prepare whose responsibility it is to respond in 
each phase (Rikoski, 2008; 48–49). 
Governmental organizations and officials typically have leading and coordinating 
roles in disaster response. However, many governmental and non-governmental 
organizations and individuals may be part of the disaster response without planning to do 
so. For example, in the Indian Ocean Tsunami case, Finnish government officials failed 
in terms of communication. Victims’ relatives were not informed, and in the beginning, 
an official announcement claimed there were no Finnish victims, although the truth was 
crueler, and the total loss of lives was 178. The government failed to communicate. On 
the contrary, the group of Finnish divers passed information to relatives and families 
in Finland. Their ability to act and responsed in the crisis was more resilient than the 
government’s ability. Travel agencies also played an essential role in contacting passengers 
and tourist guides in different resorts and territories. They also began an evacuation 
process with the government officials. 
However, residential fires and fire deaths studied in this research are accidents and 
continuous accidents of significance, in that fires do occur in time. They change form 
and extent, but their future existence cannot be removed, and this makes fire prevention 
indispensable (see chapter 2.1). 
Perrow (1999) defines accidents as an interaction of multiple failures. Failures can 
be made by humans and systems. Humans making mistakes have been studied as the 
“human error problem” (Reason, 2003). This is a classic individualistic view of a person 
or an operator committing “errors.” The human error problem has been studied widely in 
nuclear power plant accidents such as Three Mile Island in 1979 or the Chernobyl disaster 
in 1986, in medicine, and in aviation (Bogner, 1994; Perrow, 1999). 
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Reason (2003, 2) writes about the cognitive “balance sheet.” This automaticity means 
that slip-ups and actions-not-as-planned will be inevitable. Faultless performance and 
systematic errors are two sides of the same coin. Behavior can be non-intentional, 
unintentional, and intentional, but mistaken. The notion of intention and error is 
inseparable (Reason, 2003). Davies et al. (2003) found that one of the problems with 
ergonomics is that writers emphasizing the system aspects of error, also emphasized 
the “cognitivist” aspect. In other words, errors would be known aspects in systematic 
behavior, “in cognition.” 
System error has been studied in terms of failures in the system such as mechanical 
errors, environmental errors, mistakes in system design, and procedures (Perrow, 1999, 
7). Systemic error has been studied especially in fire safety research, material research, 
studies on fire physics, and in statistical research assessing fire risks (Tillander, 2004). Fire 
physics and safety systems are wide research areas, but this research digs into the public 
decision making problem and fire deaths as a political-administrative decision making 
problem, and in that context, particularly the human error aspect is emphasized. 
However, fire deaths are a combination of human error and systemic error. Carelessness 
and lack of caution were contributory factors in most fire deaths during 2007–2010 
in Finland (Kokki & al., 2008; Kokki & Jäntti, 2009; Kokki, 2011). Human behavior is 
essential in the further investigation on fire deaths and in considering the circumstances 
of fires, and whether preparations were made to prevent the accident, and what could have 
been done to prevent these accidents. 
3.1.1.1 Emergencies and accidents 
The evolution of emergencies and emergency management has transitioned from the civil 
defense focus of the Cold War to the all-hazards focus of the 1990s (Waugh & Streib, 2006, 
131). Emergency management has risen in importance since the catastrophic hurricanes, 
tsunamis, and terrorist attacks of the first decade of the second millennium. 
Catastrophes, disasters, terrorist attacks, and devastating accidents have become more 
common, and the daily news tells us about accidents all over the world. Accidents and 
disasters are no longer only a problem for certain countries in certain geographic areas, or 
countries with a risky political, or religious status. 
In emergency management, it is not unusual that different government agencies, 
voluntary organizations, and organizations that have not worked together before come 
together when responding to the emergency (Rikoski, 2008, 9).
Emergency management is a broad set of functions such as hazard mitigation to prevent 
or lessen the impact of a disaster, disaster preparedness, disaster response activities, and 
disaster recovery (Waugh & Streib, 2006, 131). Being resilient in the face of uncertainty 
is the ultimate task for emergency management (Handmer & Dovers, 2007, 30; Weick, 
2001; Perrow, 1999). Emergency management is the function that plans, coordinates, and 
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supports a wide range of activities to reduce vulnerability to hazards, to prepare for, and 
cope with disasters. 
Emergencies, disasters, and accidents can be divided into human-made and natural 
disasters. This research focuses on fire deaths as accidents caused by humans. What 
sort of accident type are fire deaths? Accidents can be divided into component failure 
accidents and system accidents (Perrow, 1999, 64). Systems are divided into four levels: 
units, parts, sub-systems, and systems. Incidents involve damage to, or failures of parts or 
a unit only, even though the failure may stop the output of the system, or affect it to the 
extent that it must be stopped. Accidents involve damage to subsystems or the system as 
a whole, stopping the intended output, or affecting it to the extent that it must be halted 
promptly. Component failure accidents involve one or more component failures (part, 
unit, or subsystem) that are linked in an anticipated sequence. System accidents involve 
the unanticipated interaction of multiple failures (Perrow, 1999, 63–100).
Humans are part of systems, and a group of humans or a single human can constitute 
a subsystem. Damage to these will cause an accident (Perrow, 1999, 66). It is the character 
of systems that can cause the damage. This is why systems have catastrophic potential. 
Catastrophic potential systems can cause damage to a great many humans, first-party 
victims, second-party victims, third-party victims, and fourth-party victims. 
First-party victims are the operators of the system (pilots, ship officers, nuclear plant 
officers). They run the system or attend on regular shifts. Second-party victims are non-
operating personnel or system users without influence over the system, for example, 
passengers on a ship. They are not innocent bystanders, because they are aware and 
informed of their exposure. They choose to participate in the system. Third-party victims 
are innocent bystanders who have no involvement in the system. For example, living near 
a nuclear plant in the USA is not voluntary, because nuclear plants exist near all densely 
populated areas. There is no practical means to avoid them.
Fourth-party victims are fetuses and future generations. They are victims of radiation 
and toxic chemicals, would-be children whose damaged parents will not be able to conceive, 
stillborn children conceived after exposure, and people who will be contaminated in the 
future by residual substances (Perrow, 1999, 66–69). 
In the case of fire deaths, first-party victims are firefighters. They are the operators of 
the system. Second-party victims are relatives, neighbors, and inhabitants in detached-
houses if they are aware and informed of the exposure. Third-party victims are neighbors 
and inhabitants that have no involvement in the system and are not aware of the exposure. 
Fourth-party victims are the would-be children that damaged parents will not be able to 
conceive. 
In spite of engineered safety features, accidents always happen. Humans also 
make mistakes and systems do fail. Human error spans the disciplinary gulf between 
psychological theory and the reliability of hazardous technologies (Reason, 2003). The 
interaction of multiple failures is one explanation for accidents (Perrow, 1999). It means 
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that a series of failures interact and become serious. However, the difference between 
human error and system safety error is that the failures are loosely coupled. Events in a 
system can occur independently, although they can be involved in the same production 
sequence, yet one event was not caused by the other. Tightly coupling means interactive 
systems that are tightly coupled together. Most of the time we do not notice the inherent 
coupling, because most of the time there are no failures, or failures that have occurred do 
not interact (Perrow, 1999, 7–8).
For example if the battery has not been changed or is missing, the fire alarm will not 
sound the alarm in the case of a fire and the victim will not notice the danger while asleep. 
Forgetting to change the battery or ignoring it is a human error. Mechanical failure would 
be a dysfunction in the fire-alarming system. The system would fail. This is dualism; 
separating human error and mechanical failure. Disconnecting human contributions 
from mechanical contributions requires deconstruction – the ability to disconnect the 
material and human cause. This is a demanding task. Additionally, with a growth of 
system size and complexity, the nature of accidents is changing all the time. Systems 
incrementally push their operations toward the edges of their dynamic environments 
(Dekker, 2005, 1–3). 
The cause of the accident can be found in the complexity of the system, failures in 
design, equipment, operators, procedures, or environment. However, it is the interaction 
of the multiple failures that explains the accident (Perrow, 1999, 7). 
3.3.1.2 Disasters and crises
There are differences in the conceptual use of “disasters” and “crises.” Disaster and 
crisis management literature uses concepts of crises and disasters. Instead, public policy 
theorists traditionally use concepts such as “external events,” “external perturbations” 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), “external shocks” (Ingram & al., 2007), “focusing 
events” (Kingdon, 2002), or “critical junctures” (Hogan & Doyle, 2009). Nohrstedt and 
Weible (2010, 5) divide external events, perturbations, and shocks, generally meaning 
broader processes of societal and or political development without analytical attention 
to actors’ reactions to these events. Focusing on events and critical junctures, Nohrstedt 
and Weible (2010, 5) identify capturing the impulse and the inherent parts of the societal 
and or political processes that are triggered by certain events including, for example, 
heightened attention. 
Natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, floods, and wildfires, or, for example, 
the tsunami in the Indian Ocean 2004, have kept natural disasters in global public 
awareness. In the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in Thailand in 2004, 178 Finns and 543 
Swedes were killed. In Finland, the Tsunami caused the largest number of lost lives after 
the Second World War. Most of the victims were on vacation in Thailand during the 
Christmas holidays. The estimation is that, overall, 150,000 to 300,000 people were killed 
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in the Tsunami. The exact number of victims is unknown (Yle, Elävä Arkisto, 1). Some 
estimations rise to more than 286,000 victims (Barnshaw, 2009). 
The tsunami was one of the worst natural disasters in history. It hit the poorest people 
in the poorest coastline in the Aceh of Indonesia most heavily. Sri Lanka, India, and 
Thailand also suffered from losses in human lives. The tsunami affected the locals, and 
also a number of Christmas, and New Year tourists from other parts of the world. This 
addresses that natural disasters are global and can affect many countries at the same time. 
Since large natural disasters and catastrophes usually happen abroad affecting 
mainly tourists and visitors, it makes emergency planning and international emergency 
planning, and cooperation between different geographical areas and between different 
organizations, public, non-profit, and private companies even more important. 
Hurricanes and tornadoes are still quite distant from the Finnish context, but strong 
straight-line winds have also concerned Finland. Damaging thunderstorm winds caused 
storms called “Asta” and “Veera” in summer 2010 (Yle 30.07.2010). Storms cut down wide 
areas of forest, especially in Eastern parts of Finland, blocking roads, and causing power 
cuts, and the economic damage was substantial. Storms also caused substantial economic 
damage during the Christmas holidays in 2011. Entire population centers were without 
electricity for days, especially in parts of Eastern Finland and overall, 300,000 houses were 
estimated to have gone without electricity (Yle 27.12.2011). 
3.3.1.3 Terrorism and attacks
The terrorist attack of 9-11 in 2001, school shooting attacks, and explosions have kept 
human-made attacks in global awareness. In the 9-11 attacks almost 3,000 people were 
killed in a series of suicide attacks by Al-Qaeda in the United States on September 11, 
2001. Al-Qaeda hijacked commercial passenger airliners and intentionally crashed into 
the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and also hit the Pentagon in 
Arlington. The United States of America and the Bush Government responded to the 
attacks by launching a “War on Terrorism” and invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to find 
Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking Al-Qaeda members to put them on trial, and to 
remove the Al-Qaeda – supporting Taliban regime. 
Terrorism and war has changed their format since the 9-11 attack, and since that 
point, the USA stated that it waging a “war” against terrorism, and has used methods of 
war to fight against this fragmented, global, and non-sovereign community (Huhtinen, 
2005, 76). Later on, President Obama announced the war on terror to be no longer valid 
(Jantunen, 2010). US forces killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011 (BBC 2 May, 
2011). War is a question of life and death for the country concerned, and for this reason, it 
must be carefully studied. War or an armed conflict is not an occasional irregularity, but 
a repeated conscious operation (Sun Tzu, 1990, 49). Terrorism is ideologically motivated 
violence (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 
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The 9-11 terrorist attack aimed at civilians and altered traditional warfare into abrupt 
attacks that can happen anywhere. America has great power, and is possessed of military 
might, and a wide-ranging economy (Bergen, 2006). World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
were symbols of economic and military might. The battlefield can be “traditional,” as 
well as involving business centers, and civilian environments. The discrepancy between 
terrorism and attacks is more in the depth and intention of the actions undertaken. 
In Finland, the Myyrmanni shopping mall explosion in 2002 claimed seven lives, 
including that of the bomber himself. The bomber was a 20-year-old-chemistry-student, 
who was actively participating in the Internet bombing discussions (Yle, Elävä Arkisto, 2). 
School shootings in Jokela claimed eight victims in 2007, and in Kauhajoki, 11 victims in 
2008. These examples have shown that disasters and attacks are no longer distant, are no 
longer not in Finnish society nor in the school environment either. 
The Jokela school incident was reminiscent of the Columbine High school shooting 
in Colorado, USA in 1999. The Finnish shooter respected the Columbine shooters who 
fatally shot 12 students, one teacher, and then committed suicide. The Finnish school 
shooter shared the Columbine high school shooters’ glorified web sites with a student, 
who admitted planning a school shooting near Philadelphia in 2007. The Internet became 
a virtual meeting place for these teens who were a world apart (Rocky Mountain News 
13.11.2007). This example is an opposition to the Indian Ocean Tsunami case, where The 
Internet became an information platform between the rescuers in Thailand and relatives 
in Finland. 
Another atrocity in the Nordic and the Scandinavian welfare states occurred in 
Norway in Oslo and on Utøya Island in July 2011, when a mentally ill Norwegian shooter 
killed 77 people. These tragic attacks and many more have deeply struck the Nordic and 
the Scandinavian welfare state models. 
What is common to these examples is that in human-made disasters, attackers and 
bombers may be organized terrorist groups or school children, but the disaster is the 
same, and requires a governmental response. 
3.3.2 Safety, security, certainty, and uncertainty
There are several paradigms in safety research fields and there is no one holistic approach 
to safety research. Safety research is undertaken in multiple research fields in social 
sciences, in political sciences, criminology, economics, and organizational sciences. 
Safety research is as well known in military science, in engineering, and applied technical 
sciences. The safety research field is a multifaceted and a pluralistic discipline and there is 
a need for synthesis (McEntire, 2004, 196). 
Synthesis can be developed by defining the key concepts, which sew the field of 
research together. Concepts of safety and security define the safety research discipline. A 
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conceptual division into safety as unintended damage and security as intended damage 
can be made. Security can be defined as follows: 
Security is the state of being secure, specifically freedom from fear, danger, risk, care, 
poverty or anxiety. Security also implies certainty. The roots of the term are in the Latin 
securitas/-securus, derived from sine (meaning without) cura (care, anxiety, pains, 
worry). Safety is closely related to security. Safety also means freedom from danger or risk. 
However, it has additional connotations which have more to do with physical conditions, 
e.g. freedom from injury, the safety of the body and of property. In this context certainty 
refers to certainty of order, assurance and predictability. (Virta, 2006, 371)
The definition of safety is always relative and related to a certain context. The words 
security and safety in English, securite in French and sicherheit in German all include 
the word certainty (Virta, 2006). Certainty and uncertainty are essential safety concepts. 
Uncertainty generally means inability to predict the future (Hanén, 2010).
Congleton (2012, 401) denotes crises as unpleasant surprises that call for immediate, 
unanticipated changes in plans under three settings, and continues that in some cases, 
the possible range of outcomes and probabilities of those outcomes are unknown, some 
of them are considered so unlikely that they are not given serious attention, and in other 
cases, surprises occur because the world is so complicated that some events cannot be 
assigned meaningful probabilities with the data that is available. 
This research refers to the latter. Social behavior is difficult to predict and submit 
into formulas or diagrams. The social reality is not necessarily exposed to risk analyses 
(Hanén & Huhtinen, 2011). However, we try to reduce uncertainty by trying to learn to 
predict and control it, but complexity makes social systems difficult to control (Raisio, 
2009; Osman, 2010, 9). 
The concept of resilience is essential in emergency recovery. Resilience applies to the 
minimization of losses and damages when a disaster occurs and indicates a similarity to 
the term “resistance.” Resilience implies the ability to recover to normalcy after a disaster 
occurs. Resiliency is a measure of how quickly a system recovers from failure (McEntire 
& al., 2002, 269).
Safety exists but it is continuously changing. The phenomenon of safety is complex 
and intertwined. By intertwining, Hanén and Huhtinen (2011) mean that predicting the 
results of different variables is usually not foreseeable, and the reasons leading to casualties 
are not usually inclusively clarified, because of the intertwined nature of the event. Osman 
(2010, 32) argues that causality is actually illusory and there is only a succession in the 
events we observe in the world.
Laitinen (2003, 21) uncovers the conception of safety depending on the discipline. In 
international politics, safety is safety of the state. However, widely recognized thinking 
considering individuals, communities and societies as part of a totality has become 
commonplace. Safety is something good, such as the feeling of safety, or the absence of 
the threats to welfare, and, thus, the possibility of living well.
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However, the instruments to measure the feeling of safety in society are ambiguous. 
One person or group can feel safe in society, whereas another can feel remarkably unsafe. 
Additionally, measures to keep society safe are ambiguous and even conflicting. For 
example, the retirement age of firemen has been a tense political question in Finland in 
recent years. The age of retirement was 55 years until 1989, when it was raised to 63-68 years 
with the general pension policy. Firefighters and the rescue field workers have complained 
continuously that the high retirement age weakens firemen’s safety and protection, for 
example, in the demanding smoke-diving assignments. It is evident that a fireman’s age 
and condition are effective factors in these physically demanding assignments. How does 
this affect the feeling of safety in society?
Safety can be defined through threats that are against the most important values 
and survival. In the Western countries, people, however, are looking for excitement 
and extremes in life, and in terms of relative significance, they may stand for measures 
weakening safety, but offering an opportunity to reach for some other important values at 
the same time (Forsberg, 1996, 20–21). 
What can be said about the definition of safety is that it is always relative and bounded 
into context and the definitions can be classified differently by different disciplines. 
The definitions are often presented as dichotomies (subjective/objective, ontological/
materialistic, and physical/emotional) depending on the actor or the target (whose safety), 
through opposites (threat, risk, danger, accident, catastrophe, insecurity) or as functional 
definitions of administration and politics (internal, external, national, global safety). 
Safety can also be a civil right, a value commodity, service, social, political, economic, 
human, general, or private commodity, etc. Furthermore, definitions can be presented 
as policy related definitions of safety; energy safety, traffic safety, food safety, industrial 
safety, border safety, etc. (Virta, 2011). 
Safety is a multifaceted and a pluralistic research field. Niemelä (2000) conceptualizes 
the multifaceted safety research field into four dimensions and one core: social and welfare 
conception; cultural, humanistic conception; modern, ecological conception; and traditional, 
political conception (see figure 3). In the middle is the conception of health consisting of 
existence, capacity, and self-safety as the core of the conception. 
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Safety is studied through these five ideas. Safety begins from the existence of an individual 
and the existence of health. This is the core of the safety framework, and it expands to 
areas of the social and welfare state point of view, traditional, national safety, the modern, 
ecological conception of safety, and into the cultural, and humanistic conception of safety.
In the background of the social and welfare state points of view economical wealth 
and income (poverty) is the basic principle of economic liberalism. Free means earning 
one’s living, and free ownership, and, as a consequence of this, differences in welfare and 
income. The social and welfare state point of view has become important against this 
adjustment. Besides freedom, social security and equality are strategic values in the social 
and welfare conception of safety (Niemelä, 2000, 27). 
The cultural, humanistic conception of safety concerns a human view of life and 
ideology, religious views, psychological (spiritual) safety, and the strength, and creation 
of identity. Safety is cultural in a sense that it is about human dignity and respect for the 
human being as an absolute value. Spiritual safety is linked into moral and ethical codes 
in the culture. Cultural and humanistic safety means human caring and taking other 
Figure 3. Conceptual framework of safety. Source: Niemelä, Pauli, 2000, 27.
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people into account, and allowing the unlikeness of other people in society. Fanaticism, 
manipulation, and brainwashing are estranged conceptions to cultural and humanistic 
safety. In cultural and humanistic safety, the core is in the intellectual and mental growth, 
and in the possibilities of being able to fulfill oneself in an atmosphere of freedom. One 
of the features of cultural and humanistic safety is freedom of information. An alternate 
conception for this is a civilized state (Niemelä, 2000, 29–30). Safety defined as cultural 
meaning includes the idea that human dignity and respect for the human being as an 
absolute value, or a core value refers to survival and sovereignty in a context of the state, 
and to identity in the context of nations (Forsberg, 1996, 20). 
The modern, ecological conception of safety means environmental safety in an 
industrialized and technical society. For example, traffic risks in the country, at sea, and 
in the air are a fairly new phenomenon. High technology includes unforeseen risks. A 
modern, industrialized society can be characterized as a risk society including risks and 
possible major disasters in the nuclear industry, or through genetic engineering. Concern 
about the environment is essential in this safety definition (Niemelä, 2000, 30–31). 
The social and communal safety conception includes family community and social 
networks, work communities, school communities, habitation communities, and activity 
communities. These are the core areas of safety in relationships. Violence, mischief, and 
neglect in these areas cause insecurity. Social and relationship relative security is linked to 
all other paradigms of safety presented below. The traditional safety paradigm concerns 
being a victim of violence and also a victim of home violence. The welfare paradigm 
concerns compensating for risks in economic living and efforts to secure everybody’s 
participation in work life and the work community as opposed to social exclusion 
(Niemelä, 2000, 31).
Health is the existence of safety. Diseases and illness are factors of insecurity. Medical 
science and health care fight against sickness and pain. In the background is the continuity 
of life and the quality of life. Besides sickness and disease, what is essential is how long 
the person will have to tolerate pain and distress. In an aging society, the ability to act is 
restricted because of sickness, disabilities, and old age. The ability to act is the essential 
source of security in terms of controlling the environment and one’s own life (Niemelä, 
2000, 32).
The traditional conception of safety relates to the defense policy, with different 
meanings at the institutional level in the military forces or in the defense counsel. Security 
policy has become common as a concept of foreign policy (Niemelä, 2000, 33). In the 
social and welfare paradigm, social security policy can be characterized as a safety policy, 
but also as an insurance policy. Regulating insurance companies is an insurance policy. A 
social insurance policy including basic security and a protection of earnings ideology are 
essential insurance policy topics. At the economic policy level, it is a question of securing 
the national economy, national property, and the owner’s property. Banks and insurance 
companies aim to secure these. 
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Modern, ecological, and technological safety can be improved by protection. 
Protection can be environmental protection and civil defense including fire protection, 
and rescue operations. Fire protection and safety operations are operations built to protect 
the environment, cities, and houses from accidents, and disasters. 
Cultural and humanistic safety can be improved by precautionary measures, 
for example, by freedom of speech. Securing education and learning for everybody 
secures growth. At the community level, family, work, school, home, and activities are 
“maintenance institutions,” and at the policy level, they are family, labor, habitation, and 
education policies. In health, it is about care, and at the policy level, it is about healthcare 
policy. Policy and institutional levels approve the pluralism of safety as a concept and as 
a function. 
3.4 Summary of the theoretical foundations
This section collects the theoretical models and conceptions used to analyze the 
empirical data and to interpret the results of the study. The first section conceptualized 
the theoretical foundations of public management, and decision making, and the key 
concepts of ambiguity, rationality, bounded rationality, and coherence. The second 
section conceptualized the theoretical backgrounds and the concepts of safety research 
such as safety, security, certainty, and uncertainty. 
Public management tends to strive toward rationality in decision making. However, 
rationality is bounded by cognitive limitations and limitations in the decision making 
environment. Bounded rationality identifies the discrepancy between full rationality in 
decision making and in “real life,” where the decision-maker actually lives.
The decision making model called the garbage can model describes organizational 
choices in “real life” where the link between a problem and a solution depends on the 
simultaneity of their arrival. Decision making in the garbage can model is a fortuitous 
confluence of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. The complete 
cycle of choice was also presented in order to understand how decisions actually happen 
in organizations. In the complete cycle of choice, individual behavior aggregates into 
collective choices, and the outside world responds to these choices in a way that again 
affects individual assessments of the state of the world, and of the efficacy of the actions. 
The concept of ambiguity illustrates the complexity in organizational behavior and 
choice situations. Ambiguity, as espoused by March and Olsen (1976), refers to opaqueness 
in intention, understanding, history, and organizations. Ambiguity, according to Empson 
(2004), refers to the relation between opposites with different emphases, two or more 
alternative meanings that are resolved into one, two ideas connected only by being both 
relevant in the context, and which can be given in one word simultaneously, or two or 
more meanings that do not agree among themselves, but combine to make clear a more 
complicated state of mind in the author. Ambiguity occurs when the author has discovered 
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his/her own idea in the act of writing and does not hold it all in mind at once. Ambiguity 
takes place when a statement says nothing and the readers are forced to invent statements 
of their own. Statements are liable to conflict with one another. Ambiguity takes place 
when the two meanings of the word, the two values of the ambiguity, are the two opposite 
meanings defined by the context. The total effect is to show a fundamental division in the 
writer’s mind. 
The concept of coherence describes the relations between different phases in 
the performance management cycle (identification of problems, target setting, and 
performance evaluation). The performance management cycle seems to be a compatible 
cycle where each section follows another, but ambiguities actually cause incoherence in 
the performance management cycle. 
In 21st-century public management and in the context of emergency management 
these relatively theoretical concepts are useful to study issues that are complex, that vary 
broadly from international terrorism, to natural disasters, and that need cooperation 
between various policies, and actors. Fire deaths are accidents, and in the safety research 
literature, accidents are defined as an interaction of multiple failures. Failures can be 
made by humans and systems, and fire deaths are a combination of both of these factors. 
This research studies decision making and fire deaths as social behavior that people bring 
about. In that context, particularly the human error aspect is emphasized. 
The definition of safety is relative and bounded into context. The definition can be 
classified differently by different research disciplines. The social and welfare conception; 
cultural, humanistic conception; modern, ecological conception; and traditional, political 
conception are the dimensions used as the theoretical conception of safety in this research. 
The core is the conception of safety as health. 
The theoretical models and conceptions used in this study are presented in figure four 
below. 
The empirical phenomenon is studied in order to find the sources of ambiguity and lack 
of coherence identified in the research literacy. However, all the sources of ambiguity and 
Figure 4. Theoretical foundations 
and conceptions.
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lack of coherence identified from the theoretical literacy are not exhaustively searched 
from the empirical data. However, the attempt to find them and interpreting them by 
using the theoretical findings will create the main results of this study. 
In addition, key concepts safety and security, uncertainty and certainty are found 
from the pluralistic world of safety research. These concepts define the research field and 
they are used to study the empirical case of fire deaths. 
One may ask why safety policy issues varying broadly from international terrorism to 
natural disasters are studied in the context of fire safety policy. However, from the vast 
theoretical literacy it was pointed out that fire safety accidents interacted with multiple 
failures that were made by humans and systems. This conclusion was found from the vast 
literacy and it helps to explain fire deaths. 
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4 The Institutional System of 
Finnish Fire Safety Policy
In this chapter, the institutional system of Finnish fire safety policy is introduced. The 
institutional system describes the political, economic, and social circumstances in 
the Finnish state level government, and also how governmental planning, budgetary 
planning, and performance contracting works in the central authorities, and in the rescue 
services. The organization of rescue services is introduced as a governmental and regional 
institution covering 22 rescue service regions. Rescue services consolidate planning and 
steering in the rescue service areas and in the central government. However, the budget 
of the rescue service areas consists of the budgets of the municipalities. The Ministry of 
the Interior and the rescue services are outside of this budget planning and, thus, outside 
of one of the most important management controlling instruments. Municipalities 
in Finland are also self-governed. These features make other policy instruments more 
intriguing to study in terms of how the rescue services actually guide and steer rescue 
service areas, and what policy instruments are used. 
4.1 Introducing Finnish public administration 
and governmental planning
The government of Finland consists of the Prime Minister and the required number 
of ministers11. The government is also the decision making body composed of the 
government plenary session and the ministries. Ministries prepare political decisions to 
be taken by the government, and legislation to be adopted by the Parliament. Ministers 
are the political heads of the ministries (Finnish Government, 2011; Salminen & Viitala, 
2006, 15). 
The structure of the Finnish public administration consists of a central administration 
level, ministries, and agencies; at the regional level, and at the local level of municipalities. 
The central administration agencies and public bodies function under an administrative 
sector of each ministry. Twelve ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office implement 
11 Ministers are appointed by the President of the Republic in accordance with a proposal from the Prime 
Minister. The maximum number of ministers is 18.
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laws and decrees within their sectors of administration. Political decision making and 
the steering of implementation belong to the ministries. Agencies are in charge of the 
implementation. Agencies have statutory duties and their funding is granted by the 
Parliament in the central government budget. Normative steering and performance 
guidance are the central tools of the ministries in steering the implementation of 
government policies. Steering is based on the system of performance agreements. 
Performance agreements are explained in more detailed below (Salminen & Viitala, 2006, 
15).
Regional state administrative authorities are new institutes in the Finnish regional 
administration. Six Regional State Administrative authorities began to operate at the 
beginning of 2010. Regional State Administrative authorities operate the former state 
provincial offices’ duties and their areas of responsibilities are public services, legal rights 
and permits, occupational safety and health, environmental permits, fire and rescue 
services and preparedness, and police. Regional State Administrative authorities work 
in close collaboration with local authorities. Agencies execute legislative implementation 
and steering and supervision functions in the regions. This fosters the regional parity 
(Regional State Administrative Agencies, 2011). 
Finally, with the provincial offices and the county structure Finnish local administration 
has become blurred. There are different structures for civic centers (general, specific, and 
the federation of municipalities) and the roles are structuring in nature. 
However, the municipalities are responsible for organizing the majority of public 
services in Finland. Municipalities are responsible for two-thirds of public services, and 
the state is responsible for one-third. Local government in Finland is based on local self-
government by the people. Local authorities can organize their services in different ways. 
Alliances between municipalities are common. In addition, joint authorities between two 
or more parties (local authorities, communities, and enterprises) for a specific task are 
common. In 2011, 184 joint authorities functioned in Finland. The most important joint 
authorities include regional councils, hospital districts, districts for care of the disabled, 
and joint authorities related to public health and education (Local Finland, 2011). 
The responsibility for the Finnish rescue services is divided between the state and 
regional rescue services. The Ministry of the Interior and the Regional State Administrative 
authorities are the state rescue authorities. Regional rescue services are responsible for 
rescue services in their region. Finnish municipalities have a statutory duty to organize 
rescue services together in rescue service regions. The Ministry of the Interior and the 
Department for Rescue Services direct Finnish rescue services and maintain oversight of 
coverage and quality. Regional State Administrative Agencies direct and oversee rescue 
services in regions (Rescue Services in Finland, 2010). Organizational structure and the 
responsibilities of the rescue services are explained in more detail in chapter 4.2.
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4.1.1 Government Programs 
The Ministry of the Interior and the rescue services are part of the Finnish central 
government and follow the official governmental planning cycle. The official governmental 
planning cycle begins from the Government Program. This is an action plan agreed by the 
parties represented in the government and it defines the main functions of the government. 
In recent decades, the government has continued through the whole electoral period, 
even though the Prime Minister has changed. In principle, the Government Program has 
continued for the entire electoral period. 
Implementation of the Government Program is monitored on the basis of an 
implementation plan. The implementation plan is a resolution focusing on the Government 
Program’s main objectives, preparation responsibilities, and key measures and projects, 
turning them into strategic, inter-sectoral, and comprehensive policies. In accordance 
with the Government Program, the legislative projects included in the implementation 
plan constitute the government’s legislative program (Finnish Government, 2012).
The Government Program includes focus areas in each policy field such as economic 
policy, foreign, and defense policy, EU policy, justice policy, and internal policy, etc. In 
principle, the Government Program implementation continues over the entire electoral 
period, and therefore maximally until the next election, to be held in 2015. 
The Government Program of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet, 
issued in 2007, states that the government will determine the primary objectives and 
measures for internal security in an inter-agency Internal Security Program. Prime 
Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet issued on 2 November 2011 to prepare the next inter-
agency Internal Security Program for the year 2011–2015. The Internal Security Program 
stated the primary objectives and measures for internal security. One of the measures 
in the internal security policy is to reduce the number of accidents, particularly home 
and leisure accidents. The Internal Security Programme is explained in more detailed in 
section 4.2.1. 
4.1.2 Performance contracting
Each ministry in Finland makes an agreement, a performance contract, with their 
subordinate agencies and institutes. Performance contracts include expectations of 
attainable results: outputs and outcomes for each budgetary year. Performance contracts 
include targets and performance indicators measuring each target and indicating who 
is responsible for each target. Performance contracting is based on the performance 
management system. However, performance agreements are not legally binding, 
thus obligations and sanctions under contract law do not apply to them. Performance 
management and performance agreements have a guiding role in managing the Finnish 
public administration (Salminen & Viitala, 2006, 43).
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A standard model illustrating the content of performance negotiations and agreements 
and the principles of performance management as detailed by Salminen and Viitala (2006, 
47–49) are summarized by ten points: 
•	 First,	formulating	the	targets	to	be	measured	as	concretely	as	possible,	and	binding	
their implementation to resources and schedule. 
•	 Second,	 set	 operational	 performance	 targets	 applying	 to	 productivity,	 economy,	
outputs and their quality, the service capacity of the agency, human resources and 
effectiveness. 
•	 Third,	the	implementor	is	free	to	decide	what	investments	should	be	acquired	and	
how they are allocated and in what amounts. 
•	 Fourth,	 target	 implementor	can	 influence	 the	content	of	 the	production	 function	
so that it is possible to identify the quantity and quality of this influence. This 
involves the performance-specific and function-specific monitoring and calculation 
of various investments and costs, enabling the management of the relationship 
between investment and performances for the attainment of performance targets. 
•	 Fifth,	the	guiding	principle	is	that	only	one	ministry	guides	each	agency.	However,	
Regional state administrative agencies are supervised by several ministries. 
This makes particular challenges for cooperation between the parties exercising 
performance management and for the agreeing of performance targets. 
•	 Six,	 the	 implementor	 of	 performance	 targets	 participates	 in	 the	 setting	 of	
performance targets and in the decision making concerning the quality and 
quantity of the resources with his own proposals in the performance negotiations. 
Although these talks are specifically for negotiating, if consensus cannot be reached, 
the ministry can unilaterally determine the targets and allocate resources to them.
•	 Seven,	performance	negotiations	end	up	with	a	written	agreement	which	records	
the performance targets and the resources allocated to them. The ministry-
confirmed performance targets for an agency or institution are contained in the 
performance target document (performance agreement) signed by both the ministry 
and the agency. This cannot be confirmed until Parliament has approved the central 
government budget proposal.
•	 Eight,	 the	 implementor	 of	 the	 targets	 is	 accountable	 to	 a	 higher	 level	 in	 the	
organization for the results. During and after the operating period, the implementor 
reports to the body setting the targets on how well the targets have been attained 
and what the performance has been.
•	 Nine,	 the	 attainment	 of	 performance	 targets	 is	 estimated	 jointly.	 If	 there	 is	 a	
performance-related pay system in use at the agency, attaining or exceeding the 
performance targets is rewarded: part of the resources saved can be used for paying 
a performance bonus to staff.
•	 Ten,	 how	well	 targets	 are	 attained	 in	 one	 operating	 period	 affects	 the	 setting	 of	
targets and allocation of resources for the following, depending on how good the 
performance in the previous operating period has been. The aim is to improve the 
input-output ratio every year.
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The standard model for the performance management and performance negotiations 
described should be adapted variably in different administrative sectors, in accordance 
with the practices of each ministry and agency. Thus, the practical impact, coverage and 
general guidance effect of performance management has been very different in the various 
administrative sectors.
A performance agreement is a control tool that a ministry uses to agree with agencies on 
available resources and performance targets (Salminen & Viitala, 2006, 138). Performance 
agreements can focus on the most important points and the results of the budget year. The 
guiding principle is that performance targets apply to both the agency’s basic operations 
and its development measures. Agreements do not need to cover the entire range of 
operations. They may define changing, situation-specified, and permanent targets. 
Targets based on permanent indicators assure that the agency’s basic tasks are carried out 
when new things are planned and development projects carried out (Salminen & Viitala, 
2006, 46). 
Performance agreements include the approval and signature of contracting parties. 
The signature confirms the content of the negotiation, and as such the protocol does not 
constitute an agreement on the agency’s performance targets or resources. The structure 
of performance agreements can be quite variable. They can be structured according to 
the strategy of respective administrative sectors. Agreements should include the general 
targets of the administrative sector but also the main point of focus of the agency over 
several years. Main points of focus must agree with the strategies outlined by the ministry. 
A one year longer planning period helps to develop results for the future (Salminen & 
Viitala, 2006, 46).
The Ministry of the Interior makes performance contracts with regional state 
administrative agencies, the ERC, the Emergency Service College and the Finnish Safety 
and Chemicals Agency12. 
4.1.3 Budgetary planning 
The central government (state) budget plays an important role in planning and 
implementing public policies and decisions. The budget could be said to be the binding 
planning instrument. This means that the parties to the budget decision making process 
are bound to the budget; there is no more budget money or resources to be used. 
The budget is a document or a collection of documents that refers to the financial 
condition and future plans of an organization, including information on revenues, 
12 The Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency Tukes operates under several Government ministries. The 
Ministry of the Interior and the Rescue Service Department makes an agreement with Tukes on the 
inspection of safety equipment, installation, and care and control. Tukes is responsible for preventing 
fires and accidents through different legislative sectors (electrical and pressure devices and industrial 
use of chemicals) and by providing guidance and support to rescue authorities. 
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expenditures, activities, and purposes or goals (Lee & al., 2008, 17). Menifield (2011, 
1) defines the budget as a process that not only reveals national policy choices, but 
also provides evidence of governance. In this respect, the budget plays an important 
international role when examining how governments work. The term “budget” has two 
purposes; it is an abstract tool to guide the economy of the state and a document that is 
prepared and used in the official decision making process (Meklin, 2002, 108). 
Finland has introduced performance guidance and performance budgeting as well as 
budget steering according to spending limits in the early 1990s. Commercial accounting 
was introduced in 1998. The current budgeting and financial administration systems are 
similar to other European economies such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom. Within a broader international context, the Finnish system has adopted accrual-
based budgeting, which is applied both in New Zealand and Australia. A formal decision 
to adopt this system has not been made in Finland, but in practice, accrual budgeting 
is applied to a large extent. This means that transfers are budgeted on a cash-basis, but 
the general principle applied in other expenditure is accrual-based budgeting. Moreover, 
commercial accounting produces accrual-based returns and expenses statements. 
(Ministry of Finance, 2011). 
The budgetary planning, management, and control of government finance 
instruments are enacted by the Budget Law. Financial administration requirements and 
planning instruments are enacted in the Budget Act (13.5.1988/423) and in the Budget 
Decree (11.12.1992/1243). The following instruments are used in budgetary planning, 
management, and control of government finances:
•	 Multi-annual	 operating	 and	 financial	 plans	 of	 the	ministries	 and	 government	
agencies (FOP);
•	 Overall	spending	limits	set	by	the	government	for	the	ministries;
•	 Annual	budget	and	supplementary	budgets;
•	 Reporting	and	auditing	of	central	government	finances;	and
•	 Report	on	the	final	central	government	accounts.
Ministries and agencies must design social effectiveness and economy into their branch 
of administration over a period of several years (Budget Act 12§; Budget Act 10§). Multi-
annual operating and financial plans of the ministries and government agencies are 
generally four-year plans consisting of general operating guidelines, and priorities, and 
key targets for the development of social effectiveness, and efficiency. The basic idea is 
to plan for effectiveness and operational efficiency for a number of years in advance, and 
to provide a baseline for the central government spending limits, and the annual budget 
(Ministry of Finance, 2011). 
The annual budget is the most important instrument in governmental planning. 
The formulation of the budget proposal begins in March, when ministries present their 
spending limit proposals to the Ministry of Finance. Ministries issue their own guidelines 
to their agencies and the agencies draw up their budgets. According to the guidelines, 
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agencies draw up their budget proposals in spring, and then ministries formulate a draft 
budget for the whole of their administrative branch. The Ministry of Finance will continue 
the procedure by processing the budget proposals and making a decision on a proposal for 
a budget submission, and then handing the decision to the ministries. 
The Ministry of Finance will negotiate with each ministry over the spending limits 
and try to settle possible differences on the size of appropriations. After negotiations, 
the government will handle the draft budget drawn up by the Ministry of Finance. The 
government will handle the contents of the Budget proposal in a two-day budget session 
in August. After the budget session, the Ministry of Finance will finalize the government 
budget submission. Then the budget proposal is presented to the General Assembly of the 
Government and to the President of the Republic and is submitted to the Parliament. The 
Parliamentary Finance Committee discusses the budget proposal before its consideration 
in a plenary session of Parliament (Ministry of Finance, 2012).
The budget includes estimates for annual revenue and appropriations for annual 
expenditure. The revenue estimates in the budget must cover the appropriations in the 
budget. The budget consists of the general strategy and outlook, summary tables, the 
budget statement, and appendices. Supplementary budget proposals can be presented to 
Parliament with the same procedure used in formulating the budget. 
The budget is divided into classes. The budget classes can be formulated on a broader 
operational branch, policy sector, or other obvious operational and functional entity. 
Policy-sector outcome targets should be presented in the budget justifications. Outcome 
targets and operational performance targets must be justified with intended effects. The 
justifications of the budget proposal and their indicators should give a true and fair view 
of the uses and targets of appropriations (Salminen & Viitala, 2006, 36). 
In summary, governmental planning begins from the Government Program, the 
action plan agreed by the parties represented in the government. Implementation of the 
Government Program is monitored on the basis of the implementation plan. In accordance 
with the Government Program, the legislative projects included in the implementation 
plan constitute the government’s legislative program. 
The Ministry of the Interior implements the Internal Security Program that states 
the primary objectives and measures for internal security. Ministries use performance 
contracts to negotiate with their agencies and institutes for results and outcomes. 
Contracts include targets and performance indicators for each budgetary year. The budget 
is the binding planning instrument including the resources for each budgetary year. 
In the next section, the rescue service organization is introduced including its 
organizational structure, and what institutions, and organizations are part of the rescue 
service organization.
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4.2 Rescue service organization
The Ministry of the Interior Department for Rescue Services directs and supervises 
rescue services. Rescue services have a duty to prevent fires and other accidents, to carry 
out rescue operations in the event of an accident, and to carry out civil defense work under 
emergency conditions, and maintain readiness for these duties.
The Ministry of the Interior and the Department for Rescue Services makes performance 
contracts with their agencies and institutions. These agencies and institutions are Regional 
State Administrative Agencies, the ERC Administration, the Emergency Service College 
and the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes). 
Regional state administrative agencies execute legislative implementation, steer, and 
supervise in the regions. Regional state administrative agencies perform duties relating 
to rescue services and coordination of preparedness in their regions. This is a new 
administrative structure and regional state administrative agencies started operating at 
the beginning of 2010. Their tasks consist of former state provincial offices’ duties. State 
provincial offices were replaced by state administrative agencies. Agencies operate in six 
regions: Southern Finland, Southwestern Finland, Western and Inland Finland, Eastern 
Finland, Northern Finland, and in Lapland. The State Department of Åland coordinates 
the activities of the Finnish state on the Åland Islands. 
Figure 5. Rescue service organization in Finland. 
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The ERC Administration deals with ERC activities and it is managed and directed by 
the Ministry of the Interior in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
The Emergency Response Center Administration was implemented in Finland during the 
years 2001 to 2005. The reform involved combining the municipal emergency response 
centers of the rescue services and the emergency call centers of the police into a state 
organization of 15 ERCs. The Province of Åland also has its own ERC.
The Emergency Services College provides education and training in its special field 
under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. The College plans and arranges 
basic and advanced education and training in fire and rescue work, civil defense training 
and other training in emergency operations. 
The safety technology authority maintains and promotes the technical safety culture 
and reliability. The authority’s tasks are divided into surveillance of the products on 
the market such as fire safety equipment, fire alarms, and extinguishers, and into the 
supervision of in-service plants, installations, and technical services. 
Municipalities are jointly responsible for rescue services within regions determined 
by the government. Based on a government decision, Finland is divided into 22 rescue 
service regions. Regional rescue services are in charge of rescue services in their respective 
regions. They perform their functions in cooperation with contract fire brigades. Fire and 
rescue services and preparedness is one of the areas of their responsibility. (Ministry of 
the Interior, 2012).
The Ministry of the Interior is the ministry responsible for internal security and 
migration. The Minister of the Interior and the Department of Rescue Services are 
responsible for the Finnish fire safety policy. The political head of the Ministry consists 
of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Migration and European Affairs. Both 
ministers work for the electoral period of four years. The highest official in the Ministry 
of the Interior is the Permanent Secretary. The Permanent Secretary assists the Ministers 
in directing and monitoring the activities of the Ministry and agencies and offices in its 
administrative sector (Ministry of the Interior, 2012). 
The Ministry of the Interior is divided into four departments: the Police Department, 
Department for Rescue Services, the Migration Department, and the Boarder Guard 
Department. Besides these four departments, there are seven units that form the Ministry’s 
Advisory Staff and these units report directly to the Permanent Secretary. The Office of 
the Ombudsman for Minorities and the National Discrimination Board of Finland are 
also part of the Ministry. Offices and agencies under the Ministry and the Department 
for Rescue Services are: the Emergency Services College, Emergency Response Center 
Administration, and Fire Protection Fund. Regional administration agencies under the 
Ministry considering fire safety policy are the regional state administrative agencies 
including rescue services and preparedness. 
The Ministry of the Interior and the Department for Rescue Services sets annual 
service targets for rescue service regions, but the actual rescue work is done by the fire 
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departments in the rescue service areas. Rescue services are agreed between fire brigades 
and the region. Services can be provided by voluntary, institutional, or industrial fire 
brigades. Rescue services employ about 24,000 people, of whom some 5,000 are full-time, 
4,000 are part-time and some 15,000 are voluntary (Ministry of the Interior, 2012).
The rescue services created a rescue service strategy to outline ties in with the 
government’s Internal Security Program and its strategy for securing the functions that 
are vital to society. The rescue service strategy defines the main priorities for Finland’s 
rescue services, sets strategic goals, and measures the achievements of the goals. The main 
objective is reducing accidents and injuries, and damage resulting from accidents. The 
main priorities in the strategy are to prevent accidents, pursue personnel performance, 
prepare for major accidents and emergency conditions, and to carry out research and 
development (Internal Security, 2008). 
Rescue services have a duty to prevent fires and other accidents, to carry out rescue 
operations in the event of an accident, and to carry out civil defense work under emergency 
conditions, and maintain readiness for these duties. The Ministry of the Interior and 
the Department for Rescue Services influence the fire safety policy by undertaking 
performance contracts with agencies and institutions. Regional state administrative 
agencies execute legislative implementation, steer, and supervise in the regions. Regional 
State Administrative Agencies perform duties relating to rescue services and the 
coordination of preparedness in their regions. The rescue services and preparedness 
responsibility area in the Regional State Administrative Agencies leads the planning of 
the rescue operations, and consolidates the plans. Furthermore, it controls and estimates 
the availability and the quality level of rescue services.
Municipalities are responsible for maintaining the services in their rescue service 
regions. However, municipalities in Finland are self-governed and it is an essential feature 
in the Finnish public administration. In other words, the Ministry of the Interior can 
only affect municipalities through legislation and law-making. Overall, the Ministry 
of the Interior has wide-ranging possibilities in terms of affecting the fire safety policy 
development in the legislative and political decision making arena, but limited abilities to 
affect the efficiency of the work of rescue service areas and fire departments.
4.2.1 Internal Security Program
The Internal Security Program is a government resolution that specifies the priorities, 
objectives, and measures for the inter-sectoral development of internal security. The 
Program specifies the key indicators that are used to report on a regular basis on the 
implementation and results of the Program to the government. These are part of the 
government’s strategy document. 
The Prime Minister’s government launched the first Internal Security Program in 
2003 and the second Program continued in 2008. The Internal Security Program is an 
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essential inter-sectoral organization or network that expresses the targets for the internal 
security policy. The primary objectives for the development of Finland’s security policy 
are specified in the Government Report on the Security and Defense Policy. The targets 
for the internal security policy are officially set in the Government Program and in the 
Government Strategy Document, but also in the Internal Security Program.
The objective of the program is that Finland will be the safest country in Europe in 
2015. The Program contains 74 measures intended to maintain and improve security that 
are based on estimates of future challenges and principal development needs in internal 
security. Fire deaths is one of the measures for improving internal safety. The Program 
has been prepared through cooperation between ministries, organizations and the 
business sector. The implementation and monitoring of the Program are coordinated by 
the Ministry of the Interior.
The Internal Security Program is valid for the current electoral period and it extends 
to the year 2015. The objectives of the program are set for the year 2015. The targets of 
the program relating to fire deaths will be reviewed in more detail in chapters six and the 
results in chapter seven. 
4.2.2 Budgetary process
The Ministry of the Interior’s Department for Rescue Services directs, and oversees 
Finnish rescue services, but the regional rescue areas, and their operations are funded by 
the municipalities. The Ministry of the Interior does not fund the rescue service regions 
or the fire departments, and their ability to guide and steer the regional rescue service 
areas without the funding tools is therefore constrained. 
The total number of allowances in the budget proposals has been rising since 2007. 
The total number of 40 billion euros in 2007 has risen in five years to more than 52 billion 
euros. The budget of the Ministry of the Interior has decreased since 2007 and was at its 
lowest in 2008 at 1,073 billion euros. The budget of the rescue services has increased since 
2007 from 66,689 million euros to an estimated 87,256 million euros in 2012. 
The national development of the rescue services and the operations of the Emergency 
Service College are funded from the state budget and the annual budget of the rescue 
services.
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Table 3. Total number of allowances, allowances in the Ministry of the Interior, and in the Rescue 
Services from 2007–2012. (Source: Budget Proposals 2007–2012, budjetti.vm.fi).
Year Total number of 
allowances (€)
Ministry of the Interior 
(€)
Rescue services (€)
2012 52 353 408 000 1 245 108 000 87 256 000
2011 50 269 322 000 1 323 799 000 86 738 000
2010 50 185 219 000 1 266 682 000 87 230 000
2009 45 908 348 000 1 168 899 000 86 881 000
2008 45 079 581 000 1 073 753 000 81 355 000
2007 40 481 758 000 1 584 356 000 66 689 000
The annual expenditure on state and regional rescue services amounts to more than 340 
million euros. Additionally, the Fire Protection Fund grants approximately six million 
euros in assistance on an annual basis (Ministry of the Interior, Rescue Services, 2012).
Remarkable in the budgetary planning is that the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Department for Rescue Services sets the annual service targets for rescue service regions, 
but the budget money for the regional rescue departments comes from the municipalities. 
For example, the regional rescue department of Tampere is funded by 24 municipalities in 
the Tampere region. A portion of the payment is allocated by the number of inhabitants 
(Budget of Tampere Regional Rescue Department, 2010, 4). 
Regional rescue departments are state-owned enterprises and are excluded from the 
state budget. The state rescue authorities are the Ministry of the Interior and the regional 
state administrative agencies. Regional rescue services are responsible for rescue services 
in their region. Finnish municipalities have a statutory duty to organize rescue services 
together in 22 rescue service regions. 
In comparison, the operation expenses of Tampere regional rescue services with 24 
municipalities were 34 million euros in 2010, 32.9 million euros in 2009, and 33.9 million 
euros in 2008 (Financial statements of Tampere Regional Rescue Services, 2008, 2009, and 
2010). The ministry budget for the rescue services is rather low compared to the regional 
rescue department budgets, and when considering their main overall task to reduce the 
number of accidents, especially the number of fires, and fire deaths (see chapter 6.2). 
However, the operational functions and the staff participating in the rescue operations 
are catered for in the budget of the regional rescue services. 
4.2.3 Rescue services in regions 
Twenty-two regional rescue services are responsible for performing rescue service 
functions, and maintaining a rescue service organization to carry out rescue service 
functions (Rescue Services in Finland, 2010, 4). Southwest Finland is the largest rescue 
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service area, with 56 municipalities. The rescue service region of Helsinki consists only of 
a single city, but it is large considering the population level.
The rescue service region of Lapland has the largest area and Helsinki the smallest area. 
The population of rescue service regions varies, from the approximately 90,000 citizens of 
Kainuu and Eastern Uusimaa to the approximately 560,000 citizens of Helsinki. 
Rescue units have been distributed to more than 700 fire stations in the municipalities of 
the rescue service regions. There are 635 voluntary fire brigades and 153 industrial fire 
brigades. Personnel in fire and rescue services were about 24,000, of whom some 5,000 are 
full-time employees, 4,000 are part-time and some 15,000 voluntary fire brigade members. 
Voluntary, institutional, and industrial fire brigades participate in the provision of rescue 
services as agreed between the brigades and the region (Rescue Services in Finland, 2010). 
The municipalities were responsible for the rescue services until 2004, when the 
duties were transformed to the rescue departments that are co-operatively held by several 
municipalities (Kallio & Tolppi, 2008, 11). The responsibility of Finnish rescue services 
is divided between the state and regional rescue services. Nevertheless, safety involves 
cooperation between several authorities and agencies, also including voluntary actors. 
Numerous other authorities and bodies besides rescue authorities have a legal duty to take 
part in rescue operations and civil defense in Finland13. 
13 Authorities and bodies are listed in appendix three. 
Figure 6. Rescue service areas in Finland. Source: Rescue Services in Finland, Ministry of the 
Interior, 2010)
1. Helsinki
2. Länsi-Uusimaa
3. Keski-Uusimaa
4. Itä-Uusimaa
5. Varsinais-Suomi
6. Kanta-Häme
7. Päijät-Häme
8. Kymenlaakso
9. South Karelia
10. Etelä-Savo
11. Central Finland
12. Pirkanmaa
13. Satakunta
14. South Ostrobothnia
15. Ostrobothnia 
16. Central Ostrobothnia
17. Pohjois-Savo
18. North Karelia
19. Jokilaaksot
20. Kainuu
21. Oulu-Koillismaa
22. Lapland
 The rescue services on the 
Åland Islands are regulated by 
regional legislation. 
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The Ministry of the Interior Department for Rescue Services directs Finnish 
rescue services and maintains oversight of coverage and quality. Six Regional State 
Administrative Agencies direct and oversee rescue services in the regions. Finnish rescue 
services are responsible for the active prevention of fires and other accidents. Accidents 
can be prevented by taking safety into account in all activities from the outset. Safety work 
is carried out in cooperation with other authorities, various organizations, and citizens. 
4.2.4 Finnish fire safety policy
Being resilient in the face of uncertainty is the ultimate task for emergency management 
(Handmer & Dovers, 2007, 30; Weick, 2001; Perrow, 1999). It is also the ultimate task for 
the Finnish fire safety policy. How to stay resilient in the face of uncertainty relating to 
how and when fires will occur, and how to understand the nature of risks and dangers 
of fires, and even reduce or limit the damage of fires are essential questions in fire safety 
policy.
Public policies are positions taken and communicated by governments as “avowals 
of intent” (Handmer & Dovers, 2007). Public policies recognize a problem and state 
what will be done about it. The Oxford English Dictionary defines policy as “political 
sagacity, statecraft, prudent conduct, course of action adopted by government.” Hogwood 
and Gunn (1984, 13–19) define policies as: a label for a field of activity, expression of 
general purpose or desired state of affairs, specific proposals, decision of government, 
formal authorization, program, output, outcome, or theory of model and process. Politics 
in ancient Greece was about “the right thing to do for the good of the polis” and that is the 
end objective of politics (Hinich & Munger, 1997). 
The Finnish internal security and fire safety policy is defined in the Internal Security 
Program (2008, 6) as follows:
Internal security is a state of society where everybody can enjoy rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the rule of law and a safe society without the fear of insecurity caused 
by crime, disruptions, accidents or any other phenomena in Finnish society or the 
increasingly globalized world at large.
Finnish rescue authorities are responsible for the safety of people in any kind of everyday 
incident, and in the unlikely event of a catastrophe, or war. The Ministry of the Interior 
sets annual service targets for the rescue service regions. Functions of the rescue services 
are divided into accident prevention, rescue operations, and civil defense (Ministry of the 
Interior, 2008). 
There are many factors contributing to internal security. This makes fire safety policy 
work even more important. Safe homes, living environments and working environments, 
smoothly functioning basic services, well-designed traffic environments, obtaining help 
when needed, certainty that those who commit crimes will be brought to justice – all 
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these complete the internal security. Internal security also involves preparing for major 
accidents and other disruptions under normal conditions (Internal Security Programme 
2008, 6). 
Rescue services have a duty to prevent fires and other accidents. Rescue operations refer 
to carrying out rescue operations in the event of an accident in order to protect and rescue 
people, property, and the environment, to limit damage, and to mitigate consequences. 
Rescue services have to function in exceptional circumstances and take precautions to 
protect people and property in the event of an emergency.
4.2.5 Legislation under the Rescue Law
Legislation and regulations are instruments affecting people’s behavior. Reducing 
dangerous behavior related to alcohol abuse, increasing safety consciousness, and to 
increase anticipation are ways to reduce exposure to accidents and fire related deaths. 
Legislation is the strongest method of that the public administration can use to direct 
people’s behavior. 
The new Rescue Law (29.4.2011/379) was ratified on 29 April 2011 and became valid on 
1 July 2011. The Rescue Law was revised as an objective to improve the accident prevention 
and safety in terms of housing. It is specifically emphasized in the law proposals that 
individual safety was the biggest problem in terms of fire safety policy. The number of fire 
deaths has been rising in spite of the measures of different authorities. The situation still 
threatens to worsen in the future because of the aging of the population and the growing 
number of socially excluded people. Additionally, measures improving safety in housing 
are not enough to raise the level of fire safety to a good Western European level (Rescue 
Law Reform Preliminary study, 2008, 5). 
In the new legislation, an account on exit safety is required in hospitals and nursing 
homes. The local rescue authority is liable for estimating the sufficiency of the exit safety 
and can give orders to improve safety if necessary. The Rescue authority can demand the 
installation of a fire-extinguishing systems if it is considered to be necessary. (Association 
of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, General letter 7/80/2011.) 
The law also requires that the rescue departments have to monitor that property 
owners and actors obey the legislation, and follow the rules, and for supervision they 
have to perform fire inspections, and other measures to carry out their supervision 
tasks. According to the law, the rescue department can collect payments from the fire 
inspections that are in accordance with the supervision plan, or from performing well in 
regard to another supervision measure. Payment can also be collected from call-outs that 
have been caused by continually erroneous operating fire alarm systems that have been 
connected to the ERC and caused several false alarms (Association of Finnish Local and 
Regional Authorities, General letter 7/80/2011). 
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According to the new law, the duty to build bomb shelters applies to residential 
buildings whose common surface area is at least 1,200 square meters, and in the industrial, 
and production buildings, warehouses, and assembling buildings the limit is 1,500 square 
meters (Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, General letter 7/80/2011). 
The law explicitly states that flammable, explosive, or other fire hazard and dangerous 
material must be carefully handled. In addition, the sufficient care must be taken when 
working with fire, or while doing repair work that increases noticeably the danger of fire, 
or of another type of accident. Then one must take sufficient precautions. The scope of the 
law covers people, companies, and other communities, and legal persons (29.4.2011/379).
It is also explicitly stated that the holder of the apartment is obliged to make sure 
that the apartment is equipped with a sufficient number of fire alarms, or other devices, 
which, as early as possible, perceive the beginning of a fire and warn the people in the 
apartments. In accommodation, nursing homes, and sheltered homes the liability for 
equipment is in the hands of the executive house-holder (29.4.2011/379). 
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5 Identification of Fire Deaths as 
a Fire Safety Policy Problem
This chapter reflects on the ambiguity of the fire safety policy problem. What does this 
policy problem actually consist of and what ambiguities are there? Questions discussed 
in the chapter relate to what kind of policy problem fire deaths are and how fire deaths 
come to be formed as a policy problem. This chapter is focused on ambiguities in fire 
deaths, and on this account, the question of ambiguity in identifying the policy problem 
is studied as the main question. 
Specific features of fire deaths as a long term policy problem are studied in more detail 
in section 5.1. Fire deaths in 2007–2010 are studied in more detail in sections 5.1.1 and 
5.1.2. By looking at the fire deaths in more detail in section 5.1.2, the analysis contributes 
to an understanding of the ambiguity of this specific policy problem. The results of the 
chapter will be summarized at the end of section 5.2. 
5.1 Specific features of fire deaths
Fire deaths are a simple indicator showing that there is a problem out there. The number 
of fire deaths appears in the Finnish media every year. The number either increases 
or decreases (see, for example, Yle, 6.6.2011). Recently, news has been generated about 
the possible decrease in the number of fire deaths because of the following changes to 
legislation in 2010 that require all cigarettes sold in Finland to be fire safe, self-extinguishing 
cigarettes (Helsingin Sanomat, 20.4.2011). However, it is too early to evaluate the actual 
effects of the self-extinguishing cigarettes. 
Fire death statistics have been gathered since 1952 (see figure 7). Accidental fire deaths 
have ranged from 52 to 139 during 1952–2010 and the average number of fire deaths was 
87. The total number of victims from 1952–2010 was 5143.
In 1964 and 2001, the number of fire deaths was at the lowest level of 52. In 1979, the 
number of fire deaths was the highest at 139. The disastrous fire at the Virtain elderly 
home claimed 27 elderly people and raised the figure of fire deaths in 1979. The fire was 
caused by a match that had fallen into a bed at night from the sickroom where smokers 
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were housed. Most of the victims were incapable of moving and the fire alarm did not 
alert people to danger (Investigation Report of Virtain Elderly Home Fire, 1979). 
Between the years of 1958–1965, the number of fire deaths was lower than the average 
number of fire deaths, ranging from 52 to 77. Between the years 1976–1979, numbers 
were higher than the average, ranging from 101 to 139. Again, from 1999–2002, fire death 
figures were better and ranged from 52 to 75. In 2003, fire deaths began to increase slowly 
again (84), and 109 people were killed in fires in 2006. However, the year before, in 2005, 
only 69 people were killed in fires. Besides accidents, 20–30 people per year died by suicide 
involving fires or as a consequence of unclear premeditation per year. In 2007, 85 people 
were killed, in 2008 and 2009, 107, and in 2010, 80 people were killed.
Considering the variation in fire deaths and the objective to reduce fire deaths to 50 by 
the end of 2015 that is, 37 victims less than the average number of fire deaths in the last 
fifty years – the target can be considered as challenging. However, in 2010, only 80 people 
died in fires, in 2009 and 2008, 107 people died in fires, and in 2007, 85 people died in fires 
in Finland. The number of victims varies constantly. 
The ‘70s seem to be the highest period for the number of fire deaths. 1005 people 
died in fires in the ‘70s. The ‘80s is the second highest in the number of fire deaths at 
899 victims. However, real safety cannot be evaluated by the number of victims because 
the figure as to how many accidents almost led to deaths is not known. Additionally, the 
number of injured is also outside of this scrutiny, because the statistical data for injuries 
was been collected for these years. 
As a comparison, in road traffic accidents a total of 6,072 road traffic accidents 
involved 7,673 personal injuries, and of them, 272 people were killed in 2010. In 2009, 
Figure 7. Accidental fire deaths 1952–2010.
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a total of 6,414 road traffic accidents involved 8,057 personal injuries, and in them 279 
people were killed. In 2008, 344 were killed, in 2007, 380 were killed and in 2006, 336 
were killed (Official Statistics of Finland, Traffic accidents, 2011). Road traffic accidents 
have varied from 1931–2009 from 113 to 1,072. The development of the car industry has 
affected the increase in accidents since the beginning of the century. 
5.1.1 Intensive case analysis of fire deaths in Finland 2007–2010 
The purpose of the intensive case analysis of fire deaths from 2007–2010 is to outline a 
typical case of fire deaths. Additionally, an important purpose is to define the essential 
features and factors of these fatal accidents. As the theoretical framework offers a 
combination or a “weft” of emergency, disaster and risk-management approaches including 
human error, systemic error, and loosely-coupled approaches (Bogner, 1994; Perrow, 1999; 
Davies & al., 2003; Reason, 2003), this model provides the possibility of being able to 
classify the results. The role of human error in fire deaths is an important and continuous 
theme, with 28% of fire deaths being caused by human error from 2007–2010. 
Whittingham (2008) has classified strategies to prevent corporate accidents into 
safety culture, understanding the risks, safety regulation, safety management, learning 
organizational and corporate social responsibility. These strategies are loosely utilized 
in the analysis. The conceptual framework of safety with different dimensions in chapter 
3.2.2 is used in the analysis in more detail. The existence of an individual and the existence 
of health are the core of the conceptual framework of safety expanding to areas of the 
social and welfare state point of view, traditional national safety, the modern, ecological 
conception of safety, and into the cultural and humanistic conception of safety. 
Analysis begins with a general review of fire deaths; how many victims were lost in 
fire deaths per year; and what kind of fires were the most common ones. Risky structures 
of habitation, for example, environmental factors and building types are examined. The 
basic profile is created by examining times of the day, days, and months when most of the 
accidents happened. The riskiest areas for fire deaths are examined through a risk area 
classification of 1–4. Additionally, the geographical examination is done by examining 
the number of fire deaths in the 22 rescue service areas. 
Causes of fire and contributory factors are examined by analyzing where the fire 
started, from which room, and what was the spot that caught fire first. The ability to 
react, and why the victim did not leave the site of the fire, and whether the fires were 
caused intentional are all analyzed. Whether the victim was alone, whether the victim 
had abused alcohol or other drugs, and whether the abuse had an effect on the ignition 
of the fire are also analyzed in this section. Some of the materials are restricted from this 
analysis because they are classified police material. 
Specific statistical data on residential fire deaths from 2007–2010 is remarkable data 
because previously no data like this has been available in Finland. Data includes detailed 
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information of each of the 379 fire deaths. However, mistakes in the data collection are 
possible. There are also differences in compiling the statistics. Thus, the figures are 
indicative, but this elaborate data offers a better understanding of what factors influenced 
these fatal fires from 2007–2010 and possibly in the future some fires could be better 
prevented. 
5.1.2 Fire deaths14 from 2007–2010 
Altogether, 379 people in Finland died in fires from 2007–2010 (see table 4). In 2010, 
the total number of fire deaths was 80 (16 victims per million inhabitants). In 2009, the 
total number was 107 (18 victims per million inhabitants), and in 2008, the total number 
was the same. In 2007, the total number of fire deaths was 85 (16 victims per million 
inhabitants). The forecast to the year 2020 is 90 accidental fire deaths, unless some change 
occurs. 
In 2010, fire brigades reported 14,992 call-outs to extinguish fires, that is 13.5% of all 
alarm assignments (total assignments per year 110,387.) (Statistics of the Rescue Services, 
2006–2010). 
Table 4. Fire deaths from 2007–2010. 
Year Victims
2007 85
2008 107
2009 107
2010 80
Total 379
The most common type of fire was construction fires (see table 5). The total percentage of 
90.5 of fire deaths occurred in buildings, while 6.9% of fire deaths occurred in vehicles, 
14 Fire death in this research refers to a death that has resulted from the injuries directly caused by an 
event considered to be a fire, or from the poisoning, and when the death has followed within 30 days. 
The Finnish central organization of rescue services, SPEK, registers fire deaths through media follow-
up. A person who dies in a fire and is mentioned in the media is registered as a fire death. In the media 
follow-up, it is not analyzed if the person died during the fire or after it. Delayed fire deaths will not 
be registered either if they are not mentioned in the media. Victims who died from carbon monoxide 
poisoning without afire will be registered in the SPEK statistics. Statistics Finland does not record fire 
deaths as a consequence of vehicle fires caused by traffic accidents. Statistics Finland’a follow-up time 
lasts until the actual death. If the person has died due to injuries in, for example, 33 days, or 365 days 
after the accident, it will be considered as a fire death. Statistics Finland records fire deaths according to 
the day of death, not the day of the fire. Additionally, Statistics Finland records people abroad if they had 
a domicile in Finland at the time of the accident. Different ways to record data can lead to differences in 
the statistics (Kokki & Jäntti, 2009, 19). 
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and only two of the cases occurred in the terrain as country fires. As most of the fires 
occurred in construction sites and in buildings, it is interesting to examine in more detail 
the building types, and the risky structures of areas, and housing in Finland. 
Table 5. Types of accident from 2007–2010. 
Frequency Percent
Construction fire 343 90.5
Country fire 2 .5
Vehicle fire 26 6.9
Other 8 2.1
Total 379 100.0
5.1.2.1 Risky structures of areas and housing in Finland 
Finland has been divided into risk areas starting from one and ending in four. In risk 
area one, at least ten squares that are 250 times 250 square meters size that touch each 
other, and in which the number of inhabitants is more than 250, or the floor space is 
10,000 square meters exist. This sort of risk areas is in centers of towns and in residential 
areas consisting mainly of apartment buildings. Risk area two forms at least ten squares 
that touch each other and do not belong to risk area one, and in which the number of 
inhabitants is more than 60, or the floor space is bigger than 2,500 square meters. The 
third risk area is at least ten squares that do not belong to the previous risk areas, and 
in which the number of inhabitants is more than ten, or the floor space is more than 
250 square meters. Risk area four includes those squares that do not fill the required 
conditions of risk areas one, two, or three (Kokki, 2011, 38). Area four is the riskiest area 
when considering the number of fire deaths of 41.2% in this risk area. 
However, most of the fires, in which people were saved, were in risk area one (49%): 
see table 6), 33% of the fires were in the risk area two, 10% in risk area four, and 9% in risk 
area three. The fire departments have placed their resources on the basis of risk analysis 
into areas with the biggest risk (risk area one) (Kokki, 2011, 38). 
Table 6. Fire deaths in risk areas 1–4 from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
I 72 19.0
II 103 27.2
III 48 12.7
IV 156 41.2
Total 379 100.0
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Buildings are divided into three classes in Finland depending on the building materials 
and construction method (see table 7). In class P3, the instructions for construction 
requirements are loose. Interior surface materials are usually wooden and there are no 
requirements for the supporting structures. Most of the one-family houses (terraced 
houses and detached houses) are in class P3. Most of the fire deaths occur in class P3 
buildings with 66.8% of fire deaths in these buildings. 
In class P2, interior surface materials are strictly regulated and the construction 
element must withstand fire for 30 minutes. Only some houses in Finland are in class P2. 
Only 1.6% of fire deaths were in P2 buildings. 
In class P1, the buildings will withstand material fire without collapsing and without 
the fire spreading from one compartment to another for 30 minutes. Most two-storey 
houses are in class P1. The time before the fire spreads between apartments is 60 minutes: 
22.2% of fire deaths in Finland were in class P1 buildings from 2007–2010. 
Table 7. P-classification of buildings and fire deaths from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
P1 84 22.2
P2 6 1.6
P3 253 66.8
Missing 36 9.5
Total 379 100.0
Almost half (49.9%) of the fire deaths were in one-family houses (see table 8). Apartment 
buildings are the second most typical, with 21.4% of fire deaths being in apartment 
buildings. Only some of the fire deaths were in terraced houses, summerhouses, rental 
cottages and outbuildings. Outbuildings are separate buildings outside the (residential) 
main buildings. 
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Table 8. Building types by use and fire deaths from 2007–2010
Frequency Percent
One-family house 189 49.9
Terrace house 30 7.9
Apartment building 81 21.4
Summerhouse 21 5.5
Rental cottage 1 .3
Outbuilding 4 1.1
Other 4 1.1
Missing 49 12.9
Total 379 100
Most residential fires in Finland occur at night, at weekends, and during winter months. 
The riskiest time of the day was at night between midnight and 3am, and between 4am 
and 7am, and between 8pm and 11pm. 
December and February were the most risky months and most of the fires occurred on 
Saturdays. Thursdays, Fridays, and Mondays were also risky days of the week. 
5.1.2.2 Fire deaths in the rescue regions 
When examining the figures for fire deaths in the 22 rescue regions, most of the fire 
deaths occurred in the Varsinais-Suomi, Helsinki and Pirkanmaa regions. However, these 
are the most populated areas in Finland, therefore, fire deaths have to be proportional to 
the population15. The number of fire deaths is proportionated to a number of one million 
inhabitants per year in the rescue service areas. Most cases of fire deaths from 2007–2010 
were in Kainuu, Pohjois-Savo, Pohjois-Karjala and Kymenlaakso (see table 9). These are 
the gloomiest areas when considering the number of fire deaths. In addition Satakunta 
and Päijät-Häme, more people died than on average. Proportionally to the habitation level, 
the fewest people died in Keski-Uusimaa, Jokilaakso, Pohjanmaa and Keski-Pohjanmaa 
(Kokki, 2011).
15 Population as of 31.12.2009. 
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Table 9. Fire deaths in rescue regions from 2007–2010. 
Region Frequency Percent Fire deaths/ inh.
Kainuu 14 3.7 169
Pohjois-Savo 27 7.1 108
Pohjois-Karjala 18 4.7 108
Kymenlaakso 19 5.0 104
Satakunta 22 5.8 96
Päijät-Häme 19 5.0 94
Varsinais-Suomi 40 10.6 86
Etelä-Karjala 11 2.9 82
Lappi 15 4.0 81
Etelä-Savo 12 3.2 77
Etelä-Pohjanmaa 15 4.0 77
Kanta-Häme 11 2.9 63
Pirkanmaa 31 8.2 63
Oulu-Koillismaa 17 4.5 63
Länsi-Uusimaa 26 6.9 61
Helsinki 31 8.2 53
Itä-Uusimaa 5 1.3 53
Keski-Suomi 14 3.7 51
Keski-Pohjanmaa 5 1.3 50
Pohjanmaa 7 1.8 47
Jokilaaksot 5 1.3 40
Keski-Uusimaa 15 4.0 36
Total 379 100
However, on the basis of the fire death data, it is difficult to say why most fire deaths 
happen in these particular areas. Socio-economic variables were excluded from the 
statistical data. However, Kokki (2010, 54) has analyzed that 67% of fire deaths were in 
low-income households in 2010, and 61% from 2007–2009. Eastern Finland has faced 
changes in winding up industries in recent years and this affects employment. This 
specific statistical data does not include employment or unemployment figures. 
5.1.2.3 Safety culture
Considering the factors that are related to safety culture and what can be done to prevent 
fires, it is important to examine what caused the fire. The most common cause of fire was 
cigarettes, with 24% of fire deaths caused by smoking (see table 10), 17% caused by arson, 
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17% by another cause, and 16 % were unknown, and in 11% of cases, fire deaths were 
caused by electricity, or carelessness with an open fire. 
Table 10. Causes of fire deaths from 2007–2010 (Kokki, 2011, 22).
Cause of fire
Fire deaths 
n %
Smoking 44 24
Arson 30 17
Electricity 20 11
Carelessness with open fire 20 11
Wrong use of equipment 7 4
Other cause 31 17
Unknown 28 16
Total 180 100
Fire safety requirements for cigarettes entered into force on the first day of April in 2010 
by a Parliamentary decision to amend legislation on measures to reduce smoking. All 
cigarettes are self-extinguishing and are evaluated to make them less likely to cause fires 
if used carelessly. Finland is the first European country to enact fire safety requirements 
for cigarettes. The number of fires and fire deaths is anticipated to decrease now that 
regular cigarettes have been replaced by self-extinguishing ones. In addition, compared to 
earlier years, it is decreasing. In 2010, the number of fire deaths caused by smoking was 16 
(23%) of all causes of fire deaths. In 2007–2009 it was 28 (35%) of all causes of fire deaths. 
However, it is too early to evaluate these effects. 
The spots that caught fire first were chattels (24%), for example, furniture, the 
interior furnishing, clothes, and textiles (see table 11). Supporting structures (7%) such 
as structures and coverings, were the second typical spot that caught fire first. The room 
where the fire started first was typically the living room (20%), then bedroom (17%) and 
third, the kitchen (14 %). 
Table 11. The spot that caught fire first from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
Supporting structure 25 6.6
Chattel 90 23.7
Unknown 54 14.2
Missing 210 55.5
Total 379 100.0
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5.1.2.4 Human error
Most of the fires were caused by the action of people either accidentally or on purpose (see 
table 12). Carelessness and lack of caution were contributory factors. From 2007–2010, 
28% of fire deaths were caused by human error. 
Table 12. Cause of fire from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
Human error 106 28.0
Device failure 23 6.1
Inflammable material 1 .3
Other 5 1.3
Not possible to evaluate 51 13.5
Missing 193 50.9
Total 379 100.0
In 19% of cases, fire deaths were a consequence of carelessness and lack of caution (see 
table 13). In 15% of cases, the fire was caused deliberately, and in 14.8% of cases, it was an 
accident. In 12.7% of cases, the intention was not known.
Table 13. Estimation of deliberateness of fire ignition from 2007–2010. 
Frequency Percent
Intentional 57 15.0
Carelessness 72 19.0
Accident 56 14.8
Unknown 48 12.7
Missing 146 38.5
Total 379 100.0
Due to the rapid development of fire, there is typically not much time left to save the 
victim unless the victim is able to save their own life. The ability to react and function is 
essential in the case of fire. From 2007–2010, the ability to react of those who died in a fire 
had reduced in 60.7% of cases (see table 14). This is a significant finding. The ability to 
react in the case of fire had reduced in 230 cases from 2007–2010.
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Table 14. Ability to react to fire from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
Normal 38 10.0
Reduced 230 60.7
Unknown 111 29.3
Total 379 100.0
Why the person did not exit to save themselves in time was in 35.1% of cases, due to the 
person not reacting in time (see table 15). A reduced ability to react is related to the cause 
as to why the victim did not escape in time from the scene of the accident. 
Table 15. Why the person did not exit to save their life from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
Did not perceive the fire 55 14.5
Did not react in time 133 35.1
Did not know how to operate 38 10.0
Did not find a route to save 12 3.2
Reduced ability to move 42 11.1
Lived by others help 5 1.3
Obstacles at emergency exit 2 .5
Not an accident 40 10.6
Unknown 52 13.7
Total 379 100.0
In most cases, the victims were under the influence of alcohol. In 63.1% of cases, the 
victims had abused alcohol (see table 16). An estimation of the effects of alcohol, drugs 
or medicines in terms of the accident was 49.9%. Again, this is a remarkable finding 
considering that fire deaths are connected to alcohol abuse and a reduced ability to react 
in time. 
Table 16. Had the victim abused alcohol (2007–2010)?
Frequency Percent
No 140 36.9
Yes 239 63.1
Total 379 100.0
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5.1.2.5 Protection and rescue operations
Saving people from fires requires successful protection systems, successful rescue 
performed by the victim or by external agents. The fire alarm is one of the most essential 
pieces of protection equipment. It warns the victim or the rescuers to perceive the fire 
and to save victims by moving them away from life-threatening conditions. A fire alarm 
went off in 15.6% of cases from 2007–2010 (see table 17). However, the victims were lost. 
A significant finding is that in 28% of cases there was no functioning fire alarm, and 106 
people died in conditions in which there was no fire alarm at all. 
Table 17. Functioning of the fire–alarm system in fire deaths from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
Fire alarm operated 59 15.6
Fire alarm was not operating 22 5.8
Operation of fire alarm is unknown 73 19.3
No fire alarm 106 28.0
Fire alarm system 2 .5
Automatic fire detector 5 1.3
Unknown 70 18.5
Missing 42 11.1
Total 379 100.0
In 33% of cases from 2007–2010, a third person or a bystander made the emergency call 
(see table 18). In 18.7% of cases the informer was a person from the same building, in 
13.7% of cases they were from another building, and in 9.2% of cases they were from the 
same room. Automatic announcements only occurred in 2.4% of cases. In 8.7% of cases, 
the victim was alone and the person closest to the victim was, in 25.6% of the cases, in 
the same building. In 13.7% of the cases, the person closest to the victim was in a nearby 
building. In 25.1% of the cases, the informant was unknown.
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Table 18. Person who informed about the fire from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
Automatic machine 9 2.4
Victim 13 3.4
Person from the same room 35 9.2
Person from the same building 71 18.7
Person from another building 52 13.7
Passer-by 36 9.5
Third person/ bystander 125 33.0
Other 38 10.0
Total 379 100.0
5.1.2.6 Development of the fire
The development of a room fire is distinguished from that of an open fire. In an open-
state fire, there is more burning air without restrictions and smoke escapes well. In a room 
fire, the availability of burning air is restricted and the building parts that constrict the 
space prevent the smoke and heat radiation from escaping. Usually, room fires begin to 
develop from the ignition of furniture and interior furnishing. The ignition may follow a 
smoky fire that is small in effect and may go out by itself. Properties of burning material 
and the amount of susceptible surface essentially affect the development of the fire. When 
there is enough material to burn in the vicinity of the fire and the flames reach a height of 
30 centimeters, it can be called a settled ignition. After this, the fire continues to develop 
typically at an accelerating pace (Kokki & Jäntti, 2009, 41; Sikanen & Keski-Rahkonen, 
2011, 17). The development degree of fires was 69.1% at the burning stage in the case of 
fire deaths (see table 19). 
Table 19. Development stage of the fire from 2007–2010.
Frequency Percent
Ignition stage 42 11.1
Burning stage 262 69.1
Cooling stage 22 5.8
Extinguished 39 10.3
Unknown 12 3.2
Missing 2 .5
Total 379 100.0
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5.1.2.7 Age and gender
Mostly victims of fire deaths were male (see table 20). Middle-aged men and middle-aged, 
and elderly women are at the greatest risk of dying in a fire. On average, more people that 
are elderly die in fires. The average age of dying in a fire is 55 years. From 2007–2010, 278 
victims (73.4%) dying in fires were males and 101 victims (26.6%) were females. The risk 
of dying in a fire is 2.5-fold for men compared to that for women. 
Table 20. Gender of fire deaths from 2007–2010. 
Frequency Percent
Male 278 73,4
Female 101 26,6
Total 379 100,0
The risk of dying in a fire for males and females is highest in the age group 60 to 69 
years (64 victims per million inhabitants) with 26.7% of all victims being in the age group 
60–69 years. In one of the cases, the age was not known. 
Table 21. Victims according to gender and age groups from 2007–2010 (percentage of total in 
brackets). 
Male Female Total
0–9 years 2 (0.5%) 2 (0.5%) 4 (1.1%)
10–19 years 9 (2.4%) 2 (0.5%) 11 (2.9%)
20–29 years 10 (2.6%) 8 (2.1%) 18 (4.8%)
30–39 years 19 (5.0%) 4 (1.1%) 23 (6.1%)
40–49 years 46 (12.2%) 12 (3.2%) 58 (15.3%)
50–59 years 69 (18.3%) 19 (5.0%) 88 (23.3%)
60–69 years 81 (21.4%) 20 (5.3%) 101 (26.7%)
70–79 years 27 (7.1%) 17 (4.5%) 44 (11.6%)
80–89 years 13 (3.4%) 16 (4.2%) 29 (7.7%)
90 years 1 (0.3%) 1 (0.3%) 2 (0.5%)
Unknown age 1 
Total 278 101 379 (100%)
The men’s share is considerably higher than in females with 21.4% of the male victims 
being in the age group 60–69 years and 5.3% of female victims being in the same age 
group. 18.3% of male victims were in the age group of 50–59 years and 12.2% were in 
the age group of 40–49 years. Five percent of female victims were in the age group of 
50–59 years, 4.5% were in the age group of 70–79 years, and 4.2% were in the age group of 
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80–89 years. Therefore, middle-aged men and middle-aged, and elderly women are at the 
greatest risk of dying in a fire. 
5.2 Summary and conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze fire death data to seek an answer to the fire 
death problem: what kind of problem it is and what makes the problem identification 
ambiguous. The actual policy problem is difficult to define. Fire deaths are an ambiguous 
policy problem and loosely connected and interrelated with different factors. The fire 
death policy problem aggregates from individual behavior, to a collective level, and to 
the outside world. Fire deaths are also interconnected and interlinked between different 
policies, and this makes the policy problem identification even more ambiguous. However, 
the political-administrative actors are aiming to define fire deaths as a safety policy 
problem. Fire deaths are a safety policy problem, but also a problem of social and alcohol 
policies. This makes the problem identification ambiguous. 
Fire deaths are a collective problem of social responsibility and a problem of 
inappropriate individual behavior. Fire deaths are, at the same time, a private misfortune, 
and a public problem (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 164). This can be seen by examining 
the profiles of the cases that are summarized in the table below (see table 22). 
Table 22. Profiles of the cases from 2007–2010.
N 379
Areas Kainuu, Pohjois-Savo, Pohjois-Karjala and Kymenlaakso
Age 60–69 years
Gender Male (73.4%)
Ability to react Reduced
Type of fire Construction fire
Risk area IV
Building type P3
Time of day, day of week, month Night, weekend, winter months
Cause of fire Smoking
Cause of fire Human error
Table 22 collects basic features that appear on average in 379 cases of fire deaths from 
2007–2010. Each case is critical, definite, and irreversible. Most fire deaths occurred in 
Kainuu, Pohjois-Savo, Pohjois-Karjala, and Kymenlaakso. The victims were aged 60–69 
years, were mostly male, and their ability to react had been reduced. In 62% of cases, the 
victim’s ability to react had been reduced due to alcohol abuse or the use of other drugs. 
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This figure demonstrates how significant people’s individual behavior and choice actually 
is in causing these fatal accidents. The possibility of the government being able to reduce 
the number of victims is limited. 
The type of fire was usually a construction fire in risk area four in the remote district 
areas where, 17% of the Finns live in one-family houses of building type P3 where the 
instructions for construction requirements are loose, and interior surface materials are 
usually wooden, and there are no fire-specific requirements for the supporting structures. 
Most fire deaths occur at night, at weekends, and during the winter months of December 
and February. The riskiest time of the day was at night between midnight and 3am, 
and between 4am and 7am and between 8pm and 11pm. Most of the fires occurred on 
Saturdays. Additionally, smoking was the common cause of the fire and human error 
was also considered as a consequential cause of fire in one-third of the cases. The second 
common cause of fire was arson. The number of arson attacks has been growing in recent 
years and it is an alarming sign. It can be a signal of negligence and a laissez-faire attitude 
toward those living -nearby and neighbors, and it should be studied further. One hundred 
and six people died in conditions in which there was no fire alarm at all. In one-third of 
the cases, a third person or a bystander made the emergency call. 
What sort of accident type are fire deaths? According to the analysis, fire deaths are 
accidents caused mostly by humans and system accidents in the sense that they involve 
the unanticipated interaction of multiple failures such as non-operating fire alarms or 
missing fire-extinguishing systems. Fire deaths are a mixture of human error and system 
safety error. These failures are loosely coupled. Events in a fire can occur independently, 
although they can be involved in the same sequence. However, some events are not 
necessarily coupled, or caused by the other, for example, smoking and alcohol abuse. They 
can be separate events that are not necessarily caused by each other, but they can also be 
in the same sequence causing fire deaths. 
Fire deaths can have a catastrophic potential that can cause damage to a great many 
humans, first-party victims (fire death victims, firefighters), second-party victims 
(relatives, neighbors, and inhabitants in detached-houses, those who are aware and 
informed of the possible exposure), third-party victims (innocent bystanders that have 
no involvement in the system), and fourth-party victims (fetuses and future generations) 
(Perrow, 1999). 
If the fire deaths were an unambiguous policy problem, it would be easy to define 
the cases and then respond to these accidents. In most cases, problem framing is an 
enlightened guess of the actual policy problem. This is the case in fire deaths as fire safety 
policy is an ambiguous policy problem and the actual problem needs closer examination. 
It is ambiguous as to how much the risk areas or building types have effects on fire deaths. 
More significant can be the circumstances before the fire and the social environment 
where inhabitants live. 
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Humans also make mistakes and systems do fail. Human error spans the disciplinary 
gulf between psychological theory and the reliability of hazardous technologies (Reason, 
2003). Interaction of multiple failures is one explanation for accidents (Perrow, 1999). A 
series of failures interact and become serious. 
Alcohol abuse and smoking are chosen behavioral effects increasing the chances of 
fire. Flammable furniture, interiors and building materials endanger even more if they are 
also connected to alcohol abuse, smoking, and a reduced ability to react. Missing or non-
operating fire alarms connected to the factors mentioned above reduce the probability 
of being saved from the fire even more. The fire will become perilous in a few minutes. 
Not to mention that the victims, in most cases, were alone. These particular features were 
described repeatedly in fire deaths.
Human behavior is essential in terms of further investigation on what could be done to 
prevent these accidents. Human contributions and mechanical contributions to fire deaths 
require deconstruction. Additionally, with the growth of system size and complexity, the 
nature of fires is changing all the time. 
An intriguing question relates to the identification of the fire death policy problem in 
terms of how fire deaths come to be formed as a policy problem in the first place. How do 
fire deaths come to the attention of public and governmental decision makers?
The fire death indicator simply shows that there is a problem and that it has the 
attention of governmental decision makers. This is why the case of fire deaths is followed 
more closely as a policy case. According to Kingdon’s (2002, 166) types of policy agendas, 
the governmental agenda, as a list of topics to which people in, and around government 
are paying serious attention, would be the entire internal security policy, and the decision 
agenda, as a smaller set of items being decided upon, would be the problem of fire deaths. 
Policy problems come to the attention of public and governmental decision makers 
because some more or less systematic indicator shows that there is a problem out there 
(Kingdon, 2002). This is the case in fire deaths. The figure for fire deaths is a simple 
indicator showing a problem, and this specific figure has got the attention of public, and 
the attention of governmental officials’. The figures are gathered, analyzed, and published 
in the media, and they get the attention of the public. Publicity is a considerable factor. 
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the internal safety policy, and the external 
pressure from the media is high toward the rescue services because of their main duty of 
maintaining fire safety, and, in a sense, it is “a matter of life and death.” This conclusion 
came up in the interviews with public managers in 2008. 
Reason (2003) defined that human error spans the disciplinary gulf between 
psychological theory and the reliability of hazardous technologies. A series of failures 
interact, and become serious, and eventually become accidents. Alcohol abuse and 
smoking are chosen behavioral effects endangering lives through fires. Flammable 
furniture, interior furnishing, and building materials endanger lives even more if this is 
also connected to alcohol abuse, smoking, and a reduced ability to react. Missing or non-
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operating fire alarms connected to the factors mentioned above reduce the probability of 
being saved from the fire. 
Thus, the cause of fire deaths is the interaction of the multiple failures with human 
contributions and mechanical contributions. The policy problem is nevertheless evident, 
as 379 people died in fires from 2007–2010 and that is a problem in society. However, 
fire deaths are an ambiguous policy problem since it is difficult to identify because of 
the combination of human contributions and mechanical contributions. Fire deaths are 
a fire safety problem related to alcohol abuse and precarious conditions. Fire deaths are 
also related to social and healthcare policies. These different policies are not planned, 
organized, or implemented as mutually reinforcing policy actions, and this causes 
incoherence between different policies. Links and connections between different policies 
are important in solving these policy problems. 
What does the decision-maker think about the problem formulation and what can the 
decision-maker do to solve this policy problem? Simon (1957) wrote about understanding 
crucial decision-making environments. By this, Simon meant aspects that have relevance 
to the life span of the organism being considered. The aspects that have relevance for the 
life span in fire deaths are considerable. These features are human behavioral aspects and 
fire safety technological aspects. What is essential are the connections between different 
policies that require collective decision making.
However, there are conflicting interests and objectives representing the values of 
different policies and participants (Cyert & March, 1963). Choices can be made by 
deliberately or by trial and error (Elster, 1979). Human actors can also make choices on the 
basis of the expectations of others. There is a discrepancy between the rational decision 
making world and the world where decision makers actually live (March & Simon, 1959; 
March, 1978; 1988; 1994; March & Olsen, 1979). However, these choices affect human lives 
and the effects are considerable. 
The government represents the collective choice and social responsibility exercised 
through governmental actions. The government is responsible for providing rescue 
services and measures as public goods or services. Individuals are responsible for their 
individual choice and behavior. Alcohol abuse and smoking are individual choices and 
the government has limited abilities to affect these choices. Legislation and taxation are 
policy instruments to constrict abuse. However, history indicates that individuals will 
invent their means, as during the Prohibition in the 1920s when alcohol was illegal, and 
in spite of the Prohibition citizens bought their alcohol on the illegal market (see Kyvig, 
2000). These behavioral effects should be examined further.
If an individual behaves in a way which cannot be intervened in, for example, 
when the person smokes in bed at night under the effect of alcohol, falls asleep, and 
eventually fire breaks out and the fire alarm does not function. Whose responsibility it 
is for all the possible consequences, in the end, the victim perishes, or the fire spreads 
to the neighborhood? Authorities can regulate smoking and enforce self-extinguishing 
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cigarettes, control alcohol abuse, and regulate the use of fire safety equipment such as fire 
alarms, extinguishers and sprinkler systems. However mandatory, when these measures 
are not followed there is not much for the authorities to do.
Policies crosscut multiple areas of policies and subsystems. In addition, an alteration 
in one policy will affect another. Policy interfaces or regimes have been studied from 
different perspectives. One aspect in dramatic events is to study how shocks disrupt policy 
agendas and policy change (Kingdon, 2002; May, Sapotichne & Workman, 2009, 793). 
The basic argument in this type of research is that there is a link between crises and 
policy change (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010, 4). Social and healthcare policy, alcohol and 
taxation policies are interconnected with fire safety policy. In most cases, victims in fire 
deaths were under the influence of alcohol and their capacity for normal interaction was 
impaired. Middle-aged and elderly people constitute the greatest risk group. The risk of 
dying in a fire will increase when people lose social contacts and drift away from society. 
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6 Target Setting in Fire Safety Policy
This chapter analyzes administrative target setting in the fire safety policy and in the fire 
safety organizations. The analysis concentrates on what ambiguities there are in target 
setting in the rescue services and in the fire safety policy. 
The chapter begins with a short definition of organizational targets, in terms of what 
functions they serve according to the theoretical framework and literature. The second 
section handles target setting and ambiguity in fire safety policy, exploring how targets 
are set in the political-administrative processes in the Internal Safety Program and in the 
rescue services and agencies.
The government of Finland has set overall objectives for the Finnish internal safety 
policy in the Internal Safety Program. Performance targets for the rescue services and 
agencies are set by the Ministry of the Interior. Regional state administrative agencies, the 
ERC, and the Emergency Service College are the agencies that are analyzed. 
Targets in these organizations are reviewed partly in 2001 and mainly in 2005 and 
2010. These three periods were chosen because of the change in the budget legislation 
being implemented in practice since 2005. The budget legislation defined how to set 
performance targets and how to set indicators measuring performance in the public sector. 
Therefore, periods before the change and after the change are interesting. Some of the 
data was not available for 2001 and thus was not analyzed. Regional state administrative 
agencies are only reviewed in 2010 because they were established in 2010. Additionally, 
the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency is not included in the analysis. The focus of 
the analysis is how targets are set in these years, and, most importantly, what ambiguities 
there are in target setting. 
6.1 Target setting in the Internal Safety Program 
Performance agreements represent the choice situation in which targets are made 
by evaluating based on the available information. Targets should focus on the most 
important targets and the attainable results for each budget year in ministries and 
agencies. Performance targets should express the ministries and agencies basic operations 
and the purpose of their existence. However, target setting and the purpose of existence 
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in the rescue services is ambiguous. This is elaborated on by examining the content and 
the structure of performance agreements. 
At first, the governmental level and the goals that the Finnish government has set for 
Finnish fire safety policy in the Internal Safety Program are analyzed, and then we move 
on to the more detailed performance agreements between the Ministry of the Interior and 
the Regional State Administrative Agencies, the ERC, and the Emergency Service College. 
The objectives for the rescue services and for the fire safety policy are set in the strategy 
for the rescue services, in the multi-annual operating and financial plans of the Ministry 
of the Interior and government agencies (FOP), in the budget and in the performance 
agreements. 
The Internal Safety Program identifies the priorities, objectives, and measures for 
the cross-sectoral development of internal security. The Program also specifies the key 
indicators to report on the implementation and results of the Program. The Program 
extends to the year 2015 and the objectives are set for the year 2015. The overall target for 
the Program is that Finland will be the safest country in Europe in 2015. 
There are six common targets and ten special targets to improve internal safety. 
Improvement of safety at home, during leisure time, and in traffic are one of the targets 
in ten special targets. Fire deaths are one of the indicators measuring the actual objective:
“To reduce the number of victims in accidents and the number of serious accidents 
systematically. Improve citizens’ consciousness of the accident risks and increase 
information about the prevention of accidents” (Internal Safety Program, 2008, 23).
The prevention of accidents is directed by eight cross-sectoral strategic definitions 
of policy that focus on increasing the importance of safety by standardizing methods 
to prevent accidents, increasing knowledge, offering expert services for safety planning, 
carrying out local safety work, improving habitation safety by developing risk management 
and improving inhabitants’ ability to identify and prevent risks, ensuring operational 
preconditions to prevent domestic accidents, improving measures to prevent the harm 
caused by alcohol abuse and other intoxicants, and by affirming independent initiatives 
of citizens by calling their attention to risk management and offering them the basic 
knowledge (Internal Safety Program, 2008, 23). 
Measures to achieve the objective are divided into eight procedures. Objectives and 
operational principles are specified to prevent accidents and defined by establishing a 
common forum of the authorities. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible 
for organizing this and the participative ministries are the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, the Ministry of the Environment, and also non-profit organizations from the 
field (Internal Safety Program, 2008, 23). 
All of these eight measures are not summarized in detail here, because they are not all 
relevant when considering fire safety policy. There are two relevant measures considering 
fire safety policy. The first of these two measures is to improve information about the 
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accidents and utilize this information in better cooperation between the rescue service 
areas and the National Institute for Health and Welfare. This information should be 
better used in safety planning. This information is used as part of risk management in 
the fire departments and local safety planning. Fire departments use this information 
in evaluating the performance of prevention work and to steer the collection of the 
information to utilize this better at the local level. The Ministry of the Interior is 
responsible for the measure, and the National Institute for Health and Welfare and the 
rescue service areas are participants.
The second measure considering fire safety policy is that hospitals, nursing homes, 
and care institutions should be protected with automatic sprinkler systems unless 
another method to attain a sufficient safety level is in place. Financing the system and the 
participation of the state in the financing is clarified. The Ministry of the Interior is the 
main responsible author along with the Ministry of Social and Healthcare, the Ministry 
of the Environment, the Association of Finnish and Regional Authorities. The following 
indicators are used to monitor these targets and objectives.
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Table 23. Indicators used to monitor improvement of safety at home, during leisure time, and in traffic 
(Source: Internal Safety Program).
Indicator 2007 Mid-term 
target
2011
Target
2015
Source
Accidental deaths at 
home during leisure 
time (number)
2710 (in 2006) 2440 2200 The National Institute 
for Health and 
Welfare
Deaths by falling 1178* (2006) 1060 950 The National Institute 
for Health and 
Welfare
Alcoholic poisoning 
and deaths caused 
by accidents under 
alcohol abuse
1177** (2006) 1060 950 The National Institute 
for Health and 
Welfare
Number of fire 
deaths
90 65 50 Resource statistics 
and accident 
statistics of the 
rescue operation 
Pronto
Damage caused by 
the fire damage €
150 M€ 150 M€ 150 M€ Federation of Finnish 
Financial Services
Hospitals, nursing 
homes and 
institutions that have 
been protected with 
an automatic fire-
extinguishing system
13% 20% 50% Report by the 
Ministry of the Interior
Number of deaths by 
traffic accidents 
378 250 (2010) 200 Liikenneturva, 
Organization for 
Traffic safety
Number of drunken 
drivers per 10,000 
drivers
15 11 10 The National Institute 
for Health and 
Welfare and Police
* Cause of deaths statistics, Statistics Finland
** Cause of deaths statistics, Statistics Finland
The number of fire deaths is taken from Pronto resource statistics and from the accident 
statistics of the rescue operations, and the data varies from the specific data gathered from 
the rescue service areas. The difference is due to another measurement in the statistics. 
Additionally, human error is not excluded, leading to different figures. Difference 
in fire death figures is a not, however, that significant that analysis would become too 
complicated. 
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The number of fire deaths has been set by the Finnish Government in the political-
administrative Internal Security Program to state the primary objectives and measures 
for internal security. The indicator measures the victims of fires and it has ranged 
from 52–139 from 1952–2010. The objective is to reduce the number to 50 by 2015. The 
first Internal Security Program aimed at reducing fire deaths to 30 by the end of 2012 
(Martiskainen, 2009, 9). An interesting question is how the target levels are constructed. 
Where does the target of 30 or 50 come from? 
In 2010, the total number of fire deaths was 80, in 2009 it was 107. In 2008, the total 
number of fire deaths was the same, and in 2007, the total number was 85. In 1962 and 
in 2011 the number was closest to 50, at 52. The average number of fire deaths from 
1952–2010 is 87. The objective of 50 is 37 deaths less than the average and, therefore, is 
ambitious. Attention must also be paid to the statistical variation. 
The dimension of the goal, viewing the things that are important –reducing the 
number of victims –and the aspiration level influenced by the organization’s past goal, 
past performance, and the past performance of other “comparable” organizations are the 
ways in which targets are constructed (Cyert & March, 1963). Zero would be the optimal 
level of fire deaths. Unfortunately, this level is not possible or achievable, because accidents 
always happen. Fifty would be the safest level in Europe when taking into account “other 
comparable” countries. If we examine the world fire statistics16 Finland is the highest 
ranked of the European countries after the Baltic States. Proportional to the population, 
the level is high. Hungary, Bulgaria, the USA, Poland, and Norway come after Finland 
when we compare the population level to the number of fire deaths.
16 Centre of Fire Statistics (CTIF) gathers world fire statistics. In 2005 world fire statistics included 85 
countries and 90 cities. 
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Table 24. World fire statistics in 2004. (Source: Center of Fire Statistics, 2006).
Country Population Number of fire deaths
Average number of fire deaths
Per 100000 
inhabitants
Per 100 fires
Russia 144000 18377 12.8 7.9 
Estonia 1347 127 9.4 1.1
Latvia 2319 195 8.4 2.0
The Ukraine 47517 3784 8.0 7.9
Lithuania 3500 233 6.7 1.4
Moldova 4400 222 5.0 8.9
Mongolia 2650 57 2.2 2.6
Finland 5220 103 2.0 0.9
Hungary 10117 157 1.6 0.7
Bulgaria 7761 105 1.4 0.4
The USA 293655 3900 1.3 0.3
Poland 38175 486 1.3 0.3
Norway 4577 55 1.2 0.5
Slovakia 5200 45 0.9 0.4
Croatia 4437 39 0.9 0.6
Ireland 4044 35 0.9 0.1
France 61000 500 0.8 0.1
The UK 60000 508 0.8 0.1
Slovenia 2002 17 0.8 0.3
As the world fire statistics show target levels are usually set by comparing other 
comparable organizations and their performance, which are, in this case, other countries. 
To halve the number of victims is a good target: however, it is ambitious. The Minister 
of Justice estimated already in 2011 that Finland is not likely to reach the objective to be 
the safest European country in 2015. Even though alcohol consumption would decrease 
and thus violent crimes would decrease, new property crime has increased regardless of 
the Schengen Agreement that allows transiting from one country to another within the 
Schengen area without border controls. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice argues that 
Finland is not likely to be the safest country in Europe in 2015 (HS 20.7.2011). 
This example indicates the ambiguous format around safety. Even though alcohol 
consumption or violent crimes may decrease there is always some other form of insecurity 
that increases. This example also indicates the ambiguity in the time dimension. Target 
setting was put in place prior to the establishment of the Internal Safety Program in 2008. 
So the decision-maker should have already known, in 2008, what the world would be 
115
AMBIGUITY OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN
ThE FIRE SAFETY POLICY OF FINLAND
like in 2015. Even though there are still some years left to be able to reach the objective, 
the Ministry of Justice has already estimated that the objective will not necessarily be 
achieved, or that it is not likely to be reached. However, the trend and the development of 
safety can change. 
As observed in the complete cycle of choice by March and Olsen (1976), individual 
preferences and cognitions are aggregated into organizational choices. This process can 
be bureaucratic-administrative or bargaining-political. The bureaucratic-administrative 
procedure is a process by which problems are solved, relevant solutions are associated 
with appropriate problems, and choices are made in order to resolve problems. The 
bargaining-political procedure is a process by which coalitions are formed and political 
bargains struck. Choices are made by forming a group with sufficient power to enforce a 
joint solution to a problem (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1976, 24). 
Target setting in the Internal Safety Program is a classic bureaucratic-administrative 
process where problems are solved, associated with appropriate problems, and choices are 
made in order to resolve problems. The logic of problems, choices, and solutions is written 
in the Internal Safety Program resolution. It begins with the background and purpose of 
the program, continues to the overall objective of the program including the definition of 
what is meant by internal safety, and in the end, defines the challenges (problems), aims 
to improve the situation (choices), and special targets to create solutions. Monitoring and 
evaluation of the program is achieved by reporting on the implementation and results of 
the Program to the government through the key indicators (table 27).
However, the large outcome targets that consider the whole of society such as the target 
that Finland will be the safest country in Europe in 2015 indicates that these large outcome 
targets are possible to set, but difficult to divide into a smaller chain of results. One of the 
interviewees described this as:
The perceiving and conceptualizing of outcomes is difficult or actually the conceptualizing 
is not difficult, but what is difficult is to break the effects into chains of results. If we have 
a general target such as to reduce fire deaths, what is left undone is who can influence 
this and how. The analysis of the causality chains is left undone, not the conceptualizing, 
and this leads to, that from this “business idea level,” a jump is made into such concrete 
outputs that the fire department should be at the scene of the accident in five minutes 
on average. That space will remain unanalyzed. And then this kind of style to work 
horizontally, even though this is a horizontal program, the internal safety program, how 
genuinely others are formulating this together is actually a big question. (Interviewee, 
2010) 
In the next section, performance targets are reviewed from the performance contracts of 
fire safety organizations, the organizations that are officially defined as being responsible 
for fire safety policy, and accountable for producing performance as outputs and outcomes. 
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6.2 Performance targets in the rescue services
According to the strategy of the rescue services, the main strategic goal in 2015 is to 
prevent accidents (Strategy of the Rescue Services 2015, 2007, 9). The main outcome target 
in the rescue services is to reduce the number of accidents especially the number of fires 
and fire deaths. In the case of emergency rescue services, they should provide aid fast and 
efficiently, and reduce the damage level. 
Overall performance targets for the rescue services from 2010–2014 are:
•	 Reduce	the	number	of	fires
•	 Reduce	the	number	of	fire	deaths
•	 Reduce	the	damage	of	construction	fires
•	 Develop	a	safety	culture	in	society
•	 Trust	in	rescue	services	remains	at	a	good	level	
 (Source: Multi-annual operating and financial plan of the Ministry of the Interior 
2010–2014, 2009, 47)
Table 25. Outcome targets for the rescue services for 2010–2014 in the Multi-Annual Operating and 
Financial Plan.
Outcome 
targets Score Estimation
Target 
(budget 
proposal)
Targets (multi-annual operating targets)
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Fires max. 
(exc. forest 
fires and 
wildfires)
11340 11480 12000 <12000 <11000 <11000 <11000 <11000
Of which 
construction 
fires
4030 4490 6000 <5600 <5400 <5300 <5200 <5200
Fire damage 
caused by 
construction 
fires (M€)
193 190 <160 <160 <150 <150 <150 <150
Number of 
fire deaths
91 104 <95 <73 <65 <60 <56 <56
Value of 
saved 
property in 
building fires 
(M€)
15110 16780 <10100 <10050 <10000 <9950 <9950 <9950
Confidence 
in rescue 
services % of 
population
– 94.0 – – >95 – – >95
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Again, the number of fire deaths is different from the figure in Pronto (90), and the 
figure collected from the rescue service areas (87). The difference can be put down to the 
different compilation methods involved in the statistics. 
The target in the budget proposal for the year 2010 is less than 73 people dying in fires. 
The realized number in 2010 was 80 fire deaths. For the years 2011–2014, the target is less 
than 237 fire deaths. The number is divided across four years. The Internal Safety Program 
set the target for the year 2011 and for the year 2015. In the Multi-annual Operating and 
Financial Plan, targets are set for each year. A longer planning period in target setting 
helps to develop results for the future.
As mentioned earlier in chapter four, the Ministry of the Interior makes performance 
contracts with regional state administrative agencies, the ERC, The Emergency 
Service College, and Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency. Targets with regional state 
administrative agencies, the ERC, and the Emergency Service College are elaborated on 
below. 
Regional state administrative agencies are an exception, because they make a strategic 
performance agreement with the Ministry of Finance for four years covering the 
governmental term. The strategic performance agreement sets its focus areas, priorities, 
and forms of cooperation and frame. The Ministry of the Interior makes an operational 
performance agreement with the agencies. The operational agreement is more detailed 
including more precise focus areas, policies, and targets. 
6.2.1 Regional State Administrative Agency
The strategic performance contract of the Southwestern Regional State Administrative 
Agency includes targets and preventive actions in line with the Internal Security Program. 
The strategic performance agreement includes the following targets:
•	 The	agency	participates	in	the	implementation	of	the	Internal	Security	Program	
and its objectives;
•	 The	agency	strengthens	preventive	actions;	and
•	 The	agency	improves	safety	in	the	changing	circumstances	of	people	and	society.	
(Strategic Performance Agreement with the Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
The operational performance agreement includes slightly more precise targets: 
•	 Organize	cross-sectoral	cooperation	of	internal	security	in	the	agency;
•	 Create	procedures	to	assure	cooperation	in	internal	safety	matters	between	the	
Centers for Economic Development, Transport, and the Environment;
•	 Support	the	local	safety	planning	and	operations	by	arranging	training	and	also	
by gathering reports and other information to utilize in local planning; and 
•	 The	focus	of	the	local	safety	planning	is	to	diminish	violence	and	accidents	and	
prevent alcohol disadvantages. (Operational Performance Agreement with the 
Ministry of the Interior, 2010.) 
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Operational targets are mostly pursuant: “to organize,” “to create,” and “to support.” 
Targets are not concretized by specific performance indicators or measures such as the 
number of committed cross-sectoral organizations, or a list of procedures to assure 
cooperation between centers for economic development, transport, and the environment. 
However, the regional state administrative agencies are fairly new and this might partly 
explain the character of the targets.
6.2.2 Emergency Response Center
By contrast to the performance targets of the regional state administrative agencies, the 
ERC has set more concrete performance targets and indicators such as: “90% of emergency 
calls are answered in less than 10 seconds” and “90% of cases requiring a call-out were 
responded to in a maximum of 90 seconds.” Additionally, costs of emergency actions have 
been set as a target: “8.9 euros per inhabitant per year.” 
The ERC Administration is a nationwide public sector organization consisting 
of administrative headquarters and ERCs located throughout the country. The ERC 
Administration is managed and directed by the Ministry of the Interior in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The task of the ERC Administration is to 
receive emergency calls from all over the country that fall within the scope of the rescue, 
police, social and health services, as well as other information relating to the safety of 
people, property, and the environment, and to forward their content to the appropriate 
authorities or partners (ERC Administration, 2011).
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Table 26. Targets and indicators of the Emergency Response Center Administration measuring 
effectiveness for 2001, 2005, and 2010 (Source: Performance Contracts).
Emergency Response Center 
Year 2001 2005 2010
Target 90% of emergency calls are 
answered less than in 10 
seconds.
90% of emergency calls are 
answered in 10 seconds. 
•  Score 2003: 8.6 seconds
•  Score 2004: 8.4 seconds
90% of emergency calls are 
answered in 10 seconds. 
•  Score 2006: 71%
•  Score 2007: 77%
•  Score 2008: 87%
•  Forecast 2009: 90%
Target 90% of cases that needed 
an assignment were 
responded in a maximum of 
90 seconds
90% of cases that needed 
an assignment were 
responded to in maximum 
of 90 seconds
In urgent cases, time from 
the emergency call to the 
assignment is responded to 
in the required time 70%.
•  Rescue services 55%
•  Health services 75%
Target Costs of emergency actions 8,9 € /inhabitant/year
Costs of emergency actions 
8,9 € /inhabitant/year
Costs of emergency actions 
max. 11,2 € /inhabitant/year
Costs of emergency actions 
max. 14,0 € /emergency call
Target Emergency number 112 is 
well recognized.
94% of population knows 
emergency number 112
•  Score 2003: 93%
•  Score 2004: 92% 
95% of population knows 
emergency number 112
•  Score 2007: 95%
•  Score 2008: 95%
•  Forecast 2009: 95%
Target – ERC work is reliable.
Utilization rate is 99.99%
Score
ERC works is reliable.
Utilization rate is 100%
The compact and concise targets such as in the ERC are easier to follow than broad and 
pursuant targets from the regional state administrative agency. However, the behavioral 
effects following these compact targets are ambiguous. Two ERC operators got a ticket 
from the District Court in 2010 regarding breaking a duty. Three calls were made over an 
hour in August 2009 concerning the same man’s threatening behavior. Some hours later, 
the man kindled his former lady friend’s house into a fire. The lady was saved, but six 
neighbors were hospitalized. In court, the second operator appealed that one emergency 
call should last only for a maximum of 90 seconds, and with this customer, it was used for 
four minutes (Helsingin Sanomat, 6.10.2010). 
This indicator led into negative behavioral consequences. The call lasted longer than 
it had been set as the target time. Considering the targets and the scores of the ERC 
administration, the numbers look good. It does not matter if 90% of calls are answered in 
10 seconds, the 10% of cases that are not answered within that time allocation can include 
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fatal consequences. Due to the character of the operations (saving lives), one case can be 
crucial, and only the best performance is good enough. Even though the numbers look 
good in the performance reports, performance is much more ambiguous than can be 
judged from the figures involved. As the example above showed, where the ERC operators 
hung up the phone, one case can be crucial, and can cause damage to a larger number of 
people. 
Performance indicator awareness of the emergency number 112 is a question of 
marketing and informing. The reliability of ERC work is a question of image – how the 
rescue operations are viewed by the public and in the media. Publicity was mentioned 
in the interviews with the Ministry of the Interior as one of the considerable factors 
influencing public management and for estimating the success of an agency from outside 
the organization. External pressure from the media is considerably high towards the police 
and the rescue services. Due to the nature of rescue operations, the ERC’s operations are 
always under close scrutiny. Saving human lives is a crucial assignment. 
Also the publicity much specifies public management, it is estimated through the publicity 
whether the branch of administration has succeeded in its task or not. (Interviewee, 
2008)
6.2.3 Emergency Service College
From the tight and crucial targets of the ERC Administration, the Emergency Service 
College provides education and training to supply labor for the rescue services and 
emergency response centers. The college provides training for fire fighters, ERC 
operators, sub-officers, and fire officers. The college also provides preparedness training 
for disturbances during normal conditions and emergency conditions, as well as for 
international, civil crisis management tasks. The college is involved in the research and 
development functions in the field. The College is also responsible for maintaining the 
assignment register of the rescue services called Pronto (Emergency Service College, 2011). 
The Emergency Service College has set targets to measure concrete outputs such as 
degrees gained, training days, and courses. The Emergency Service College also measures 
the current prices of the courses and training days, the number of teachers per student 
and also the quality of education (professional skills of the teachers, teaching material, 
course management, and contents of the courses).
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Table 27. Targets and indicators for the Emergency Service College to measure effectiveness in 
2001, 2005, and 2010 (Source: Performance contracts).
Emergency Service College 
Targets 2001 2005 2010
Degrees 171 244 250
Training days 70180 97680 93840*
Vocational education 51680 68020 54720
Vocational supplementary education 18500 19660 11400
Preparation training 11500 5000
From which obligatory civil defense education 7000 2250
Supplementary education (subject to public law) 1700 1400
Supplementary education (non-profit) 5300 1000
Supplementary education (profit) 4000
* Target has been revised to match better the actual amount of training days in the beginning of 2009 (now 180 days, earlier 190 
days)
The number of teachers and the quality of teaching indicate the resources and internal 
success of the Emergency Service College. Service ability and quality measures of the 
college are assessed through quality indicators on a scale from one to four. The quality 
target for degree education in 2010 was set as 3.00. The quality target for supplementary 
education in 2010 was set as 3.50, and for preparation training at 3.50. In previous years, 
the service production (degrees and training days) and quality measures were merged and 
a comparison between these years is not possible. Nevertheless, in 2009, the quality score 
in degree education was 3.06, and in 2008, 2.96, and in 2007, 3.01; thus the level of quality 
has been around three. The target for the year 2011 is 3.08. 
However, an indicator measuring the educational need compared to the actual training 
is missing. There are 635 voluntary fire brigades and 153 industrial fire brigades. Regional 
rescue services have approximately 5,000 full-time employees and approximately 14,300 
part-time employees and voluntary fire brigade members. What are the future number of 
employees, part-time employees and voluntary fire brigade members, and how is it taken 
into account considering the targets for the year 2015? 
Neither are targets for research, or targets for the use of the rescue service register 
Pronto included in this table. 
6.3 Summary and conclusions
Fire safety policy is about preventing accidents and acting in the case of an emergency. 
Reactions have to be made, otherwise human lives may be lost. “Solution salience” is an 
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essential feature of fire safety policy. A solution needs to be found and action has to be 
taken. Therefore, the objective-orientation fits well for the rescue services. 
However, no matter how fast and vigorously fire safety actors act, rescue measures alone 
do not reduce the number of fire deaths. Many of the actions with respect to threatening 
fire deaths are preventive, for example, installing fire alarms and sprinklers, conducting 
fire inspections, taking care of chimney sweeping in the houses, and increasing people’s 
safety awareness, events that happen before the fire brigades are even needed. These 
measures are not included in performance contracts between the Ministry of the Interior 
and the agencies that are scrutinized.
There should be targets largely indicating preventive measures. Otherwise, rescue 
services are reviewed by acts that are beyond their sphere of influence. People’s lack of 
carelessness caused the accidents in 19 % of the cases, and the risk became a reality. It is 
difficult to affect people’s behavior, or predict their behavior, or their lack of care. However, 
following the level of awareness toward safety is an essential feature in target setting. 
Additionally, the performance of the measures requires cooperation between several 
policies, their planners, and various implementing agencies. Fire safety policy is as much 
as about social and healthcare policy as safety policy. However, targets and measures are 
set for each ministry and agency, although cooperation is enacted between the ministries 
and agencies, and the Internal Safety Program. However, crosscutting policy targets are 
not set. Linkages or the connections between fire safety organizations are not explicit. 
Measures are divided into responsible authorities and each authority is responsible for 
each measure, although the cooperation model is pioneering in nature. Crosscutting 
policy targets would be targets that aim at a collective goal. 
As the Minister of Justice stated, alcohol consumption and violent crimes may be 
replaced by other different social problems in the future, and these may cause insecurity in 
society. The changing format of safety makes target setting ambiguous. Who is “mostly” 
responsible for each policy field in each time and who is mentioned as the main authority 
responsible for reducing or improving each policy problem? 
In target setting, the optimum level is impossible to reach. According to Simon (1957), 
this would mean a stable system of policies (preferences) and skills in computation to 
calculate the alternative policy choices. Cognitive limitations and the allocation of 
attention to different problems and policies at the same time is bounded, and there are no 
“perfect” solutions available, only the “best possible” solutions (Vakkuri, 2009b). 
It is also interesting how the target levels are constructed. The number of fire deaths 
has ranged from 1952–2010 from 52–139 and the average number of fire deaths from 1952–
2010 was 87. The objective is 37 deaths less than the average. Zero would be the optimal 
level, but it is unattainable. The dimension of the goal and the aspiration level influenced 
by past goals, past performance, and the past performance of other “comparable” 
organizations affects the target setting (Cyert & March, 1963). 
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Safety is overall, a multifaceted and pluralistic discipline to set targets and it will 
change over time. This should be perceived in target setting. Annual targets may not be 
relevant for reviewing, for example, fire deaths. Annual variation may be considerable. 
For example, in 2001 only 52 people died in fires. What does this tell us about the change 
in 2002, when 66 people died in fires, or in 2006, when 109 people died in fires? It is not 
known exactly what caused the increase or decrease in the number of victims. 
Altogether, a fire death is not a good indicator for objectives. Authorities’ ability to 
prevent accidents and fires is restricted. Individuals have their own will and freedom to 
choose their way of life. A better measure would be the success in saving people’s lives; 
how many people were saved from fires compared to the actual number of victims.
However, all operations are not surrounded by targets. Action and operations outside 
the target-orientation can also lead to results (Kassel, 2008, 241–252; Autero, 2009, 118). 
Results can be achieved in sectors for which the targets would not have been set at all 
(Kassel, 2008, 241–252; Autero, 2009, 118).
In the rescue services, reducing fire deaths has been identified as a need and an objective 
has been set to reduce the number of victims. In performance evaluation, an interesting 
point of view is whether the number of fire deaths begins to decrease or increase according 
to the objectives. What is also interesting is whether the rescue services had an effect on 
the decrease in fire deaths. How much have the rescue services affected the objective, and 
how many other operations and measures were affected outside of fire safety authorities?
In the next chapter, this is studied from the point of view of performance evaluation. 
What is interesting here are the effects that were generated, effects that were generated 
without intention, and the effects that effect society overall. 
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7 Evaluating Performance 
in Fire Safety Policy
This chapter analyzes ambiguity in evaluating fire safety policy. Evaluation means a 
systematic investigation of the effectiveness of social interventions (Rossi, Freeman & 
Lipsey, 1999, 4). In the case of fire deaths and fire safety policy, an interesting question is 
whose performance should be evaluated? Fire brigades are the operating units responding 
in a case of emergency. Rescue services are the legislative actors giving guidance and 
steering fire safety policy guidelines. Municipalities are the funding parties paying the 
costs of the rescue service regions, not to mention individual behavior and action that 
plays an important role in causing fire deaths. Dangerous situations, in most cases, are 
caused by individual choice and behavior. So who should take the credit or blame for the 
actual results? 
The main focus of this chapter is that evaluating performance of the fire safety policy 
is ambiguous. The chapter begins with a short definition of what performance evaluation 
is and why it is ambiguous. The chapter reflects ambiguity in evaluating performance of 
public policies as social interventions in the fire safety policy. The second section handles 
evaluating performance in the fire safety policy and in the rescue services according to 
the current model.
The analysis has been carried out based on the literature, interviews, and performance 
management documentary data, and on the statistical data for fire deaths. Interviewees 
were asked how they knew whether their organization was performing or not, and what 
they knew about social effectiveness and outcomes in public interventions. Interviews 
were undertaken in 2008 with directors from the Ministry of the Interior and with 
directors from the Ministry of Finance, the State Treasury, and National Audit Office, 
and members of the Parliament in 2010.
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7.1 Evaluating performance in fire safety 
policy and in the rescue services 
Whose performance should be evaluated?
In fire deaths, the problem is people dying in fires, and solutions to prevent fires and save 
lives is somewhere within the ambiguous mixture of safety, alcohol, social, healthcare, and 
housing policies. These several relatively independent policies formulate the performance 
of fire safety policy. However, the performance of the actions is evaluated only through 
the functions of a few organizations; the regional state administrative agencies, the ERC, 
the Emergency Service College and the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency. These 
organizations have signed performance contracts with the steering Ministry of the 
Interior for results in terms of fire safety policy. These organizations are only one aspect of 
carrying out fire safety policy. Many organizations outside these organizations affect the 
performance of the fire safety policy. This causes ambiguity in performance evaluation. 
One of the interviewees described the ambiguity of performance as:
Many actors influence carrying out performance. Also individual behavior affects and 
the people’s safety consciousness. No individual actor can put their hand on their heart 
and say we achieved this alone. (Interviewee, 2008) 
Thus, we do not know the results, in terms of who has performed their duties well: the 
Rescue Services, the ERC, or the Emergency Service College? Has their performance of the 
actions had an effect on the number of fire deaths? Evaluations can be made from several 
points of views. The accountability perspective measures the results or the value for the 
money expended; the knowledge perspective generates insights about public problems, 
policies, programs, and processes; and the development point of view aims to strengthen 
institutions (Chelimsky & Shadish, 1997, 21).
From the accountability perspective, evaluating the performance of a fire safety 
organization is done by evaluating performance reports and possible external evaluations. 
The basic idea is that billions of euros of tax money are spent and it has to produce some 
results and effects in society. However, how to evaluate the effects is another ambiguous 
question.
Tax-payers should have a right to know where their tax-money goes. Tax authorities levy 
a remarkable amount of money and go really deep into tax-payers’ pockets. So tax-payers 
should have a right to know where their tax-money actually goes. (Interviewee, 2010)
Financial statements and annual reports are the reports where the performance of the 
actions is assessed and the basic criteria for the performance of central government 
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finances and operations are defined in the budget legislation with the criterion divided 
into social effectiveness, cost effectiveness, and operating performance17. 
According to the financial statements, the performance of the actions of safety 
authorities is good. According to the financial statements, performance is at a good level; 
however, this does not tell us about the actual performance of the actions. It is ambiguous: 
are the targets measuring the right actions, and what is a good level for performance? 
As in the previous chapter examining objectives, it was noticed that the number of 
tasks, duties, actions, and measures is enormous, and the targets have been reached, or 
even exceeded in most of the result areas. In 2010, the number of fires was 11,994 and 
the target was to constrain fires to a maximum of 12,000 fires, the number of fire deaths 
was 80, and the target was 73, the damage caused by construction fires was 156 million 
euros, and the target was a maximum of 160 million euros. The saved property value in 
construction fires was 6,638 million euros and the target was 10,050 million euros. Trust 
in the rescue services was 96 % in 2008, for the latest year that has been reported. 
According to these targets, the number of fires and the damage caused by construction 
fires achieved the set target level. Targets were not reached in the number of fire deaths and 
in the saved property value in construction fires. The damage by construction fires was 
reduced and the number of fires was lower than was set as a target. However, more human 
lives were lost than what was estimated. What does this tell us about the performance of 
the actions, or the outcomes, or effectiveness of the fire safety policy?
In the central authorities’ interviews the ambiguity of performance evaluation was 
considered evident. Interviewees were asked how they knew if their organizations had 
been successful or not. Interviewees emphasized certain “hunches” in estimating the 
success in their agency and how things were done in their organization. These hunches 
were verified through different sources outside the organization. Sources were signals 
and messages from official and unofficial sources of information. Official signals and 
messages were feedback from other state agencies such as controlling authorities, the 
National Audit Office, and the Ministry of Finance. 
One could say roughly that with a certain hunch it is done. But from where will this 
hunch then come from and what will it consist of, from sources outside, messages and 
many kinds of signs from the outside. It consists of these; through these signals it forms. 
(Interviewee, 2008)
Professionalism was also emphasized as a feature in public management and the certain 
hunch in decision making is surely a part of this professionalism. An interesting remark 
was that public managers are not afraid to say that they do not necessarily know how 
17 The bookkeeping unit must draw up the financial statements from each financial year. The financial 
statements of the bookkeeping unit contain an annual report, a realization estimate considering the 
budget, a return and expense estimate, a balance sheet describing the economic position, and the 
appendix information for information (Budget Decree 63§ 1992/1243).
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to measure performance. The ability to manage performance and the ability to manage 
practical matters were considered more important.
The management ability of performance and of practical matters is central. Personal 
character, ways to lead performance, the manager has to know what the management 
ability of performance requires. (Interviewee, 2008)
Professionalism and certain mind-set were preferred as being more meaningful than 
gathering information and measuring performance. Interviewees were asked how 
organizations are managed and run if the performance of the actions is obscure. One of 
the interviewees’ distinct responses was:
Easily. It makes management easier if you do not get any measures. More valuable is the 
way of thinking in public management. It is easier to give a statement that is not based 
on anything but knowledge and experience. (Interviewee, 2010)
This response captures an aspect in public management: managers do not necessarily 
want or feel the need for performance information. Managing public policies is so wide 
ranging that the way of thinking and a certain mind-set is preferred as being more 
meaningful than gathering specific information and performance measures. On the other 
hand, they do not necessarily have any better alternatives. Measuring processes makes 
public management more complicated and also possible errors and mistakes may become 
more visible. Despite the reluctance or even fear of making and showing mistakes publicly, 
managers do work hard with their organizations and their goals. The ambiguity between 
measuring performance and using this specific performance information in management 
is evident. 
Different numerical and statistical figures were considered problematic in measuring 
and evaluating performance. Expressing figures for certain crimes or accidents do not 
tell us much about societal effectiveness. These factors are deep in society and will affect 
society no matter what is decided. Indicators measuring the number of crimes or accidents 
are not based on the consciousness, or knowledge of the society, or the phenomenon. 
This takes place by examining different statistics and others; it is extremely problematic 
that the results are hit numerically. There should be, for example, less than a hundred 
murders or manslaughters; this is not based on social knowledge. The factors are deep in 
the society, for example, in home violence, and they prevail in the society no matter what 
is decided. (Interviewee, 2008)
The basis for public policies is to achieve societal outcomes. However, the outcomes are 
not really measured in the Finnish state level government, or the processing of these 
objectives is loose. Defining outcomes was experienced as artificial in the sense that there 
are always issues that cannot be affected by public policies. Legislative power and budget 
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resources are means to affect these things; however, it is ambiguous as to what can actually 
be affected and what cannot. 
It is a little artificial to try to define social effectiveness and outcomes. There will always 
be so many other factors that cannot be influenced. (Interviewee, 2008)
It is regarded as good that performance targets are in the budget, but they were experienced 
as being broken into small pieces that are impossible to measure and to evaluate, and that 
their significance is difficult to understand from the public policy point of view. Building 
indicators like this seems apparent. On the other hand, perceiving and conceptualizing 
the outcomes is considered difficult. The analysis of the causality chains is difficult to 
define and thus the outcome targets will become more like mission statements than 
actual outcome targets. Usually, the action level is an easier step to follow, and the analysis 
between the outcome and output objectives is not processed. 
Analysis of the causality chains and actually conceptualizing the outcomes is not done; 
these will stay as mission statements and from the level of effectiveness it will be jumped 
up to concrete objectives such as the fire brigade must be there in five minutes on average. 
The link between the causality chains is not analyzed. (Interviewee, 2010)
It is remarkable that systematic targets for improving performance and indicators 
measuring performance have not been set until 2005. Performance reporting has been 
developed since 2005, and it is still developing, especially considering the societal 
effectiveness and outcome measures. The material through which to evaluate the 
performance of the fire safety policy is nevertheless limited and describes mostly the 
performance of the few organizations that have signed performance contracts with the 
Ministry of the Interior, not the fire safety policy as a whole, or the outcomes of the whole 
policy. 
It is also remarkable that some of the performance areas are totally excluded from the 
examination. For example, the regional rescue departments are funded from the budget of 
municipalities, and an essential part of the rescue operations is outside the investigation. 
On the basis of this, material conclusions cannot be made of what the actual performance 
of the actors and actions is. Yet, the task of this study is to point out the reasons as to why 
it is ambiguous to evaluate the performance of governmental actions. 
In the end, the interesting and fundamental question is who will take the credit or 
the blame for the actual performance? Who is responsible for bad performance and who 
should be credited with the good results? 
A decrease in the number of accidents and damage in large societal objectives is a long–
term objective and one year tells nothing actually. Long time spans must be followed, and 
how they go. Many actors influence carrying them out. Also, the individual behavior of 
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people affects this, but the alcohol policy, social policy, and people’s safety consciousness 
affect the decrease of fire deaths. (Interviewee, 2008)
In spite of the ambiguities, performance evaluations have to be done. In the annual report 
of the financial statement, the accounting unit has to report on the most important 
information on evaluating effectiveness, if the evaluation has been made during the 
present financial year (Budget Decree 65§). 
The next section describes the current system of evaluating performance in the fire 
safety policy. The analysis is carried out on the basis of financial statements and annual 
reports of the organizations that have signed performance contracts with the Ministry of 
the Interior. Describing the current system of evaluating performance through financial 
reports strengthens the view that performance evaluating is ambiguous. However, 
somehow, performance should be measured and evaluated in public management, and 
the public managers have to bear this contradiction. 
7.2 How to evaluate the performance of 
the actions in fire safety policy
Emergency management comprises planning, response, and recovery responders 
(Subramaniam, Ali & Shamsudin, 2010, 572). The success of the emergency management 
operation requires collective and cooperative emergency teamwork between different 
actors. Emergency response preparedness is a critical element in any emergency 
management system for emergency mitigation and makes planning an essential phase of 
emergency management. 
A considerable additional factor relates to how the rescue services are organized. 
Twenty-two regional rescue services produce rescue services, and municipalities are 
responsible for maintaining these services in their rescue service regions, and are also 
responsible for financing the services. The Ministry of the Interior and the Department 
for Rescue Services direct and supervise rescue services. The regional state administrative 
agencies coordinate preparedness in their regions and ensure cooperation. In addition, 
the Internal Safety Program plays an important role in fire safety policy. 
The systematic examination of performance in fire safety policy and the rescue services 
begins from the overall objective, which the government of Finland has set in the Internal 
Safety Program. The objective is that Finland will be the safest country in Europe in 2015. 
This overall aim embodies the Finnish internal safety policy. However, it is ambiguous 
to improve safety and security at this level in society. As described in the conceptual 
framework of safety in chapter 3.3, safety begins from the individual conception of health 
when considering safety at home, in housing, school, work, and overall in the community, 
and it spreads into national, ecological, cultural, and economic dimensions. Safety is a 
mosaic of individual and communal dimensions of welfare (Ranta-Tyrkkö & Ropo, 2003). 
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The emphasis on the social context in evaluation is important (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 
1999, 397). The plural nature of safety and the collective and cooperative characteristics 
of emergency work have to be considered when evaluating performance in the rescue 
services. Crucial attention must be paid to emergency preparedness and planning as one 
of the critical elements in the success of the rescue services. 
7.3 Performance in the rescue services 
The main outcome target of the rescue services is to reduce the number of accidents, 
especially the number of fires, and fire deaths. In the case of emergency rescue services, 
they should provide aid rapidly and efficiently, and reduce the damage caused. 
In 2005, there were no quantified effectiveness indicators reported in the financial 
statement. It is mentioned that the rescue services had operated in the Internal Safety 
Program, especially in projects considering accident prevention work at home and during 
leisure time, and in the expansion of local and regional safety plans considering especially 
accident prevention work. The data collection concerning accidents has been improved 
and the rescue services have launched a regional study on fires. Furthermore, the rescue 
services have participated in developing the statistical system of accidents, which has been 
given as a task to the National Institute for Health and Welfare. 
The rescue services have prepared a strategy for protecting the population on the 
basis of the safety and defense policy report. To prepare for unusual conditions and 
catastrophes, the rescue services have intensified the development of the management 
system in the rescue services. As part of this development work, a population warning, and 
alarm system, and follow-up system will be renewed. The rescue services have supported 
the new regionally functioning organization by arranging regular meetings with rescue 
institutions, rescue leaders, the management of the county, the ERC, and the Emergency 
Service College four times a year to agree on a common policy and definitions. The 
maintenance of the rescue services resource and accident statistics system, Pronto, has 
been transferred to the Emergency Service College since the beginning of 2006. 
Contrary to that, in 2010 there are indicators considering the social effectiveness of the 
rescue services. The indicators are taken from the rescue services resource and accident 
statistics system, Pronto, and the numbers vary compared to the numbers gained through 
the specific data on residential fire deaths collected from fire investigations. This is due to 
different recording systems for statistics.
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Table 28. Indicators of the social effectiveness of the rescue services (Source: Financial Statement of 
the Ministry of the Interior, 2010, Pronto)
Indicator Target 2010 Score 2010* Score 2009 Score 2008
Number of fires (excluding wildfires)
•  Number of construction fires
<12,000
<4,400
11,994 12,248
6,233
11,483
4,485
Number of fire deaths <73 81** 108*** 107
Damage by construction fires (million 
€) 
<160 156 124 197
Saved property value in construction 
fires (million €)
10,050 6,638 16,837 2,796
Trust in rescue services (percentage 
of the population****)
– – – 96
* Estimation
** According to the specific data on residential fire deaths 80 people died in fires in 2010.
*** According to the specific data on residential fire deaths 107 people died in fires in 2009.
**** Gallup study carried out every 3rd year. Realization in 2005 was 97% of the inhabitants. 
The low numbers of construction fires in the target in 2010 (4,400) and in the score in 2008 
(4,485) resulted from the compilation of statistics. Since the beginning of 2009, an accident 
type, “building fire risk,” was brought into use. The old accident type, “construction 
fire,” was divided into two. Some of the tasks that would have been earlier recorded as 
construction fires, were recorded as building fire risks at the beginning of 2009. In the 
score for 2008 and in the target for 2010, the building fire risks were not included. 
The number of fires excluding wildfires and terrain fires decreased during the year 
2010 compared to the previous year; however, the number in 2008 was lower than in 2010. 
Fifty-five percent of construction fires were residential fires and almost a half of the fires 
took place in one-family houses. In a third of the cases, the fire alarm required by law was 
missing (in 28% of cases from 2007–2010). Changes regarding cigarette legislation came 
into effect on 1 April 2010. According to the legislation, the cigarettes sold in markets 
must be self-extinguishing. This decreases the probability of fires caused by carelessly 
handled cigarettes. 
The worst individual fire that claimed three victims in Tampere spread from business 
premises into an apartment house. This fire was caused deliberately and with the purpose 
of insurance fraud (Helsingin Sanomat, 22.11.2010). 
The material damage from construction fires and building fire risks was estimated 
altogether at 156 million euros and it was 32 million euros more than for the previous year. 
The estimated material damage caused by residential fires remained nearly unchanged 
(50 million euros). The estimated damage to production, business, and storage spaces 
increased to 56 million euros. The value of saved property from construction fires rose 
by approximately 137%. The financial statement does not specify where this vast change 
resulted from. 
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The confidence toward the rescue services is measured every third year with a Gallup 
poll -study. The next inquiry will be made during the year 2011. In 2008, 96% of the 
population considered the rescue services as reliable. 
Fires caused by cigarettes were estimated to be reduced by 14% in 2010 compared to 
the previous year. Eleven percent fewer fires were estimated for construction fires than in 
2009, with 7% fewer in residential fires. The information was gathered following police 
investigations. The number of fires estimated to be caused by a cigarette from April–
December 2009 was 774, and the figure was 668 in 2010. 
Table 29. Number of fires estimated to be caused by a cigarette from April–December 2009 and 2010 
(Source: Financial Statement of the Ministry of the Interior, 2010, Pronto/ Esa Kokki).
2009
(95 % confidence interval)
2010
(95 % confidence interval)
Difference
Construction 227 (198–259) 203 (176–232) -11%
Residence 173 (148–201) 161 (137–188) -7%
Vehicle 8 (3–16) 9 (4–17) +13%
Terrain 286 (254–321) 265 (234–299) -7%
Other 253 (223–286) 191 (165–220) -25%
Total 774 (720–830) 668 (618–721) -14%
In addition to effectiveness objectives, performance in the rescue services and in the 
ERC Administration has been reported in seven sections: prevention of accidents, rescue 
operations and preparing, support services of the rescue operation, emergency response 
operations, results and profitability of the chargeable operation, and the jointly funded 
operations (Financial Statement of the Ministry of the Interior, 2010, 50–62). These 
sections are each evaluated with the criteria of productivity and economy, number of 
public goods, service ability, and the quality of public goods. 
The regional rescue service areas are mostly responsible for the prevention work in 
terms of accidents, together with non-profit organizations in the field. Due to the present 
bookkeeping systems, it is not possible to report costs relating to directing accident 
prevention. The Ministry of the Interior has actively participated in the development 
of bookkeeping systems, so that it would be possible to get cost information about the 
accident prevention work in the future. The municipalities are also responsible for funding 
regional rescue departments. Indicators describing the productivity and economy of 
operations have not been set, because the systems of financial management do not enable 
the specification of costs yet. 
The figures for performance and public good in terms of the accident prevention relate 
to the number of fire inspections, the proportion of the population that received advice 
and guidance, the proportion of changes to automatic fire detectors in relation to the 
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alarm call-outs, and nurse and care homes protected by automatic fire-extinguishing 
systems. 
The rescue departments carried out a total of 35,000 fire inspections for special 
targets in 2010. That was 85% of the target figure. The previous year, rescue departments 
carried out 35,800 fire inspections for special targets, with 36,570 in 2008. In 2005, rescue 
departments carried out fire inspections for 85% of the target group. 
The proportion of the population that received advice and guidance relates promoting 
safety work. There is considerable variation in the results between different rescue 
departments. Five of the rescue departments exceeded the target of 20% and the best 
rescue department exceeded the target, with a percentage of 28.1. The lowest percentage 
was 6.9%. However, there are differences between the manner of compilation of the 
statistics. 
The proportion of the changes to automatic fire detectors in relation to the alarm call-
outs relates to erroneous automatic fire announcements compared to the actual alarm 
call-outs. In 2010, the number was 20.2%. There is not a comparative percentage in 2005; 
however, in 2006 the percentage was 21.7, in 2007, 20.3, in 2008, 19.6, and in 2009, 19.1. 
Almost a fifth of automatic fire alarms were false and took resources from the rescue 
departments. 
Nursing and care homes that have been protected with automatic fire-extinguishing 
systems amounted to 23% in 2010. In 2009, the percentage was the same, and in 2008 it 
was 14%, and 2007 it was 13%. Thus, the number of protected nursing and care homes is 
improving. 
Table 30. The number of performances monitored for 2007–2010 (Source: Financial Statements of 
the Ministry of the Interior).
Indicator Target 
2010
Score 
2010
Score 
2009
Score 
2008
Score 
2007
Number of fire inspections (%) 100 85 89 92 89
Proportion of the population that 
received advice and guidance (%)
20 15 16 20 14.5
Proportion of changes to automatic fire 
detectors relation to alarm call-outs (%)
16.5 20.2 19.1 19.8 20.3
Nursing and care homes protected by 
automatic fire-extinguishing systems 
(minim.)
16.5 23 23 14 13
The number of fire deaths per construction fire is defined as an indicator for service 
ability and the quality of public goods in the financial statement. In 2008, the number was 
41.5, in 2009, 58.3, and in 2010, 78.3. The target for 2010 was 60. There was no target for 
fire deaths in the financial statement in 2005. The target was mentioned as significantly 
exceeding the requirements because the number of fire deaths reduced by a fifth in 2010 
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(80) compared to 2009 (107). In addition, the number of construction fires was the same 
in 2010 and 2009. The number of missing fire alarms reduced relatively compared to the 
previous year according to the financial statement. However, in 28% of fire deaths from 
2007–2010, a fire alarm was missing. 
The rescue services continued cooperation with the safety in housing program. The 
program has clarified fire safety in nursing and care homes and housing units for special 
groups. Additionally, the effectiveness of the preventive means for fire death reduction 
has been continued. 
Public goods produced in rescue operations and preparedness are alarm call-outs. There 
were 110,367 alarm assignments reported in the financial statement in 2010. Fires caused 
14,991 assignments, checking assignments were 34,180, emergency responses excluding 
transportation of patients were 27,043, and other assignments were 34,153. The target for 
the year 2010 was 94,000 alarm assignments. In 2009, alarm call-outs stood at 101,435, 
so the number of alarm assignments increased by 8,932 (9%) assignments. Checking 
assignments increased the most. In 2009, there were 29,461 checking assignments and the 
increase compared to 2010 was 4,719 (16%). 
Service ability in public goods relates to the operational response time in minutes 
according to the first unit at the scene of the accident. Operational response time in risk 
area one for urgent tasks of rescue departments was 65% in 2010. The target is that the first 
unit should be at the scene of the accident in six minutes in 90% of cases. Additionally, 
the score was that in 65% of cases the scene was reached in six minutes. In 2009, the score 
was 65 and in 2008 it was 62%. In risk area two, the response time in urgent cases is ten 
minutes. In 87% of cases the scene was reached in ten minutes in 2010. The target was 
90%. In 2009, the score was 88 % and in 2008 it was 85%. 
The main reasons for exceeding the target time in terms of operational response time 
was mentioned as overlapping rescue assignments and other tasks of the rescue staff, for 
example, fire inspection tasks and education tasks. In these cases, the nearest unit may 
have to respond to a call-out from some other response area. Additionally, if the unit is 
badly located in terms of the risk area, it can cause delay, missing the target, especially in 
traffic jams, or other changing conditions such as bad weather conditions. 
The number of shelters related to the population was another indicator measuring 
service ability. The number of shelters per 10,000 habitants was 58.9 in 2010, and 53.3 in 
2009, and 46 in 2008. 
The rescue services have a threat estimate in coordinating vital functions of society. 
This threat estimate is based on the Finnish security and defense policy of 2009 and the 
strategy for security in society 2010. Rescue services participated actively in the planning 
and preparation of these strategies. Rescue operations that are within the responsibility of 
the rescue services have drawn situation cards for coordination and action.
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Reform regarding operational response was launched in 2010. This reform examines 
the structure and the capacity of the rescue staff and the work that was to be carried out 
in 2011. 
In the budget of 2010, a target was set considering the rescue services ability to 
contribute when international catastrophes takes place. The Ministry of the Interior and 
the crisis management center agreed with procedures in responding to international calls 
for help. The crisis management center declares possibility for the used resources prepares 
a proposal for the Ministry of the Interior. The Crisis management center takes care of 
procedures and supports possible operations after the Ministry of the Interior has decided 
to start an operation. Finnish experts have maintained preparedness through education 
and training. The operation ability was improved significantly when a 1.6 million euro 
project to establish a rescue service unit in cold environments was funded by the European 
Union. A project continuing the work has been launched. 
Preparation of the regional state administrative authorities in terms of common 
affairs was launched and organized in coordination with the responsible organizations. 
The need to develop municipal planning for preparedness was clarified. The preparedness 
system was improved to analyze compatibility and integration in catastrophes and states 
of emergency in terms of management, positioning, and communication systems between 
authorities at a local and regional level. 
Due to the novelty of regional state administrative agencies, the performance reports 
were not available relating to their performance during the study. However, the ERC and 
the Emergency Service College had reported on their performance. This is evaluated in 
the following subsections. 
7.3.1 Emergency Response Center
The effectiveness objective for the emergency response operations in the budget of 2010 
is that there is a consistent, networked and reliable ERC in 2015 in Finland. This center 
works as the first link, responding to the need for help professionally and without delay. 
Essential decisions required to pursue this objective have been made and the required 
projects have been started. Reform proceeds according to the plans and schedules.
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Table 31. Indicators of the social effectiveness of the Emergency Response Center (Source: Financial 
Statement of the Ministry of the Interior, 2010, 19). 
Indicator Score 
2008
Score 
2009
Target 
2010
Score 
2010
The ERC responds to the emergency call rapidly
•  In 10 seconds
87% 91% 90% 91%
Customer satisfaction among the ones who have 
telephoned an emergency number (on a scale of 
1–5)
4.23 4.38 4.4 4.33
The realization exceeded the target in terms of responding to emergency calls in ten 
seconds. According to this indicator, the performance can be kept excellent and the 
resourcing to respond to emergency calls can be kept successful. Customer satisfaction 
among the ones who have phoned the emergency number is also good. The criteria in 
evaluating customer satisfaction were the speed of respond to the emergency call, the 
operator’s attitude in serving customers, and the clarity of given instructions. All these 
were at a good level. 
The number of emergency calls per operator was 7,900 in 2010 and the target was 8,000. 
In 2009, the number was 7,800 and in 2008 it was 7,400. The costs incurred by emergency 
operations per inhabitant were 10.8 euros in 2010 and the target was 11.2 euros. The score 
in 2009 was 11.0 euros and in 2008 it was 10.8 euros. Costs per call were 14.5 euros in 2010 
and the target was 14 euros. The score in 2009 was 14 euros and in 2009 it was 14.9 euros. 
Costs per inhabitant and per call vary significantly among emergency response centers. 
The smallest cost per inhabitant was 6.3 euros and the biggest was 13.1 euros. The smallest 
cost per call was 8.7 euros and the biggest was 15.1 euros. 
The size of the center affects economy significantly. A center classified as small on 
the basis of human resources receives a worse indicator, because other costs than the 
personnel costs are not dependent on the size of the center. Additionally, the minimum 
personnel in a three-shift-work pattern and securing sufficient resources for duty in rush 
hours causes bigger costs in smaller areas with fewer habitants. Tourism and traffic work 
affects the figure. A variation between seasons and time of the day can be substantial. 
However, this indicator also considers the number of inhabitants. Expenses common 
to departments have not been allocated to each center, for example, the center and data 
administration costs.
There were 4,195,000 emergency announcements in 2010. In 2009, the number was 
4,183,000 and in 2008 it was 3,840,000. The number of emergency calls was 3,031,000 in 
2010 and 3,034,000 in 2009, and 2,844,000 in 2008. The number of announcements per 
inhabitant was 0.79 in 2010 and the same in 2009, and 0.73 in 2008. The number also 
includes several emergency announcements for the same case. This was changed from the 
previous procedure, and this caused a 9 % increase in the total number. More than every 
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fourth emergency call is not supposed to be assigned to ERCs. 865,000 calls in 2010 can 
be classified as not belonging to the ERCs. 702,000 calls were unintended false calls and 
163,000 were intentional, mischief calls. The number of unintended false calls has been 
reduced, but the number of intentional, mischief calls was increasing. 
Service ability is measured as the time from the emergency call to the call-out, and 
what percentage of calls was responded to in the target time. In 2010, 59% of cases were 
responded to in the time from the emergency call to the actual assignment. The target 
was 70%. In 2009, the score was 58%, and in 2008 the score was 55. Different tasks have 
a different time in terms of the response from the emergency call to the assignment. For 
example, in traffic accidents, construction fires, or vehicle fires the response time is 90 
seconds in 70% of cases. The indicator in the performance contract measures the time 
spent on the emergency call. The time begins from the initial response and ends when the 
assignment has been given to the first unit. What is remarkable is that the time should 
not be confused with the length of the call. The operator can continue the call after the 
assignment has been given. 
Strategic guidelines for the emergency response operations were launched. In March 
2010, the Ministry of the Interior decided on the location of ERCs. Project HAKMU is 
planning a new administrative- and management model for the ERC Administration 
and by the end of 2015, the new model should be in use. In addition, an operating and 
information technology project was launched at the beginning of 2010. 
The statistical data gathered from the regions has provided information on the time 
taken from the emergency call to the alarm sounding in 2009 and 2010. In most of the 
cases involving fire deaths, the time from the emergency call to the alarm being raised 
was more than 90 seconds. Additionally, only in some cases was the time lower than 20 
seconds. 
Table 31. Time from emergency call to the alarm sounding in 2009 and 2010 (Source: statistical data 
gathered by the rescue service areas and the Emergency Service College).
Frequency Percent
Valid
Lowest through 20 sec 5 1.3
20 sec through 89,99 sec 82 21.6
90 sec through highest 93 24.5
Total 180 47.5
Missing System 199 52.5
Total 379 100.0
However, it is considered that in all of the cases, the victims perished. More illustrative 
would be to compare the time taken from the emergency call to alarm being raised in 
cases where victims were saved. However, this information was not available from the 
gathered statistical data.
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With these indicators, one can say that the performance of the emergency response 
teams is excellent. Ninety-one percent of emergency calls were responded to in 10 seconds. 
According to this indicator, the performance can be kept excellent and the resourcing to 
respond to emergency calls can be kept successful. Customer satisfaction among the ones 
who have phoned an emergency number is good. However, we do not know the customer 
satisfaction rate on the whole. The victims who perished in fires are excluded from the 
sample. 
An important factor in performance evaluation is that evaluation is a showcase for the 
public managers. How successfully the managers have managed their organization is a 
critical question. Public managers should make their organizations perform well. What is 
ambiguous is that the results can look good but they might measure the wrong things. The 
validity of performance (measuring the right things) and the reliability of performance 
(measuring the right things correctly) must be taken into consideration (Sinervo, 2011; 
Vakkuri, 2009). In fire deaths, validity measuring, for example, in terms of the success of 
customer satisfaction among the victims who perished and victims who were saved is not 
possible. However, the opinion of the relatives could be taken into account and what they 
thought about the public service. 
7.3.2 Emergency Service College
The Emergency Service College has reported on their performance in the annual reports 
published on their web pages and also in the Netra Internet reporting system18. However, 
the annual report for 2001 was not available, so the years 2005 and 2010 are analyzed in 
this section. 
The Crisis Management Center of Finland19 (CMC Finland) serves as part of the 
Emergency Service College. However, in this study, CMC Finland is dealt with as a separate 
unit and is not included in the performance analysis. CMC Finland was established in 
2006 and is a rather new and forming unit. 
In the annual reports of 2005 and 2010, the mission of the Emergency Service College 
was to develop the safety of society by developing knowledge in terms of the rescue 
services. In the vision for 2010, the Emergency Service College is an internationally 
appreciated center of competence that challenges through development. In addition, 
the Emergency Service College is a widely networked and attractive study and work 
community (Emergency Service College Annual Report and Financial Statements, 2005, 
4). 
18 Netra is an internet reporting service provided by the State Treasury of Finland to openly report 
performance and personnel information and expenditures of the state (www.netra.fi). 
19 The main tasks of CMC Finland are training and recruiting experts for international civilian crisis 
management and peace building missions. Also conducting research focusing on civilian crisis 
management is one of the CMC Finland’s tasks. 
139
AMBIGUITY OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN
ThE FIRE SAFETY POLICY OF FINLAND
The most important performance indicator of the Emergency Service College is the 
training days. Training days are divided into vocational education, preparation training 
and supplementary training. In 2005, the target was 97,445 training days and the score 
was 99,359 training days: thus, the actual target was exceeded by 1,914 days. In 2010, the 
target was 93,840 training days and the score was 92,451; thus, the score was 1,389 days 
lower than the actual target. 
Targets and scores for degrees, training days, vocational education, preparation training, 
and supplementary training are presented in table 29. The number of degrees has been lower 
than the target in 2005 and 2010. In the annual report of 2010, the drop-out percentage was 
mentioned as increasing slightly in vocational education. However, most of the students 
finish their studies as planned, and that is reported in the annual report. In addition, 
drop-outs have increased mainly in the training of emergency response operators. 0.7% of 
students suspended their studies in 2005 and 2.85% in vocational education in 2010. The 
percentage of drop-outs in polytechnic education was 0.66%. Furthermore, notable is that 
the number of drop-outs in the fire officers’ training program also includes the students 
who have not completed their degree on time. 
Figure 8. Training days in the Emergency Service College in 2005 and 2010.
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Table 33. Performance indicators in the Emergency Service College in 2005 and 2010 (Source: 
Emergency Service College Annual Report and Financial statements 2005 and 2010). 
Year
Target Score Target Score
2005 2005 2010 2010
Degrees 244 238 250 227
Training days 97 445 99 359 93 840 92 451
Vocational education 80 085 80 873 82 440 80 380
Preparation training 10 000 9 202 5 000 5 737
Supplementary training 7 360 9 284 6 400 6 334
What do the number of degrees or the training days actually tell us about the performance 
of the Emergency Service College? Training days is an indicator measuring the number of 
days of education. The Emergency Service College is an education institute and training 
days and degrees are an essential part of the results of the college. 
As a comparison, the University of Tampere has agreed a target level of an average 
of 1,120 higher academic degrees in 2010–2012 (Performance agreement between the 
Ministry of Education and the University of Tampere, 2009, 2). That would be 373 degrees 
approximately per year and there were 3,377 students studying for a higher academic 
degree in 2009. There are 400–500 students in the Emergency Service College, so more 
or less half of the students graduate per year. Notable again is that, for example, the 
Emergency response operator’s degree and rescuer’s degree lasts for only three semesters. 
Thus, the character of the education is different from the universities and thus is not 
comparable. However, the score for degrees in the Emergency Service College can be 
considered relatively good, even though the target has been set higher than the actual 
score is. Additionally, the low percentage of drop-outs can be considered as a signal of 
highly motivated students and success in teaching. 
The Emergency Service College has reported in detail about the realization of economy 
objectives, productivity, and the cost correlation of the chargeable operations, the quality 
management, and the control of human resources in 2005. However, the effectiveness of 
the operations has not been reported. How does the college fulfill its mission to develop 
safety in society by developing knowledge in the rescue services? In 2010, the effectiveness 
of the education has been reported. The Emergency Service College “increases safety in 
society with education and research. Through education and development, the college 
effects into students’ knowledge in their organizations in the present and in the future.” 
(Emergency Service College, Annual Report 2010, 5.) 
The quality of the education and the economic effectiveness of the education have 
been analyzed systematically. The quality of education was evaluated through the student 
feedback. The target for the student overall feedback in 2005 was four (4) on a scale of 1–5, 
where 5 is the best. The score in 2005 was 4.07. Professional skills of the teachers were 
ranked the highest in vocational education, in vocational supplementary education, and 
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in preparation training. Teaching material was ranked the lowest: however, it was 3.7 in 
vocational education, 3.8 in vocational supplementary education, and 4.0 in preparation 
training. In 2010, student feedback was 3.1 and the target was 3.00. The scale had been 
changed into 1–4, where four is the highest. 
In 2005, the average cost for the education per day in all teaching was 136 euros and 
the target according to the performance agreement was 138, so the score was better than 
the actual target. However, the difference is rather small and the actual performance 
cannot be determined from this difference. These are the only indicators measuring the 
economy of the training. 
In 2010, the target for the cost of education per day in vocational education was 165 euros 
and the score was 151 euros; hence, the score was better than the target. In polytechnic 
education, the target was 102 euros and the score was 114 euros. The target was exceeded 
by 12 euros. In vocational additional education, the target was 175 euros and the score was 
201 euros; thus the target was also exceeded by 26 euros.
Figure 9. Average cost of education per day (Source: Emergency Service College annual report and 
financial statements 2005).
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Table 34. Cost of education per day (Source: Emergency Service College Annual Report and 
Financial Statements, 2010). 
Cost of education per day Score Target Score
Year 2008 2009 2010 2010
In vocational education 150 153 165 151
In polytechnic education 105 100 102 114
In vocational additional education 179 195 175 201
The costs per student in the vocational education had been set as 29,700 euros per year 
as the target and the actual costs were 27,252 euros in 2010. The Ministry of the Interior 
account for the expenditure costs in polytechnic education was set as a target of 4,000 
euros and the score was 3,890 euros. The total costs of the education was 13,601,216 euros 
in 2010 and the target was 14,000,000. The person-year value used for education was 93.80 
in 2010 and the target was 96.00. 
The lower costs in the vocational education were due to lower investment costs in 
the education infrastructure. The building of the training area for the field of dangerous 
materials was delayed and this was estimated to lower the costs of vocational education 
and particularly the costs of rescuer education. Unit costs per student were estimated to 
stay at a moderate level and the cost of education per day had reduced due to volume. In 
2010, there were 8,275 training days more in vocational education than in the previous 
year. This was estimated to indicate that the cost of training days could have been even 
lower. However, in 2010, due to the delay of the construction project, it was decided to 
invest more into education materials such as overalls, and this raised the unit costs in 
vocational education.
The costs in polytechnic education vary more than the costs of vocational education 
according to the number of students and because of the fixed costs that are smaller than 
in vocational education. In polytechnic education there is more classroom teaching than 
field exercises, as for example, in the rescuer education. The total costs were increased by 
the higher number of participants in the officers’ education in 2010 than in the previous 
year. Costs of education per day in polytechnic education were higher than the target 
because the capital costs were higher than in the previous year. 
The account of the Ministry of the Interior for the expenditure costs in polytechnic 
education was lower than the target. The indicator is calculated by reducing the 
expenditure costs of the officers’ education per year from the funding Savonia polytechnic 
directs to the Emergency Service College for the education, and then calculating the 
student–specific expenditure costs from the remaining share. The annual variation of 
this indicator depends on the number of students and strongly affects the total cost of 
the polytechnic education. Instead, the share for the Savonia polytechnic does not vary 
according to the number of students per year, but the funding is determined mainly 
according to the long-term costs, and the number of students, and remains fairly even in 
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spite of the variation in the number of students. In 2010, the share of the funding was at 
an exceptionally good level in relation to the expenditure costs of the officers’ education 
paid from the state budget. 
The costs of the additional vocational education include the costs of supplementary 
training and preparation training, and the sum is divided between the numbers of 
training days in these two training models. The economic target was not reached in these 
two models. Reorganization of the coordinative regional administration was estimated to 
have partly affected the demand for the preparation training. 
The total cost of the education was lower than the target, but increased compared 
to the previous year. Capital costs are increasing because of the long-term investments 
affecting the amount of write-offs. Person-years used for education have decreased, as 
expected in the productivity program. 
The productivity of the Emergency Service College was measured by training days 
per person-years, training days per teacher, and by the ratio of teachers to students. 
Productivity targets were achieved according to the performance agreement. 
Table 35. Productivity indicators and score* (Source: Emergency Service College Annual Report and 
Financial Statements 2010). 
Target
2005
Score
2005
Target
2010
Score
2010
Personnel costs/training days 50,00 48,51 – –
Training days/person-years 955 1,001 960 985
Training days/teacher 1,433 1,460 1,200 1,266
Student: teacher ratio 7,5 7,7 7,1 7,04
* The personnel costs per training days have been calculated in 2005: 4,820,213/99.359 = 48.51, the training days per person-
years have been calculated in 2005: 99.359/99.28=1,001 and in 2010: 92451/93.8=985, the training days per teacher have been 
calculated in 2005: 99.359/68.06=1,460 and in 2010:92,451/73=1,266 and students per teacher have been calculated in 2005: 
99.359/190/68.06 = 7.7 and in 2010: 92,451/180/73=7.04. Teaching hours were in calculated in 2005: 7,687,5 and in 2010: 11,365.
Calculation of the costs of chargeable operations have been drawn up by the Ministry of 
the Interior and the basis for payment as per 1§–2§ and 5§. The Emergency Service College 
has commercially priced service production; according to the 2§ service production 
funded by the budget, 60% of the price per education day is subsidized by the state, 
and according to 5§, service production is priced on commercial grounds. Both service 
production groups have their own cost-equivalence calculations. In addition, chargeable 
service production includes products with fixed prices subject to the decision of the 
Ministry of the Interior (1§).
144
ANNIINA AUTERO
Table 36. Target and score of cost correlation of chargeable and jointly funded operations (Source: 
Emergency Service College Annual Report and Financial Statements 2010). 
Score 2009 Target 2010 Score 2010
Commercially priced service production 74% 100% 89%
Commercial production subsidized by the state 
budget
21% 40% 32%
Service production subject to public law 26% 40% 31%
Jointly funded service production 101% 76%
The cost correlation of the priced subsidy service production was 90% in 2005. The cost 
correlation of the commercially priced service production was 128%. Additionally, the 
cost correlation of the service production subject to public law was 36%. (Emergency 
Service College Annual Report and Financial Statements, 2005, 12–13). 
The cost correlation of commercially priced service production was 89% in 2010. 
Compared to the year 2009, it is better. However, compared to the year 2005, it is not as good 
as it was in 2005. In 2005, internal pricing had been developed and cost accounting had 
been focused, and as a result of the development work, the pricing had become profitable. 
At the same time, commercially priced training days had increased by 70%. Sharpening 
the costs in terms of teachers’ working hours was mentioned as one of the reasons for 
an improvement in the results in 2010. In addition, the cost accounting of teaching had 
been focused on different premises than previously. Write-offs to chargeable operations 
had been raised in 2010 due to the investments in education and this weakened the cost 
correlation. The incomes had increased significantly in comparison with the years 2008 
and 2009, and it had positively affected the cost correlation of the commercially priced 
service production. 
The income from the supplementary education as a commercial production subsidized 
by the state budget was smaller in 2010 than in earlier years and its share of all chargeable 
operations was quite small. The cost correlation improved. However, a 40% target is still 
rather far off the mark. The cost level of the courses and training days would have to 
be raised by about 950 euros a course and 40 euros a day. Pricing should be focused by 
defining costs and prices, but the prices should be whithin the limits of the solvency of 
the rescue authorities.
The cost correlation of the service production subject to public law was 36% in 2005 
and 31% in 2010. The target in 2005 was 36% and in 2010, 40%. The cost correlation of 
jointly funded service production was 76% in 2010 and with investments it would be 61%. 
There was not a target for the jointly funded service production in 2010. It was estimated 
to be extremely difficult to reach a target of 100% if the real joint costs are directed to 
projects. In jointly funded service production, in national-funded and EU-funded 
production, there is always a proportion of self-financing, and it is difficult to agree to a 
total cost model that would bring costs on board that cannot be focused in bookkeeping. 
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The Emergency Service College’s responsibility to coordinate research and development 
in the rescue services increased in 2005. The coordination model for consolidation was 
finalized and research strategy work with the Ministry of the Interior was conducted in 
2005. According to the research strategy of the Ministry of the Interior, the Emergency 
Service College is responsible for coordinating research activities in the rescue services in 
Finland. The Emergency Service College is responsible for guiding research and directing 
the resources of the rescue services efficiently and effectively. The cooperation between 
the Fire Protection Fund is tight.
The Emergency Service College arranged a research meeting with a large network 
of rescue actors. In 2010, the Emergency Service College sealed cooperation with the 
educational institutions, the Police College of Finland, and the Finnish Border Guard 
School. The Emergency Service College arranged the first safety research seminar in 2010. 
The Emergency Service College is responsible for maintaining, developing, and 
statistically analyzing the rescue services resource and accident statistics program Pronto. 
In 2010, the Emergency Service College produced two reviews about the state of the rescue 
operation, pocket statistics of the rescue services, and a report considering fire deaths. 
The Emergency Service College has actively been participating in projects developing 
operative information systems called PEKE, KEJO, and MapInfo. The testing environment 
of VIRVE/TETRAPAK was utilized in two reported tests in 2010. The Emergency Service 
College carried out data collection on the requirements for the future of the cordless-data 
transfer project. The council contemplating the future of the rescue services was active 
and produced a research report examining the need and usefulness of contemplating the 
future. The council carried out workshops and a seminar, and the trend and scenario 
analyses were utilized in the strategy work and planning of the rescue services. 
The Emergency Service College also continued its duties as the representative of the 
fire research council. The council coordinates, improves, and promotes fire research 
in Finland in cooperation with the industry and commerce, insurance companies, 
universities, research organizations, authorities in the state and municipalities and 
non-profit organizations. In 2010, the council made a preliminary study for a possible 
professorship in fire safety. 
Person-years in 2005 were 99.28 and the target was 102 person-years. In 2010, person-
years were 138 and the target was 94.2 for education. In 2010, 71% were men and 29% were 
women. The average age was 43.9 in 2005 and 44.8 years in 2010. A project preparing for 
retirement in the next few years has begun. 
7.4 Conclusions
In evaluating the performance of the fire safety policy, one can easily notice that 
performance of the actions is a mosaic of several actors and several streams of action. 
The performance of the fire safety policy is a sum of several factors. As in the garbage can 
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model by March and Olsen (1976), where the decision is an outcome or an interpretation 
of several relatively independent streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice 
opportunities, performance of the fire safety policy is an outcome of an abundant group 
of actors from fire brigades, rescue services, municipalities, social services, schools in 
welfare for intoxicants, and numerous crews of other, different safety authorities, and 
other actors outside the public sector.
The performance of the fire safety policy was ambiguous in terms of evaluation, since 
the data covered only documentary data from regional state administrative agencies, the 
ERC and the Emergency Service College. Other data and data covering other fire safety 
organizations are outside the analysis. The studied data also covered only governmental 
authorities and, thus, fire departments are outside the analysis. This makes performance 
evaluation ambiguous. Whose performance do the actual results relate to if the 
performance of the actions is analyzed in only a few organizations? 
What is also ambiguous is the level of targets. What can be said about the actual 
performance of the fire safety policy and the rescue services when the overall objective 
level to reduce fire deaths to by 2015 is 50? The optimal level is that nobody would die 
in fires and that level would be zero. An objective level of 50 reduces the number of fire 
deaths, but it still tells us that 50 people will die in fires and it is not a good result. The 
objective level would be zero to be the best possible objective level. 
Then what can be done to prevent accidents and operate efficiently in the case of an 
emergency being at hand for the rescue services; however, in cooperation with different 
authorities. The question of whose performance should be evaluated is an essential subject 
of examination. Financial statements and annual reports of the ERC or the Emergency 
Service College tell a detailed story of targets reached. When considering the achieved 
targets, both agencies are performing well. However, people are still dying in fires. This is 
the result of a series of events that are linked to each other and can neither be predicted nor 
excluded. However, examining what the consequences were of intended actions (positive 
and negative) and if there were any non-intended side effects (positive and negative) that 
were caused as a result of the actions, is an essential aspect of performance evaluation. 
The logic of performance is familiar, for example, from school exams. Students may be 
successful in tests but they may fail in actual learning. Tests do not tell us much about the 
actual learning. Targets are of limited use and people will try to manipulate them to gain 
good results. In management, this means “gaming” in that managers may try to make 
results look good by any means by “hitting the target but missing the point.” Their work is 
evaluated in the performance management cycle by reaching the targets and reaching the 
targets should look good. Actors will change their conduct when they know that the data 
they produce will be used to control them (Bevan & Hood, 2006, 521). 
Outcome measures help policy makers control public sector resources. Smith (1996) 
defines internal, managerial control, political control, contractual control and the science 
of control. In managerial control, the central management wishes to control the periphery, 
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and outcome measures can be used as an instrument to control. In political control, the 
outcome measures are used to inform external persons about the performance of the 
organization. In contractual control, the principal is a central purchasing organization, 
and the agent is a separate provider organization, and under these arrangements, control 
is by means of a formal contract such as a performance contract. The science of control 
derives from the Greek word for a steersman, and it is illustrated in a cybernetic model of 
measurement, analysis, action, and system (Smith, 1996, 7–8). 
The rescue services, the Emergency Service College, and ERC, for example, have set 
targets in a professional and skillful manner. However, there are many ways to reach these 
targets and there are many ways to improve performance outside these targets. 
What can be done to intensify cooperation and who are the most important actors in 
terms of preventing accidents? In alcohol–related fires caused by a cigarette, an important 
feature is the alcohol consumption and behavior; the victim’s ability to react is one of 
the most important features in fires. Alcohol education could play an important role in 
individual behavior. However, it is beyond the rescue services’ sphere of influence. It is not 
impossible to affect people’s awareness of the accidents and the risky situations leading 
to casualties. However, this requires much cooperation between several authorities and 
other parties. 
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8 Conclusions
This dissertation explored ambiguity in the performance management cycle and in the 
fire safety policy. This chapter presents the major findings of the study and discusses 
them in the light of theoretical findings. Ambiguity was analyzed in a performance 
management cycle of three phases: ambiguity in identification of fire deaths as a fire 
safety policy, ambiguity in target setting in fire safety policy and ambiguity in evaluating 
performance toward the targets of fire safety policy. The fourth research question was 
the coherence of the performance management. Is the performance management cycle a 
coherent management cycle, and are mutually reinforcing policy actions supporting each 
other? 
The main aim is to understand ambiguities in the model of performance management 
and what causes ambiguity in the context of political-administrative decision making 
environments. In addition, the question of coherence in the performance management 
cycle and how different intercrossing policies go together when considering fire safety 
policy were questions that needed to be clarified. Fire safety policy and fire deaths offered 
an empirical case through which to analyze these questions, but the same questions and 
phenomenon could be studied in some other policy field as well. This is a possibility for 
further studies. 
Thus, we start in section 8.1 by examining at what ambiguities there are in the 
performance management cycle. The specific research questions are what are the 
ambiguities in identifying fire safety policy, in target setting and in evaluating performance 
of the actions? The specific research question considering coherence studied the coherence 
of the performance management cycle and mutually supporting policy actions as policy 
coherence. The theoretical implications are used to elaborate the empirical results. 
Possibilities for further research are presented in the end in section 8.5.
8.1 Conclusions on fire deaths as an ambiguous policy problem
The purpose and links between different policies are important in the identification of 
the policy problem. Nevertheless, policies are often planned in separate processes and 
attention to links between policies is not taken into account. Policy problems have become 
so complex and messy that they are ambiguous to identify. 
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Fire deaths are a policy problem connected to different policy problems such as the 
social and healthcare policy and alcohol policy. Fire deaths are a social problem in the sense 
that they relate to people’s personal lives and interaction with society. Social problems and 
the construction of social problems have been studied in sociology (e.g. Spector & Kitsuse, 
2001), although the definition of social problems is rarely comprehensively explained 
(Best, 2002). However, the focus in fire deaths as a social problem in this study is more in 
the policy context, and in the public policies, and what the government decides, or decides 
not to do to prevent fires, and fire deaths. Nevertheless, a life and death problem concerns 
the 379 people who died in fires from 2007–2010, and each of these cases is definitive, and 
final. 
The Finnish government and the public administration have identified fire deaths as a 
problem in Finnish society, since it is recognized, and it is the overall performance target 
for the rescue services, and one of the measures in the inter-sectoral Internal Security 
Program. The government has recognized the problem, and stated what will be done 
about it, and, thus, it has become a public policy. 
The basic characteristics of fire deaths can be analyzed such as in most fire deaths 
occurred in the riskiest area four, in specific P3-building types, at night, at weekends, and 
during the winter months. Most fires occurred in Kainuu, Pohjois-Savo, Pohjois-Karjala, 
and Kymenlaakso, and the most common cause of fire was cigarettes, and the second 
most common reason was arson, and other causes. The ability to react had been reduced 
in those who died by fire and slightly less than one-third died in conditions in which there 
was no fire alarm at all, and where a third person or a bystander made the emergency call. 
Mostly victims were men. Middle-aged men were at the greatest risk of dying in a fire. 
Fire deaths are also caused by human behavior and partly by system error. Human 
behavior and human error are caused by intended and unintended actions. Choices can 
be made deliberately or by trial and error (Elster, 1979). In fire deaths, trial and error can 
be disastrous, and it can lead to effects on a wider group of people such as first-party 
victims, second-party victims, third-party victims, and fourth-party victims. 
Fire deaths are an ambiguous policy problem. Fire deaths are a compounding of 
individual choice and behavior, and public choice. Individual choice and behavior is a 
mechanism that triggers with the interaction of the context, and the society, and these 
together construct the actual performance change. However, individual choice and 
behavior are an ambiguous area of study. Individuals and citizens have their own will and 
their own responsibility for their lives. Individuals make different choices depending on 
their cognitive abilities, previous experiences, beliefs, attitudes, and the decision making 
context, – their living environment. Making and sustaining different choices require a 
change in an individual’s reasoning and the resources they have available.
Finland as a Scandinavian welfare society provides public services relating to broad 
considering wide social and healthcare services, education, and rescue services. The 
Finnish public sector is based on public finance and tax money, and the financing is 
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decreasing since the baby boomers are retiring and there are fewer tax-payers, but more 
service users in the future. The individual’s responsibility and choice has an increasing 
significance on the future in terms of their health and lifestyle such as alcohol abuse or 
smoking. Taking care of one’s health and a healthy lifestyle are individual choices and 
take on a more significant meaning in the future. 
Governmental actions represent collective choice exercised through governmental 
actions. Collective choice offers the possibility of correcting the perceived deficiencies 
of individual choice (Weimer & Vining, 1989), for example, by regulating alcohol abuse, 
or selling self-extinguishing cigarettes on the markets or by stipulating the use of fire 
alarms, not to mention preventive actions such as fire inspections, or increasing safety 
consciousness. However, both individual choice and collective choice matters, and the 
responsibility being held between citizens and the government is becoming more and 
more essential. 
In the decision making theory, the complete cycle of choice (March & Olsen, 1976) 
describes individual behavior aggregating into collective choices, and the outside 
world responds to these choices in a way that affects, again, individual assessments 
of the state of the world, and of the efficacy of one’s actions. Collective choices by the 
government aggregate into the outside world and into the environment that affects, again, 
the individual’s choice and behavior. This kind of cycle can turn out to be positive or 
negative. Positive effects would be that individuals would understand the health risks 
better and keep away from the heavy abuse of alcohol and smoking, and would follow 
the preventive actions such as making sure that there is an operating fire alarm in the 
house, and avoiding fires, and risky situations. In addition, the governments would 
succeed in guiding citizens in their behavior. These effects would respond to the state of 
the society, and, again to the individual’s behavior and choices. However, the effects can 
also be the opposite as well. The complete cycle of choice explains only how decisions 
actually happen, but the actual performance improvement is an interaction between the 
context (society) and the mechanism (policy actions and individual choice). Some factors 
in the context that is, society as legislation, safety regulations, etc. – may enable fire safety 
in society to “be triggered.” Other aspects of the context, for example, positive attitudes 
toward heavy drinking, may prevent the particular mechanisms to enable fire safety from 
being triggered.
8.2 Conclusions on what the ambiguities are in target setting
Fire safety policy is about preventing accidents and acting in case of emergencies. Therefore, 
attention should be paid to preventive measures and people’s safety consciousness, and 
especially to measures that are in the sphere of influence of the public sector, and the 
rescue services. There are no preventive targets included in the performance contracts 
between the Ministry of the Interior and the agencies studied. A fifth of the fire deaths 
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were caused by people’s lack of care. As mentioned earlier, social behavior is difficult to 
predict and submit into formulas or diagrams, not to mention into a form of a target, but 
following the level of awareness toward safety is an essential feature in fire safety policy.
Targets and measures are set for each ministry and agency, not to the crosscutting 
policy operators that would aim at collective goals, although cooperation between several 
policies, their planners, and various implementing agencies has been identified. Fire safety 
policy is not a social policy problem as such, but fire deaths are a safety policy including 
social and healthcare policy, and alcohol policy aspects. However, it is not evident 
whose target this collective and crosscutting policy would be. Fire safety authorities are 
responsible for saving lives in the case of fires, but social and healthcare authorities are 
as much responsible for the increasing problem of taking care of elderly people and their 
safety. Linkages and connections between different policies are not explicit but ambiguous. 
It is ambiguous what affects these misfortunes and who is mostly responsible from each 
policy field or subsystem to respond to these needs. Who is “mostly” responsible for 
each goal in each time and mentioned as the main authority responsible for reducing or 
improving the policy problem should be agreed. 
Participatory policy analysis methods should be expanded in setting crosscutting 
policy targets (deLeon & Varda, 2009, 59). Proposals that expand the range of actors and 
stakeholders involved in the making and execution of public policy, for example, fire 
safety policy should, be undertaken in a discursive or deliberative mode. 
Additionally, the changing format of safety makes target setting ambiguous. Alcohol 
consumption and fire deaths may be replaced by other different factors in the future that 
may cause insecurity in society and the optimum level of safety would not be possible as 
a target. Setting the target level is ambiguous. In the matter of life and death situations 
the zero level would be optimal, in that nobody would die in fires. The target level was 
originally set to 30, but later discarded, and changed to 50. The target number fluctuates 
over the years. However, it is not known what is the normal amount of variance, since 
there are no longer data series, and the targets have been set only for the last few years. 
Effects of other policy initiatives such as alcohol policy, requirements of fire alarms and 
self-extinguishing cigarettes and construction requirements may have a possible effect 
into variation. However, this should be studied further with longer data series. However, 
accidents always occur and the optimal level of zero is difficult to attain. A little less than 
fifty thousand Finns die every year for various reasons and fires are one of these reasons. 
Overall, the number of victims is not a good indicator to set targets by or to measure 
performance against. The Indian Ocean Tsunami claimed an estimated 150,000 to 
300,000 victims, the largest number of lost lives after the Second World War. The total 
loss of Finns was 178, more than the victims of fire deaths per year. In the 9-11 attacks, 
almost 3,000 people were killed and thousands of civilians were killed in the Afghanistan 
war. The Finnish Myyrmanni shopping mall explosion claimed seven lives and the Jokela 
school shooting accident, eight. The Columbine school shooting in Colorado claimed 15 
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victims, and the atrocities in Oslo and on Utøya Island in Norway killed 77 people. The 
number of victims tells of nothing but misery and the state of the nation as being in 
crisis. It is not a good performance indicator. There is a philosophical problem involved 
in a target of zero, 30, 50 or any other number of deaths. What number of fire deaths is 
acceptable? Zero preventable deaths would be better.
Ill-defined and inconsistent objectives feature target setting and make target setting 
ambiguous. Public sector organizations such as ERCs and the fire brigades are responsible 
for producing rescue services, and the Emergency Service College is responsible for 
educating firefighters, but their overall effect in reducing fire deaths is constrained. It is 
also remarkable that public managers and decision-makers can only try to imagine what 
will happen in the future as a result of their actions (March, 1978). However, the intended 
actions and results and what will actually happen in reality will not necessarily meet. 
The goal dimension, and things that are viewed as important to aim at, and the 
aspiration level for these particular goals are important to identify when setting targets 
(Cyert & March, 1963). Past goals, past performance of one’s own, and other “comparable” 
organizations are important factors. The Finnish government viewed it as important to 
reduce the number of fire deaths (dimension). The number of accidental deaths due to 
fire has varied from 50 to 139 during the period 1952–2010. In 2006, 126 people died 
in fires (past goal) and in 2010, 80 people died in fires. The number of fire deaths has 
decreased by a third (past performance). The forecast for 2020 is 90, unless some change 
occurs, and now it seems that fire deaths are decreasing. The government chose to reduce 
fire deaths to 50 by the end of 2015. That would be the safest level in Europe (in terms of 
other “comparable” organizations). However, the first Internal Security Program aimed 
at reducing the number of fire deaths to 30 by the end of 2012. That would have been the 
safest level in Europe too, but the target level was revised in the second program.
All in all, targets are of limited use, and actors will change their conduct when they 
know that the data they produce will be used to control them (Bevan & Hood, 2006). 
Gaming in performance management would mean that public managers would make the 
results look good with no meaning attached to them in reality. However, the motivation 
to do this can be considered rather low in Finnish public administration since there are 
no awards that would persuade managers to do this. 
However, the reputation and negative publicity can be considered as an effective factor. 
For example, the ERC operators who were ticketed at the District Court in 2010, and 
who appealed in court to the target level that one emergency call should last only for a 
maximum of 90 seconds, attracted negative publicity. However, the target was that in 90% 
of cases, the call-out response should take place in a maximum of 90 seconds, and then 
the assignment should be forwarded to the police, to the rescue department, or to patient 
transportation. In addition, the target is directed to the whole agency, not to individual 
operators. However, Helsingin sanomat reported on 4 October, 2010 that they were handed 
an evaluation form that emphasized speed as a performance measure of ERC operators. 
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In 2010, this target was formulated as “in urgent cases time from emergency call to the 
assignment is responded in the required time in 70% of cases.” Thus, the content and the 
aspiration level of this target were changed, although the dimension remains the same. 
However, this single case tarnished the reputation of the ERC for a while. 
The behavioral effects of performance measures are important. However, how 
important are the validity, reliability, and relevance of the measures, and will the 
measurement lead to the desired actions? It is generally easy to measure the duration of the 
emergency calls and quantify them, but it tells us little about the quality or the outcomes 
of the service (did the caller get help, were the instructions clear etc.). To identify effective 
modes of delivering public services in terms of allocative efficiency and to identify the 
competence with which those services are delivered in terms of managerial efficiency are 
two fundamental reasons why public efforts should be made to measure outcomes (Carr-
Hill & al., 1996, 195–196). 
The level of variation and alteration in fire deaths can be explored, since it is a 
continuous policy problem, not a sporadic series of events. Significant changes and 
deviations in a long-term trend are important. However, a single occasion can turn out to 
be disastrous such as the fire of the Virtain rest-home that claimed 27 elderly victims and 
raised the figure of fire deaths in 1979 to 139. 
An indicator that would measure the effects of the rescue services and measure an 
effect on the decrease of fire deaths, considering the sphere of influence of the rescue 
services, would need to say more about the performance of the actions. How many victims 
the rescue services were able to save, how much the rescue services affected the event, 
how much other operations and measures affected it outside of the fire safety authorities, 
and did the rescue authorities even have the chance to provide help would be questions to 
study further in terms of the performance of the actions. 
Pioneers are always needed in constructing and committing to new reforms. The 
Ministry of the Interior has been a pioneer in target setting and it is a good fit for the 
solution salience character of the ministry and its administrative head. This development 
can be considered as one of the “best practices” in the Finnish public administration. The 
collaboration models and inter-sectoral models such as the Internal Security Programme 
model should be developed and expanded into wider areas of public administration. 
Public planners and administrators are in the key role of creating cross-sectoral 
collaboration. The collaboration between policy planners has been wide-reaching in the 
Internal Safety Program. Collaboration between 12 ministries, 22 government offices 
and agencies, 23 non-governmental organizations, the Association of Finnish Local 
and Regional Authorities, and research institutions are mentioned in the government 
resolution of the Internal Safety Program (2008). Collaboration models and networks like 
this should be supported and developed, acknowledging that the Finnish Government 
Program is based on policies and inter-sectoral collaboration.
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However, the motivation and willingness to participate in deep collaboration may 
vary. Public planners and managers may not necessarily even want to be around the table 
planning for solutions in other policy field. Policies are intertwined and interconnected 
and their effects can be opposing or even conflicting. Taxation policy plays a key role 
in many public policies and especially in the alcohol policy that is linked into the fire 
safety policy. A reduction in alcohol prices in 2004 led to an increase in alcohol-related 
mortality (Herttua, Mäkelä & Martikainen, 2009). Travelers’ imports to Finland from, 
for example, Estonia were liberalized in 2004 and Finland reduced the excise duty on 
alcohol and alcohol beverages by an average of 33%. The harmful effects of increased 
consumption seemed to be the most serious in respect of heavy users of alcohol (Ministry 
of Finance, 2005). These policies (the taxation policy and alcohol policy) had conflicting 
interests and they were not in coherence. Policy coherence is not about choosing between 
conflicting aims, but more about enabling processes through which both aims and means 
can be redefined and eventually achieve better outcomes (Jones, 2002, 391). 
In addition, the nebulous and messy public policies may become too frustrating 
and too boring for the public planners and managers, and instead of working for the 
public interest, they may become advocates working undercover for a specific client as 
“administrative guerrillas” who are dissatisfied with the actions of public organizations, 
and they can even document fraud and abuse, but typically they work behind the scenes 
(O’Leary, 2006, 5). 
The Finnish government aims at transparency and openness in public policies. 
Transparency of the Finnish public administration is globally recognized and Finland 
is one of the least corrupted countries in the world20. However, transparency does not 
remove the fact that the motivation and the willingness to participate in collaboration 
between ministries and agencies play a key role in planning public policies. 
8.3 Conclusions on what the ambiguities are in 
evaluating performance of the actions
Performance is a construction of multilevel actors and actions in public and private 
sectors and in the non-profit sector. Performance management and target setting offer 
an opportunity to examine only the performance of these organizations and their 
operations in a limited fashion. Financial statements and annual reports of the ERC and 
the Emergency Service College tell a detailed story of targets being achieved and it seems 
that both agencies are performing well. Yet people are still dying in fires and this reduces 
the safety in society as a total outcome. 
20 According to Transparency International (TI) the perception index in Finland was 9.2 in 2010 on a 
scale from 0-10 where 0 is highly corrupted and 10 is very clean. Source: http://www.transparency.org/
policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. 
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What is ambiguous is that rescue measures alone do not reduce the number of fire 
deaths or increase safety. However, the actions with respect to preventive means and 
implementation of various measures (legislative, regulative, educative, and operative) 
in cooperation between several policies, their planners and implementing agencies will 
improve performance. 
There is a particular problem of showing the effectiveness of policy actions. The 
effectiveness of the policy actions can be produced by independent and separate actions 
that were not even pursued or were pursued by pure chance (Ahonen, Tala & Hämäläinen, 
2009, 13). This question has been posed already since the 1960s: has there been an 
independent and separate effect in terms of the subject of actions or is it pursued by socio-
economic conditions, or changes in the international and national economic situations, 
or by pure chance? (Weiss, 1972). 
8.4 Conclusion on coherence and public 
management in the 21st century 
Bureaucratization is caused in part by the proliferation of rationalized myths. (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977, 347)
This quotation from John Meyer and Brian Rowan in the American Journal of 
Sociology at the end of the ‘70s captures some basic generalizations and myths that 
public administration still faces in the 21st century. One of the basic generalizations is 
that governmental organizations are blamed for being inefficient. However, big business 
companies face same kind of inefficiency problems. However, their profitability is 
more explicated to approve. Business companies have an absolute zero in terms of their 
profitability, and one can say whether the business is profitable or not. In tax-funded 
public organizations, there is no absolute zero, and the added value is only theoretical 
(Meklin, 2009, 45). 
Rationalized myths refer to rationalizations in organizations that are not necessarily 
true but they have become true and common over time. For example, countries use GDP 
(general domestic product) to measure and compare public economies, but this measure 
was not used at all a few decades ago. Over time it has become more general and more 
important in world economics. 
What features are incorporated in the real-world, 21st-century public management and 
decision making? What makes a difference in the age of performance? Key contextual 
factors that affect the real-world decisions can be divided into ill-defined problems, an 
uncertain, dynamic environment, shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals, action and 
feedback loops, time stress, high stakes, multiple players, and organizational goals and 
norms (Zsambok & Klein, 1997, 5). 
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Organizations are characterized by ill-defined and inconsistent objectives. As we 
found out in the literature review, the causal world in which organizations live is obscure, 
technologies are unclear, and environments are difficult to interpret (March & Olsen, 
1976). The past is important, but the history can be twisted. Individuals also vary in the 
attention they provide to decisions, and the pattern of participation is uncertain and 
changing. 
The real world is full of uncertainties no matter how much we try to predict and 
control it. Ambiguity makes social systems difficult to understand and complexity makes 
them difficult to control. Osman (2010, 32) argued that causality between social systems is 
actual illusory and there is only a succession in the events we observe in the world. 
Policy decisions are events we observe in the world and reach conclusions about. Policy 
decisions are complex and boundaries on individual rationality can lead to policy choices 
that are not fully informed. In addition, failures are indispensable in public decision 
making. Imperfectly informed decision-makers are, however, capable of learning from 
their errors, developing new understanding, and adopting new strategies in pursuit of 
their goals (Busenberg, 2001, 175). 
The modern public manager should adopt resilience. Resilience implies the ability to 
recover to normalcy after a deviant event. Resiliency measures how quickly organizations 
or individuals recover from failure. Fire safety authorities have to be resilient because they 
face failures several times a year, in fire deaths 80 times in 2010, 107 times in 2009, 107 
times in 2008, and 85 times in 2007, and so on. These failures, lost lives, are not the fault 
of the authorities or society; however, these failures happen and fire safety organizations 
have to recover and be capable of responding to accidents and calls for aid again. There is 
a lot to learn from the public management of fire safety authorities.
Is there a coherent decision making and management model in 21st-century public 
management? The answer to the question in short is no, there is no coherent decision 
making model in the political-administrative decision making environment. Reasons for 
this straight answer are numerous. One of the reasons is the lack of one single management 
model or style in the public sector. One holistic management model that all organizations 
and managers in the public sector should use is an illusion. In real-life management there 
are several applications and management styles. 
One theoretical reason for the lack of a management model or style is that there is 
no one explicit theory of public administration either. The early US writers on public 
administration constituted the political theory and a theory of democratic governance, 
and commented on things such as the good life, the criteria by which decisions are made, 
who should rule, how a separation of powers should be maintained, centralization versus 
decentralization, and they were actually writing political philosophy (deLeon & Denhardt, 
2000, 90). 
The performance management model is an ideological model including the aim of 
performance improvement. In Europe and in Finland this ideology is under the label of 
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New Public Management including ideas and concepts of what the management should 
be like (Lähdesmäki, 2003, 16). However, it is not an explicit description of the existing 
management model in the public administration. 
In real life, public management is a messy and a complex system of mixed aims and 
policies, problems and solutions, in the same disorder, just like garbage in a garbage can 
in the next corner of the street as you pass by (March, 1976). 
At the extreme, one can claim that the governmental system is not even designed 
to solve problems (Moe, 2005). Moreover, the political-administrative management 
and decision making system is a forum of different political viewpoints and ideologies. 
Politicians represent the state elected by the citizens, and stipulate laws and make decisions 
on the budget. However, if the politicians were to be asked if they had read the 900-page 
book called the budget to make decisions and manage the state of Finland, hardly any of 
them could claim to have done. In addition, it is logical because the budget is not designed 
to be an instrument to guide and manage the country. It is a plan as to how the tax money 
is spent each year and the money can be transferred to another year. The budget is a 
collection of allowance decisions and their transfers from one year to another. The budget 
is not a strategic management tool. However, strategic management and anticipating 
have become the short-term management challenges in the Finnish central government 
(Virtanen & Stenvall, 2011, 67). 
However, the budget is the only binding planning instrument the political-
administrative decision making system has. The actual targets for the operations are 
set in the performance contracts, but the resources for the actions are allocated in the 
budget. Without connecting the actual targets and the resources spent on these targets 
in the binding planning instruments (budget and performance contracts), this becomes a 
mechanical process without connections to real-life policy decisions and choices.
One of the major problems concerning the performance management and the 
planning and budgeting system is the distribution of responsibilities between the state 
and the municipally organized rescue service regions. The Department for Rescue 
Services directs and oversees the Finnish rescue services but the regional rescue areas 
and their operations are funded by the municipalities. The ministry budget for the rescue 
services is rather limited considering the huge task of preventing fires and saving people 
from fires. This, and other ambiguities have led to dissatisfaction toward the performance 
management model. The Ministry of the Interior and the Department for Rescue Services 
has determined that they cannot fulfill the management model. The rescue services have 
solved the problem by announcing that they guide and steer their administrative branch 
in cooperation with the Regional State Administrative Agencies through information 
control (Rescue Services in Finland, 2012). 
Controlling is one part of public politics that helps to guide and steer the public 
administration after a democratically made policy decision. The information control is 
not binding and the subject of the control has the freedom to decide not to do anything as 
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a consequence of that control, or end up with another solution than the one the controller 
was hoping for. Even in this case, the control had behavioral effects. 
For example, the rescue service areas (municipalities) can follow the definitions of the 
central administration or decide not to follow the definitions. The indirect consequence of 
the information control exists, however, if the rescue service areas (municipalities) identify 
the problem or the subject of development (Stenvall & Syväjärvi, 2006, 17). According to 
Osborne and Gabler (1998), a state using information control is more effective than a state 
which widens its administration. Information control in this meaning does not refer to 
traditional bureaucracy but more to entrepreneurial administration (Törrönen, 2004, 17). 
However, one cannot totally resign from the management system of the state level 
government. The ministry has to plan for the most important goals of the administrative 
branch with indicators measuring these goals anyway. This is done through different 
instruments such as the multi-annual operating and financial plan (Budget Decree 10§). 
However, it could be done through some other procedure as well. 
Budget legislation defines that the performance accounting and management system 
has to report on the most important information on operational effectiveness and the vast 
societal effectiveness in the annual financial report (Budget Decree 63§). No matter what 
the management system were, obligations to plan and report on performance during each 
financial year would have to be fulfilled. 
Prime Minister Katainen’s government has introduced new measures for the 
Government Program monitoring, and has drawn up a strategic plan for the implementation 
of the Government Program on 5 October 2011. This implementation plan is a resolution 
focusing on the Government Program’s main objectives, preparation responsibilities, and 
key measures and projects, turning them into strategic, inter-sectoral, and comprehensive 
policies. The government has three priority areas: the reduction of poverty, inequality, and 
social exclusion; the consolidation of public finances; and the strengthening of sustainable 
economic growth, employment, and competitiveness. The government has identified the 
reform in local government structures, the social guarantee for young people, and the 
fight against the shadow economy as its key projects (Finnish Government, 2012).
All these priority areas include social effects, and especially social exclusion and 
strengthening sustainable economic growth can have effects on the development of fire 
deaths as well. A positive change in poverty, inequality, social exclusion, sustainable 
economic growth, and employment can have positive effects on the fire safety problem 
as well. However, these priority areas are not planned or implemented with the mutual 
support of different policies in coherence. 
The complete cycle of choice by March and Olsen (1976) offers a view of public 
decision making and management. Individual behavior (members of Parliament, public 
managers, citizens) is aggregated into collective, organizational actions and choices 
(Parliament, ministries, and agencies). The outside world responds to these choices in a 
way that affects individual assessments both in terms of the state of the world and of the 
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efficacy of the actions (Ministries, National Audit Office, public media). People move in 
and out of choice situations and involvement in a decision is not attractive for everyone 
in all relevant choice situations, all the time. Individuals also act in several arenas at the 
same time. In the case of fire deaths, the cognitions and preferences held by individuals 
(victims) affected their behavior. Their behavior and choice can affect cognitions and 
preferences of society, and society can learn and change the standards and cognitions of 
healthy living in a safe environment. Overall, their behavior and choice affects, in the end, 
the state of the world through the next generations.
In 1347 when Finland was part of Sweden, the jurisdictional districts were obliged to 
help victims of fire if the fire was not caused by a lack of care. All residents were obliged to 
carry out fire aid. Six assessors estimated the damage and if the damage was 20 marks, the 
whole jurisdictional district was obliged to employ fire aid. If the damage was 10 marks, 
the aid was divided in half for the district, and if it was five marks, the aid was given from 
the quarter of the district where the victim lived (Halonen & Nevanlinna, 1983, 11). This 
medieval joint responsibility system has been replaced by modern taxation and insurance 
systems in the present-day. However, the solidarity among the residents in neighboring 
areas should not be replaced. Even though one should not pay jointly for the damage 
caused by fires, no longer should one be jointly responsible for greeting the neighbors 
from time to time, and doing the most effective preventive fire safety work. 
8.5 Implications for further research
In the end of the study it is logical to discuss ideas and possibilities for further study. Fire 
safety policy and fire deaths offered an empirical case through which to analyze ambiguity 
of performance management. However, this is just one policy area and the same questions 
and phenomenon could be studied in other policies as well. There are possibilities for 
further study for example in social and healthcare policy, education policy and so on. 
In addition, public finance and public service production are facing challenges and 
there is a lot to be studied under these titles in the rescue services and other field of 
public service production in the future. The rescue services have organized functions and 
reallocate resources more effectively for the last decade. The municipal rescue services 
transformed from the municipal level to the regional level, but stayed in the sphere of 
responsibilities of the municipal self-government. 
Finnish municipalities are undergoing an extensive reform in the coming years. 
The local government reform and the New Municipality 2017 program support the 
development of new municipal structures. Municipal rescue services were organized 
in 22 rescue service regions in 2004. Kallio and Tolppi (2012, 126) have been studied 
this change before, in the middle and after seven years of the change. One of their latest 
research finding is that the rescue leaders examine the rescue operations, tasks and the 
level of service production as a coherent whole, not through administrative municipal 
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boundaries. According to them the available resources should be allocated according to 
the risks, not according to the municipal boundaries. Structural reforms like the new 
rescue service organization could be studied further while carrying through reforms such 
as the local government reform. 
In the times of scarce public finance economic aspects are important areas to study 
in the field of security and safety studies. Maximizing safety and minimizing economy 
at the same time are difficult questions. At what level of risks people are then willing to 
live with, in return for freedom to act as we please and in return for a lower level of public 
expenditures? These could be interesting areas to study further. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1. World fire statistics of 2004 (Source: 
Center of Fire Statistics, 2006)
Country Population Number of fire 
deaths
Average number of fire deaths
Per 100000 
inhabitants
Per 100 fires
Russia 144000 18377 12.8 7.9 
Estonia 1347 127 9.4 1.1
Latvia 2319 195 8.4 2.0
The Ukraine 47517 3784 8.0 7.9
Lithuania 3500 233 6.7 1.4
Moldova 4400 222 5.0 8.9
Mongolia 2650 57 2.2 2.6
Finland 5220 103 2.0 0.9
Hungary 10117 157 1.6 0.7
Bulgaria 7761 105 1.4 0.4
The USA 293655 3900 1.3 0.3
Poland 38175 486 1.3 0.3
Norway 4577 55 1.2 0.5
Slovakia 5200 45 0.9 0.4
Croatia 4437 39 0.9 0.6
Ireland 4044 35 0.9 0.1
France 61000 500 0.8 0.1
The UK 60000 508 0.8 0.1
Slovenia 2002 17 0.8 0.3
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Appendix 2. List of interviewees
Date Name Title Organization
30.3.2010 Heikki Joustie Director and Deputy Director 
General
Ministry of Finance/ Governance 
Policy and Public Services Unit
18.4.2005 Markku Huuki Senior specialist State Treasury/Administrative 
Management
20.4.2005
14.1.2008
Jukka Aalto Financial Director Ministry of the Interior
12.5.2005
6.4.2010
Matti Salminen Committee Counsel Ministry of Finance/ The Audit 
Committee/ Parliament
27.5.2005 Maileena Tervaportti Central Bookkeeping Manager State Treasury
17.1.2006 Antti Lehtonen Counselor Ministry of the Interior/ Internal 
Audit
30.5.2006 Jukka Wuolijoki Director general State Treasury
14.1.2008 Harri Martikainen Counselor Ministry of the Interior/ Strategic 
planning and reporting unit
14.1.2008 Kaija Uusisilta Head of Press and Communi-
cations Services
Ministry of the Interior/ Press and 
Communications Services
14.1.2008 Janne Kerkelä Director of Administration Ministry of the Interior/ Administra-
tion Unit
16.1.2008 Pentti Partanen Director-General Ministry of the Interior/ Department 
for Rescue Services
9.9.2009 Outi Mäkelä Member of  the Parliament Parliament of Finland
9.9.2009 Markku Haiko Senior advisor The Association of Finnish Local 
and Regional Authorities
9.3.2010 Tuomas Pöysti Director-General National Audit Office of Finland
25.3.2010 Matti Ahde Member of the Parliament and 
Chairman of the Audit Com-
mittee
Parliament
26.3.2010 Juhani Turunen Under-Secretary of State Ministry of Finance
29.3.2010 Soili Vasikainen Government financial controller Ministry of Finance
30.3.2010 Helena Tarkka Director Fiscal Management Unit/Ministry 
of Finance
6.4.2010 Mikko Kangaspunta Director State Treasury/Administrative 
Management
7.4.2010 Sirpa Kekkonen Counsellor Prime Minister’s Office/ Policy-
analysis Unit
8.4.2010 Silja Hiironniemi Director General Ministry of Finance
178
ANNIINA AUTERO
Appendix 3. List of authorities and bodies responsible 
for taking part in rescue operations and civil defense in 
Finland according to the Rescue Act (468/2003)
Emergency Response Centre Administration, 
Finnish Police, 
Border Guard, 
Finnish Defense Forces,
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 
National Public Health Institute, 
National Agency for Medicines, 
National Product Control Agency for Welfare and Health, 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, 
National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs, 
Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, 
Ministry of the Environment,
Finnish Environment Institute, 
Regional Environment Centers, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, State Enterprise For Forestry Metsähallitus,
Ministry of Transport and Communications,
Civil Aviation Administration, 
Finnish Meteorological Institute, 
Finnish Maritime Administration, 
Finnish Rail Administration,
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority,
Regional State Administrative Agencies.
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Appendix 4. Covering letter to the interviewees 
in the Ministry of the Interior in 2008
Dear representative of the Ministry of the Interior,
M. Adm. Sc Anniina Autero from the University of Tampere is writing her doctoral 
dissertation about the performance coherence in the Finnish public administration. The 
empirical research subject examines the branch of administration of the Ministry of the 
Interior.
The doctoral dissertation is partly written in a research project “Public Sector Efficiency 
as an Ambiguous Problem” funded by the Academy of Finland and led by the University 
of Tampere and Professor Jarmo Vakkuri. Professors Jarmo Vakkuri and Pertti Ahonen 
are the supervisors of this dissertation.
The research questions to be followed are from where do we know what public performance 
is (problem of search) and secondly how do we act relying on this information (problem 
of application)?
The first empirical part of this study is to analyze the documentary data including 
performance contracts in the Ministry of the Interior from 2001–2005. The second stage 
of the study includes the interviews with the head of the Ministry of the Interior.
The interviews are carried out by adapting thematic interviews. Interviewees will get the 
questions beforehand and the interviews will take about an hour. The interview times are 
set for January 2008.
Interviews form an elementary data element for this the study and will be supported with 
respect to developing public management in the future.
Additional information about the doctoral dissertation or about the interviews is available 
on request from anniina.autero@uta.fi.
M.Adm.Sc. Anniina Autero
Financial Management and Public Sector Accounting
Department of Economics
33014 University of Tampere
email: anniina.autero@uta.fi
